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The First Gulf war commenced, in effect, on 02 August 1990 with Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait and ended with its eviction on 28 February 1991.
The actual conflict witnessed the war being fought by Iraq against a
multinational coalition of 50 countries, which had 38 countries
contributing actively to war. This virtually one sided war was fought
in several dimensions, political, diplomatic, economic and finally
military with the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi forces. The combat
phase lasted 42 days including a 100 hours ground war. The operational
environment witnessed excellent co-ordination of multinational assets
by the coalition. Whereas Iraq had deployed its forces in static
defence of Kuwait and prepared for attrition warfare, the coalition
employed manoeuvre warfare and destroyed the Iraqis means of waging
the war as also their will, with overwhelming firepower and high
technology. The war became totally one sided and resulted in the
imposition of the UN sanctions - both economic and military, including
periodic inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the UN
teams.
Before an analysis of the second Gulf War is made, it is necessary to
recapitulate its geo-strategic environment. Iraq is strategically
located in the Middle East. It borders Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iran and
the Arabian Peninsula in the South. It is the gateway for the Central
Asian Republics and has the largest oil resources after Saudi Arabia.
Iraq had been involved with a war with Iran for eight years before
being engaged in the conflict with Kuwait which resulted in the First
Gulf War of 1991. Subsequent to that conflict, it had come under the
UN sanctions. It was also subject to active surveillance and to
selective Anglo-American bombing, thus crippling its economic and
military capabilities. At the time of the US led coalition war in
March 1993, it had been ruled by Saddam Hussain's Sunni dominated
Baath-Party, although it had a heterogeneous population of 55 per cent
Shias, 22 per cent Sunnis, 18 per cent Kurds and 5 per cent Turkman
and Assyrian Christians.
The political aim of the Second Gulf War in 2003 by the American led
coalition-forces was to wage a 'Pre-emptive War' to oust the Saddam
Hussein regime who allegedly supported terrorism, and possessed WMD,
and to establish a democratic set up in Iraq. The military
intervention in Iraq by the US Allies was, however, without the
sanction of the UN Security Council. There were widespread protests by
the international community and public criticism by France and Germany
against this overt unilateralism of the US. The war was, in every
respect, illegitimate as neither was there any evidence of WMD nor of
Al Qaeda linkages. As for the so called right of 'pre-emptive strike'
it can be resorted to only in Self Defence, for which also no
justification existed.
The military aims of the war were to ensure an early collapse of the
regime by securing the key towns of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul with
speed and the economic assets of oil wells, ports and air-heads.
The military strategy was to conduct joint military operations with
relentless offensive action for the capture of Baghdad, once the
battle field was sufficiently degraded. It consisted of the following
components:-
| (a) |
Crippling the fighting potential of the Iraqis by denial of
wherewithal through sanctions and by massive military build-up
on air, sea and land to break their will to fight. The isolation
of Iraq was achieved by an eight months long concentration of
forces. |
| (b) |
Destruction of Iraqi Military capabilities, command and
communication centres and leadership by application of the
strategy of "Shock and Awe" through air attacks, Precision
Guided Missiles (PGMs) and technology degradation. The US led
coalition launched 1200 air-sorties per day. They destroyed over
2500 tanks and other equipment by PGMs and smart bombs from 30
warships and air bases. |
| (c) |
Conducting Psychological operations by information warfare,
intelligence operations and exploiting ethnic diversities of the
population. The Kurdish population in the North was openly
supportive, the Shias in the South displayed a mixed response
with the Sunnis definitely hostile to the invasion. |
Analysis of the Second Gulf War
The US military operations achieved spectacular success, over running
the entire country within three weeks. Momentum of the operations were
maintained by developing strategies in depth, by exploiting speed and
mechanised forces, Special Forces operations and air power.
Independent logistics capabilities were provided by self containment,
aerial resupply and securing air heads. Such situations are not normal
and assymetrical war would exist only as exceptions, between
adversaries.
Collateral damage was minimized for the civil assets by avoiding
fighting in the urban centres by engineering surrenders and defection.
But the damage to the country's infrastructure was considerable,
particularly to power, oil and water supply, since it became difficult
to distinguish military targets from the civil targets in the capital
city of Baghdad and other major towns.
Air-Power and Air-Space Management. It is not only the control
of various platforms in the air, but also the tremendous clutter of
communication transmission that would call for strict control and
management. In the case of ground forces, the launch base was 200 Kms
south in Kuwait and air bases extending over considerable distances
from Europe to the Indian Ocean. In the first weeks of war, a dozen
opportunities to strike time-critical and high-value targets were
missed due to the wide sensor-shooter gap. This was markedly reduced
to just 12 minutes as the operation progressed, displaying substantive
strides in improved joint operations, inter-operability and seamless
data linking.
Civil Affairs. This is described as facilitating military
operations and consolidating operational activities by assisting
commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing or exploiting
relations between military forces and civil authorities, both
governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a
friendly, neutral manner in a hostile area of operation. Language and
culture training of target countries is essential. Cross-cultural
proclivities and sophistication can be developed by study of a target
country and living there for some time. Unless this is done, civil
affairs will not succeed. This is a Special Forces mission and
selected Units would have to train for it. The American forces did not
adequately plan this aspect well in Iraq. They firstly antagonised the
local population unlike the British forces who were friendlier and
polite. Secondly, rather than be the liberators of the oppressed
people, the Americans behaved like an "Occupation Force". Thirdly,
after disbanding the Government machinery i.e. the Army, the Police
and other agencies it should have been ensured that such steps do not
hurt the national pride of the Iraqi people.
Use of high technology. All weather continuous surveillance by
'Global Hawk' Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and aerial platforms,
satellite digital communication, PGM strikes, use of tank busters (40
bomblets) and use of smart bombs, both from air and warships achieved
total degradation of Iraqi war machine. Iraqi equipment was mostly of
pre-1991 vintage Soviet origin, which could not be up graded or even
maintained due to lack of spares and the imposition of UN sanctions.
It had few "Scud" missiles and AD guns which were no match for the
Allied air might.
Use of Special Forces. Special Forces were used effectively
before, during, and after the campaign both for the traditional roles
and for unconventional warfare. In addition to the unconventional
warfare, they were used for rapid transfer and management of human and
signals intelligence, and for directing air-strikes
Post conquest Issues. Western media had created an impression
that a military conquest of Iraq would not be difficult and that when
the Americans went in, the Iraqi people would greet them as
liberators. The obsession with the conquest was so paramount, that the
coalition forces did not take the necessary steps for preventing the
administrative collapse of Iraq or closing the porous borders with
Jordan, Syria and Iran to prevent escape of Saddam loyalists across
the borders. Similarly the damage to infrastructure was so total that
even the basic amenities like water and electricity supply became a
major problem.
The Current Iraq Situation
In military terms, the US started losing the upperhand in Iraq when
the Islamic fundamentalists and others opposing them started to fight
the coalition forces in Iraq where the coalition forces present over a
hundred thousand targets daily. Restricting themselves into
"fortresses" results in loss of freedom of manoeuvre, whereas sallying
out involves escorting by tanks gunship and helicopter guns ships.
Both the options require additional troops and resources, which would
imply nearly doubling the present force levels of 150,000 troops.
Every US soldier killed raises the morale of the Islamic
fundamentalists correspondingly reducing the morale of the US forces.
According to a reliable analyst, (Jeffiry D Sachs) America is paying
an astounding US $ 51 billion per year to station 1,40,000 troops in
the country. The US could save itself tens of billions of dollars per
year by withdrawing troops and instead allocate resources for
reconstruction of infrastructure and recovery of oil production. The
US seeks greater participation from friendly countries for additional
troops as well as funds but opposition from Jehadi Islamists and
absence of UN mandate are the restricting factors. The US has already
lost 2000 soldiers since last two years, whereas in Vietnam the total
US soldiers killed between 1962-63 were only 392. This is making the
war in Iraq highly unpopular in the US.
It would be reasobable to assume that the US is unlikely to stabilise
the situation without enhancing the force levels. A pull out would
result in loss of face and greater chaos. Placing the country under UN
Security Council control does not serve the long term US strategic
goals or provide control over oil. The US is left with no choice but
to continue 'occupation' for another three to five years and shape the
new Iraqi Government. The US is also simultaneously undertaking
back-channel contacts with the insurgents both amongst the Sunnis and
Shias, to break the insurgency.
Instability in Iraq suits the Sunni population, who dominate only 4
out of 18 districts. The Al Qaida supporters in the region, and the
Taliban in Afghanistan are growing stronger. Syria and Iran are
threatened by the Americans with possible air-strikes. The two US
allies - Saudi Arabia and Pakistan also have hardliners at the
grassroots who are supporters of fundamentalists, with the autocratic
governance at the top forced to coexist with the fundamentalists.
The Emerging Security Challenges in the Middle East
It appears that having temporarily pushed the Islamic fundamentalists
from Afghanistan, the Anglo-American intention to use Iraq as a launch
pad for further consolidation in the Middle East with Turkey, Israel,
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the outer flanks, has met a setback for
the present. American bases in the Central Asian Republics for
operations in the region have also become potential trouble spots as
both the local governments and the Russian and the Chinese have come
to suspect them of serving American interests.
After winning the war in both Afghanistan and Iraq and bringing down
the governments that were in power before the attacks, the resistance
of the local population has increased and Fidayeen attacks have taken
a heavy toll of both the coalition led forces and civilian
populations. One of the biggest problems that the US forces and their
allies face is the need for higher allocation of combat elements for
safeguarding the assets and bases of the occupying forces. It leaves
less effective combat strength for offensive operation whose reach and
periodicity is thereby reduced. The public opinion in America and in
the home countries of the coalition countries demands reduction and
early return of their soldiers, which has no prospect of immediate
relief in sight. The morale of the occupation forces would get
adversely affected due to prolonged deployment and the stress. This
would require shorter tenures and frequent relief and hence higher
allocation of troops,
The high tech advantage of the initial onslaught of shock and awe and
savage effects has died down. The local elements fighting the
Americans have found ways to effectively neutralize the high tech
advantage.
Urban Warfare-Future Trends. The Americans did not visualize the need
for sufficient ground forces and the power of the boot" in the urban
warfare in Iraq and they are not able to ensure effective security in
Iraq. William S Lind and others of the US Army, have written on the
Fourth Generation of Warfare where the battlefield is likely to
include the enemy's society and warfare will be widely dispersed and
the distinction between war and peace may vanish. The difference
between civilian and military may disappear, as there would be no
definable battlefields or fronts. Major military and civil facilities
will become targets. The characteristics of this type of warfare
combined with new technology would possibly be the outline of the
fourth generation of warfare. However, urban warfare involves people,
and unless deliberate attempts are made to win them over, nothing else
will succeed. It implies military dealing with non-state actors rather
than the conventional armed forces of a country, (such as the Jehadis)
with which they are not comfortable.
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Security Scene in the Iraqi Neighbourhood |
Post Conflict Peace Building
The political process in 'Iraq' has not proceeded as visualized and
the interim Government has taken a heavy beating. The Army and the
Police have not become fully professional, lacking leadership,
motivation and equipment. The new constitution that is being worked
out as the federal democratic set up has met with disagreement by the
'Sunnis' who do not want the federal structure, as it would involve
domination of Shias and the Kurds in respective majority areas,
leading to eventual separation and disintegration.
Balance of Power in the Region
Although, in general terms the war in Iraq has not altered the
security scene in the Middle-east dramatically, it has changed the
balance of power as under:-
| (a) |
The new Regime in Iraq will no
longer be a pro-Arab Sunni regime as the majority Shias, the
Kurds in the North of Iraq, and to a certain extent the Turkmans
will sit in a mixed government. A Shia Regime in Iraq is also
likely to develop closer relations with Iran, thus posing a
potential threat to the Saudis, the third major power in the
region. |
| (b) |
The US is now a power in the
region with its troops stationed in Iraq. This will make the
radical forces in Syria and Iran uncomfortable. |
| (c) |
The war has inflamed Arab anger
and encouraged radical elements as also anti-West resentment,
thereby creating a space for the Islamic radicals who subscribe
to fighting a Jehad against Western powers. Frequent suicide
attacks within Iraq and outside in the neighbouring region of
Israel and Jordan clearly demonstrate this trend. |
| (d) |
The traditional US-Turkey
cordial relations were also somewhat strained due to the denial
of bases to the US as also due to the rising aspirations of the
Kurds for autonomy. However, Turkey remains a strategically
located North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally both to
the US and the European Union (EU). |
US-Iran Relationship
Re-establishing security in Iraq would become the prime concern of the
international community to prevent its spill-over effect. As far as
Iran is concerned, it does not pose any credible threat to the US
notwithstanding the US branding it as part of the 'evil empire',
although in a decade or so it may pose some threat to US interests in
the region. It is unlikely to harbour any expansionist ambition.
However, Iran would need to be integrated into the world community in
return for its abjuring its nuclear ambition, by lifting all
restrictions and providing access to nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes.
The US-Arab Equation
Despite the rhetoric, the Syrian response to the Israeli air strikes
on Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was symbolic. Most
countries in the region are beholden to the US in one way or the
other. Egypt, the traditional leader in the Middle East has been
living on an annual American grant of US $ 2 billion since the Camp
David agreement. However, wide-spread suspicion remains among Muslims
that Iraq is only part of a wider American plan to subvert their
faith. Jordan, though one of the progressive states has hardcore
elements with Jehadi leanings who undertake terrorist activities in
Iraq with some of the underground groups.
Relationship with CAR countries
The US intrusion into the traditional Russian turf of Central Asian
Republics (CAR) worries Moscow more and more. What began as temporary
American Military presence in Central Asia endorsed by Russia to
facilitate the anti terror war in Afghanistan, far from winding up, is
expanding. In addition to air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the
US is helping Kazakhstan to set up a naval base on the Caspian Sea
close to the Russian border, besides seeking to lease three military
bases in Tajakistan. Russian President Putin has reportedly stated in
an interview to Al-Jazeera TV that "we are against the policy of
pre-emptive strikes without the UN approval. But if this practice
continues to be asserted in international relations, Russia retains
the right to act in the same way".
Conclusion
Two of the basic justification of the Second Gulf War i.e. that Iraq
had WMDs and that the Iraqi people (other than the Kurds) were eager
to be liberated have not been proved right. The situation on the
ground today for the common people is no better than during the Saddam
era, infected with a hurt national pride, and an ineffective
administration with a civil warlike situation.
The war has been won militarily but nearly lost politically. The war
on terrorism has got enlarged with more Bin Ladens in the making. The
Middle East appears to be heading for greater in-stability. American
stature has been reduced and the coalition forces have got involved in
a 'quagmire' from where there is no easy way out. American led forces
need wider allied support and a UN mediated authority to handle the
civil-war like situation in Iraq, whereas the US does not wish to hand
over the mandate to the UN as it wishes to be able to influence the
new government in Iraq for strategic interests. An early pull out
would result in loss of face which is not in the US interest. The
Americans are also attempting to split the insurgency by establishing
interest groups, not only with the Kurds, the Shias but even the
Sunnis. The new Iraqi Army, the Police and the Administrative
authorities are also being in- doctrinated with the US strategies.
However, there are others who feel that the war in Iraq will never be
won as there are no clear military targets and the political issues
are complex. People are getting disillusioned and a civil war like
situation is emerging.
In the final analysis, it is ironic that the strategy of pre-emption
adopted by the US has legitimised terrorism as a heroic fight for
justice. The war on terrorism has not only extended the reach of
terrorists but has even glamorised them. Hence what is needed is not
the American concept of pre-emption but genuine attempts to pre-empt
the causes of poverty, ignorance and negative religious indoctrination
that provides a continuous stream of recruits to Jehadi outfits.
There are signs now that the US is changing its foreign policy
orientation because of difficulties it is facing in establishing
democracy. It is advocating greater Middle East and South Asian
initiatives to encourage these countries to adopt democratic
institutions, economic reforms and ensure human rights. A closer
political and economic cooperation along with engagement and security
arrangement is being propagated. This would involve applying pressure
on Saudi Arabia to introduce democratic reforms and curb funding of
Jehadi terrorism. It would warrant to pressure Syria and Iran to deny
sanctuaries to the insurgents and on Pakistan to dismantle the
terrorist infrastructure and finally provide incentives to the CAR
countries for pursuing secular and democratic governance.
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