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The Background
In pursuance of the annual trilateral dialogue between United Service
Institution of India, Okazaki Institute of Japan and the Institute of
Taiwan Defence Strategic Studies, the third in the series of dialogues
on Regional Security was hosted in Tokyo on 26 and 27 January 2007 by
the Okazaki Institute of Japan.
The trilateral dialogue between the Institutions from the three
countries was initiated in 2005 to discuss issues of common security
concerns to ensure better understanding on shared perspectives. The
first trilateral meet was held at Taipei in July 2005, where the three
Institutes decided to discuss issues of regional security on a common
platform, on a regular basis. The second dialogue took place in Delhi
on 16 and 17 March 2006, with the same objective.
The Delegations
The Indian delegation was led by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar,
PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director USI; delegation members included Vice
Admiral Inderjit Bedi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd); Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak,
AVSM, VSM (Retd), Joint Director, Centre for Air Power Studies; and
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), Deputy Director (Research), USI-Centre
for Strategic Studies and Simulation. The delegation from the Okazaki
Institute, Japan was led by Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda (Retd),
Director; included Lieutenant General Masahiro Kunimi (Retd); Rear
Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, Vice Chairman of the Okazaki Institute; Dr
Hiroyasu Akutsu and Mr Akihisa Nagashima, former Defense Minister in
the Shadow Cabinet of JDP. The delegation from the Institute for
Taiwan Defence and Strategic Studies (ITDSS) and Taiwan Strategy
Research Association (TSRA) was led by Dr Parris Chang,
Representative, ITDSS; and comprised Dr Michael M Tsai, former Deputy
Defence Minister; Dr Ming-Shang Wong, Representative, TSRA and Chief
Secretariat of the dialogue; Mr Jiann Yan; Mr Lee Hsi-Min; Major
General (Ms) Huei-Jane Tschai. Also present was a special
representative from the USA, Rear Admiral Robert Chaplin (Retd),
former Commander of naval Forces in Japan.
The Deliberations
The main focus of this dialogue was to exchange views and ideas on
three important topics – "Assessing the Rise of China and its
Strategic Implications", "Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs)
from the Indian Ocean to Western Pacific" and the "Impact of Changing
Global Security Dynamics on Indian and Pacific Regional Security". The
leaders of the three delegations highlighted the importance of the
deliberations and exchange of ideas in a free and frank manner.
The leaders of the Japanese and Taiwanese delegations alluded to
changing security environment marked by the rise of China and its
growing political and economic salience. Their concern was that as the
Chinese economy grew, it would develop voracious appetite for raw
materials and energy resources. They also pointed out to China's
growing sphere of influence which included the increasing
Chinese-Russian rapprochement.
Concern was expressed about China's military modernisation and its
emergence as a strong economic power with growing leverages in the
international system. In the context of growing Chinese strategic foot
prints, fears were expressed with regard to domestic Chinese politics,
orientation of next generation Chinese leadership and competing
demands of socialism with market economy particularly in the context
of increasing socio-economic divide between coastal areas and the
hinterland.
The issue of maritime security was highlighted in the context of
growing energy demand in Asia, with particular reference to China,
India, Japan and South Korea. In this context, Chinese navy's inroads
into Indian Ocean was voiced as an aspect of concern. The Japanese
were particularly concerned about competing interests and talked about
building regional consensus on the use of oceans.
Rise of China and it's Strategic Implications
On the issue of China's rise and the manner in which China was
leveraging its economic and political power and its implications,
there was general consensus that a rising China posed a serious
challenge. This was premised on the fact that China was projecting
itself as a traditional power, that is a major player in Asia and the
world. The manner in which a strong and resurgent China leveraged its
power potential in the region was a matter of speculation in almost
all the presentations on the subject. The issue was accorded
importance in the backdrop of declining American power in Asia and the
fear that strategic space was being usurped by China through its soft
power approach based on economics, trade and political influence. This
was highlighted by detailed trend analysis on how China was
incrementally using its growing power potential for regional
ascendancy through aggressive moves in energy sector, growing military
power and a desire for creating "greater neighbouring region"
(euphemism for extended strategic neighbourhood that included West
Asia among others).
Increasing Chinese economic orbit wherein China has emerged as number
one trading partner of almost all the states in Asia; growing foreign
exchange reserves and consistently high performing economy were seen
as part of increasing Chinese leverages and unipolar propensities.
Another important trend highlighted was the recent Chinese stress on
multilateralism and use of regional instruments, be they security
oriented like the SCO, economic like the East Asia Summit or political
like the Six Party talks. Chinese growing inroads into South Asia and
its increasing focus on the Indian Ocean in terms of developing
maritime oriented partnerships with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and
littorals like Maldives were also focus of discussion. Attempts to
create strategic land bridges to address the Malacca Straits dilemma
as also to break the isolation of China's western areas notably
Xingjian and Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) were seen as matters of
concern. Interestingly, while there was much speculation and concern
about the rise of China, there was no consensus whether it constituted
an opportunity or a challenge. Dominant perception among the Taiwanese
and Japanese scholars was that a unipolar China posed a challenge and
needed to be met through so-called coalitions of democracies and a
nuanced military build up within the overall American security
umbrella.
Chinese attempts at development of naval power, militarisation of
space and its voracious appetite for strategic raw materials were
sited as particularly destabilising. Another issue of focus was that
an unbridled China could become a major force beyond 2020, within the
perspective of declining American power. Consequently, unless adequate
containment strategies were developed, Asia could see the emergence of
a more assertive China in a unipolar Asia. This had to be dealt
through dissuasive military power and garnering coalition of the
willing, based on collusion of democracies, comprising Japan,
Australia, Taiwan with the possibility of including India, Vietnam and
South Korea.
Building inclusive multilateral relationships and working together
with all regional players towards common agenda was a priority from
the Indian perspective. In contrast to the views of Japanese and
Taiwanese, the Indian position was consistent with the stated stand
that while India remained wary of Chinese increasing influence, it was
important to engage China and develop mutual dependencies to prevent
hegemonic propensities. It was highlighted in clear terms that India
was not in the game of joining any coalitions or anti China
strategies.
India's focus remained on growing trade and economic linkages to
enhance political and strategic influence of India – a model similar
to that of China's peaceful development. India's strategic thrust is
underscored by sustained economic growth and trade relations to propel
India to a similar position; basic premise being that an economically
strong India would be a strategically strong India. It was further
stressed that the main question was whether these developments mean
peace and stability, or bring about a new set of dependencies.
Question is not so much about containment or confrontation but of the
ability to make balanced choices based on national interests. An
economically, politically and militarily strong India, it was
highlighted, could make the difference. To this end, India believed in
engagement through employing soft power-rather than confrontation.
Indian delegates also highlighted that China would be operating sub
optimally to its potential; biding time for economic, social and
military consolidation. This was likely to change in the medium term
ie beyond 2015, by when China could emerge as the most dominant Asian
power with greater assertive connotations in pursuance of its national
interests. This period will be marked by the glow of confidence, post
successful conduct of Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo. By 2025, it
was opined, that China would be well on its way to becoming an
important player on the world stage, having developed its
comprehensive national power including a modernised PLA. The factors
that could derail China from its growth trajectory included
dissensions leading to disunity, within the next generation
leadership, on how to manage rising China, liberal socialism allowing
market forces to operate freely or command economy with structured
freedom, to enhance trickle down effect and address the growing youth
bulge. Second issue of concern was the growing gap between the rich
and the poor, coastal areas and hinterland, rising corruption, and
land reforms, which could lead to uprising among the masses. The third
was the impact of environmental degradation, global warming,
ecological challenges as also, shortages of raw materials and
resources, particularly in the energy sector.
The Japanese delegates speculated that China was likely to exhibit
bare knuckled resource diplomacy in order to maintain momentum of
economic reforms. Secondly, Chinese military modernisation was likely
to continue apace with PLA incrementally becoming a modernised net
centric force with increasing effect based capability. Japanese were
concerned about the stability of the Chinese economy. They looked upon
it as a bubble economy driven by foreign capital investments. They
highlighted the inherent instability of the model particularly, as
capital has the habit of up-sticking and going to more lucrative
destinations, which in the case of Asia could be India, Vietnam,
unified Koreas among others. Such an unstable economy was vulnerable
to internal and external shocks. In the Japanese perspective, an
economic decline of China would have global impact with much stronger
shock waves in Asia. It was necessary to hedge against such a
possibility. Last, but not the least, they highlighted that
unification of Taiwan would remain an important part of the future
Chinese strategy.
Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) through Indian Ocean
to Western Pacific
In the backdrop of rapidly growing energy and resource consumption,
population, and global environment effects, this session focussed on
oceans becoming intricate tangles of national interests, focussing on
the need for regional maritime security cooperation based on
multilateral agreements.
Within the construct of this session, the issue of building
cooperative security architecture of democracies in Asia Pacific
region repeatedly came up for discussion. This was emphasised by Mr
Nagashima, Member Japanese Diet and Shadow Defence Minister who
proposed establishment of 'Rimland Maritime Cooperation’. In his
perception, Rimland referred to littoral states that surrounded "the
Heartland", comprising essentially China and Russia. He underscored
the need for creating a cooperative architecture of maritime nations
of East and South East Asia including India, based on shared
democratic principles and dependence on maritime trade, as the means
of influencing the Heartland. Similarly, during the deliberations,
alliance of democracies based on shared ideals of freedom,
transparency, respect for human rights etc was repeatedly brought to
the table by both the Japanese and Taiwanese delegates. The logic of
such proposals appeared to be based on the following:
| (a) |
Contain growing Chinese economic and
political influence in Asia-Pacific and their appropriation of
strategic space in Asia, through alliances or cooperative
arrangements of nations sharing democratic ideals.
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| (b) |
Echoing sentiments of American strategy of
creating alternative security architecture in East and South
East Asia to contain rising Chinese influence through "Coalition
of Democracies". |
Another aspect repeatedly stressed was the importance of Taiwan not
only for the security in East Asia but also in containment of Chinese
hegemonic aspirations. It was pointed out that Taiwan was not only
part of central architecture of containing Chinese naval power
projection ambitions beyond the First Island Chain, but also a
strategic SLOC through which nearly 70 per cent of Chinese maritime
trade passed. Thus, dominance of Taiwan Strait formed an important
part of the overall Taiwanese coalition design for restraining Chinese
influence. This was further underscored by the fact that recently
Taiwanese have upgraded their deployment on an Island in South China
Sea called 'Taiping' that is part of the Paracel Island chain, in
terms of building an airbase and deploying naval marines replacing the
existing Coast Guard contingent.
Despite apparent strategic overstretch being experienced by the
Americans in terms of involvement in West Asia and Afghanistan, both
the Japanese and Taiwanese lay great stress on the US Asia-Pacific
commitments. However, such optimism was underscored by the fact that
increasingly American commitment is being seen in diplomatic rather
than hard core security terms ie America is not seen as a power that
will raise the ante in East Asia, should "push come to shove". Both
appeared to be using the USA more as part of hedging strategies
wherein; it was important to remain engaged than looking upon the US
as a serious guarantor of security.
Seen in the above context, Japan appears to be groping for a strategic
role in Asia commensurate with its economic and latent power
potential. An impression gained was that the Japanese community were
now seriously looking towards India as a possible strategic partner in
realising this goal. It was, however, clarified that this is not so
much as part of China containment strategy but reflection of balance
of power perceptions that continue to pervade the thinking of the
regional players in East Asia. Simply put, Japan wants to be a
reckonable player in Asia rather than simply being seen as a rich
donor with little or no strategic clout. These are ominous
developments, whose shaping is likely to cause consternation in the
existing balance of power; an aspect which India will need to focus in
its own strategic calculations.
In so far as Taiwan is concerned, it appears to have reconciled to the
prevailing status quo in the belief that at least in the short to
medium terms American regional strategic interests will prevent any
change in the situation. Notwithstanding the above, the current Chen
Shui-Bian regime is attempting to upgrade overall defence posture
ahead of 2008 general elections wherein, pro mainland KMT party that
eschews open confrontation with China is expected to fare much better.
Taiwan is planning to increase its defence spending from current 2.5
per cent of GDP (approximately) to three per cent including, induction
of eight additional submarines.
In context of the prevailing geo-strategic scenario and its future
contours, Taiwan is keen for closer partnership with India under the
overall rubric of common democratic values and shared interests.
Within the above construct, it was nuanced that China's rise could
pose a serious challenge to India, if the power gap between the two
was to increase or become unbridgeable. The central theme was that all
nations who are potential competitors in Chinese hegemonic designs
should come together to fight a common challenge.
It was apparent that broader strategic thinking of both Japan and
Taiwan is driven by balance of power relations vis-a-vis China backed
by salience of the US alliance in containing China's growing
geo-economic influence. Attempt is to carve out an alternative
architecture to support SE Asian countries as part of their hedging
strategies. Towards this end they are focusing on common concerns,
like security of SLOC, shared maritime interests, the growing
influence of their diaspora, shared perceptions on Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) and of course economic issues. Within the above
thinking, an economically resurgent India with growing markets and
trade is looked upon as a befitting partner in both strategic and
economic terms.
India is being looked upon as a country maximising strategic options
in the obtaining regional and geo strategic environment. Growing
Indo-US strategic partnership further strengthens this perspective.
Although repeatedly clarified by the Indian delegation that India is
unlikely to countenance being partner in any strategic coalition or
alliance, howsoever laudable the objective, it appears that efforts to
draft India as a partner or supporter of such a framework are likely
to continue. Although not specifically stated during the dialogue,
such an effort is likely to be subsumed in the wider perspective of
our 'Look East' policy along with membership of major economic
groupings like Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or ASEAN + 3
(China, Japan and South Korea) as possible inducement.
Changing Global Security Dynamics: Impact on Indian and Pacific
Regional Security
The issues raised and discussed in this session were–global power
shift, emerging polycentric order, and implications of polarisation on
security and how strengthened multilateralism (including a reformed UN
and restructured Security Council) and cooperative security
institutions were a pressing need. Concepts like mutual and equal
security, peaceful resolution of disputes and adoption of less
threatening defence postures were underscored. Expectedly, some
Japanese and Taiwanese scholars persisted with the refrain of threats
posed by accelerating rise of China and the resurgence of Russia and
how the China-Russia nexus through or outside the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) constitutes a threat to the US-led alliance in East
Asia. The counterview projected was that Russia's resurgence was
inevitable, as it was sought to be treated in the post Cold War period
like Germany after Versailles; while the eastward expansion of NATO
only served to exacerbate Russia's concerns. Whether such resurgence
could spark conflicts remained a questionable proposition, was
highlighted by the Indian delegation.
The North Korean nuclear tests and the six-party talks featured in the
discussions. North Korea's apparent success in weakening deterrence in
East Asia and leveraging nuclear weapons as tools for furthering its
geo-political game plan of ending isolation and safeguarding regime
security served to dispel possibilities of its comprehensive de-nuclearisation.
While this poses a huge challenge to Japan and Taiwan, it was pointed
out that Russia, South Korea and China may not be too unhappy with the
developments in North Korea. (The ramifications of the North Korean
agreement after our visit are yet to unfold in their entirety).
China's apparently successful anti-satellite weapon test in space, in
the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis, figured in the
discussion. The test, timed soon after the East Asian summit, was
perceived as yet another signal of China's determination to be a
global power that does not lag behind the US and Russia in the
capability to weaponise space. Significantly, there were reports that
in the latter part of 2007, China would launch a joint Asia-Pacific
Space Project for cooperation in research, manufacture and application
of small multi-mission satellite capabilities with Islamic countries.
Pakistan and Bangladesh, as also South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand,
Indonesia and Turkey are envisaged to be incorporated into this
project subsequently.
Economically Resurgent Russia. An interesting aspect of the
dialogue was the discussion on the rise of Russia and its impact on
the security environment in Asia. The following points
emerged :-
| (a) |
Japanese were particularly concerned with
emergence of strong Russia and growth of its energy potential.
This was underscored by the growing importance of Sino-Russian
relations that are assuming increasing strategic contours.
Growing cooperation was seen as undermining Japanese interests
particularly; the manner in which Japan has been done out of its
stakes in Sakhalin I, where it had invested huge sums.
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| (b) |
The issue of absence of basic human rights in
Russia and autocratic tendencies also came up for discussion. A
pointed issue raised with the Indian delegation was on how India
would deal with an increasingly authoritarian Russian regime.
Traditional Indian ties with Russia were highlighted,
particularly the fact that Russia had stood by India through the
troubled period of the Cold War. To date, it remained crucial to
India's growing energy, technological and armament needs. On the
issue of dealing with authoritarian regimes, it was pointed out
that given the record of the Western world and the countries
like Japan condoning the overthrow of democratic regimes in
countries such as Pakistan, there was little need for India to
be apologetic about the manner in which it deals with Russia. It
was highlighted that it was more important to engage, rather
than adopt a confrontational approach. |
Other Important Issues
Some other important issues that emerged in the deliberations were:-
| (a) |
Strategically, the global balance of power
would entail accommodation of competitive and contradictory
trends of an asymmetric hexagon, the USA, Russia and the EU in
Europe, and India, Japan and China in Asia. In the emergence of
a multipolar global order, the way the Six manage international
peace and security would constitute the key to stability in the
international system.
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| (b) |
Primary drivers for an India–Japan
cooperation in maritime security and criticality of SLOC were –
dependence of Japan an island-state having to import nearly all
its food and energy supplies; and in the case of India, land
route feasibility was precluded by geo-physical topography or
Pakistan. India's growing interest in security of far flung
SLOCs made for upgradation of force levels to acquire a blue
water capability and acquisition of oceanic power.
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| (c) |
There is intense speculation in Japan on its
future security orientation; particularly, in the context of
growing geopolitical and geo economic significance of China and
challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea. While elements from
liberal political establishment like Shigeru Ishiba, former
Defence Minister and Nagashima, Member of the House of
Representatives of Japan would like a more independent security
role in consonance with their national interests there are those
who believe that having invested so heavily in treaty
obligations and payment for American troops on the Japanese
soil, the USA must continue to underwrite its security.
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| (d) |
Alternative view, however, was that America
chastened by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, will not have
the stomach to get involved in a future crisis in the region or
raise the ante, should such a need arise. Consequently, it was
important for Japanese to look at their self defence.
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| (e) |
On Japan becoming a nuclear power, an
impression gained was that while Japanese continued to be
pacifist in their approach and depended upon American umbrella,
they have seriously begun to debate the relevance of nuclear
weapons and their practicality in the changing security
environment. This is not to suggest changes in the Japanese
mindset but to highlight the impact of developments in north
Korea on the Japanese psyche. |
Conclusion
The dialogue was marked by free and frank exchange of views. An
impression gained was that East Asian security dynamics was
increasingly getting impacted by the rise of China and its increasing
geo-strategic imprints. Tendency to build politico-military influences
based on coalition of interests as part of containment strategy were
discernable. Similar fears about rise of Russia were also expressed.
What appeared to concern regional powers, was the profound impact of
these developments on their security; particularly, in the context of
the US involvement in West Asia and Afghanistan and its consequent
effect on the balance of power in Asia.
The dialogue concluded with drawing up of a road map for future
dealings, including research in areas of global and regional concern,
particularly in the context of increasing globalisation and
information revolution.
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