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Build up on 13 and 14 July 2000 (D minus 2 - D Minus 1)
Build up was successfully completed on 13-14 July, using UN contracted
and Indian aviation unit helicopters. Artillery ammunition was
initially dumped at Kenema using the available road as much as
possible and was, thereafter, heli-lifted to Daru. In order to
maintain secrecy and surprise, troops were moved at the last moment
from Freetown to Kenema by air using C-130 Hercules and all available
helicopters. Move from Kenema to Daru was also done at the last moment
by helicopters. See Sketch P.
Operations on 15 July 2000 (D Day)
the two Chinooks, which had the ability to operate in bad weather,
carried out their task of inserting the pivot at Kenewa and,
thereafter, evacuating military observers, sick peacekeepers and
essential warlike stores, as planned. the strikes planned by attack
helicopters were slightly delayed due to bad weather. This was
followed by a pre-emptive strike by attack helicopters and artillery
at Kailahun, Pendembu, Mobal and Kotuma. After this, the advance was
commenced by 5/8 GR and the mechanised company from Daru on schedule.
At around 0800 hrs helicopters of the IAF landed one company sized
pivot ex 18 GRENADIERS at Geihun. Simultaneously, another company
sized pivot of the quick reaction company (QRC) was landed by them in
the 3 Bridges Area. Around this time, the Kailahun column broke out
from its location and linked up with the pivot of 2 PARA (SF) at
Kenewa. Subsequently, by 1100h they linked up with the 18 GRENADIERS
pivot at Geihun. An impromptu air head was established here and 65
personnel were heli lifted out to Daru. Further link up was delayed
due to cratering of road between Geihun and Pendembu by the RUF and
stiff opposition by them enroute to Pendembu and at Pendembu itself.
To facilitate the link up, I ordered heli dropping of bridging
equipment (FOB) in the affected areas North of Pendembu. This helped
the Kailahun column to get their vehicles, laden with warlike stores,
across these obstacles. From the south, 18 GRENADIERS cleared Kotuma,
Kuiva and Mobai by 1300h. However, 5/8 GR advance did not progress as
per schedule due to stiff opposition by the rebels. They could
eventually clear Pendembu after heavy fighting only by 1900h D Day.
Link up was established with the Kailahun column North of Pendembu, by
1930h. Due to the delay in the establishment of the airhead at
Pendembu and due to the fact that the Russian owned MI 26 helicopters
returned to their base at Freetown by noon the same day, the planned
heli lifting was postponed to 16 July 2000. Due to lack of opposition
from the rebels, the Ghanaians were able to advance and secure Bendu
Junction by 1300h D day. As planned, it resulted in keeping the RUF
theatre reserves tied down.
Operations on 16 July 2000 (D Plus 1)
The major operation conducted on D Plus 1 was the air evacuation of
316 personnel from the airhead at Pendembu. Despite problems of
refuelling, this was achieved by the Indian Aviation helicopters in a
record time of three hours by resorting to "hot- refuelling", an
activity never attempted by them before. Tactical withdrawal was,
thereafter, conducted by 5/8 GR from Pendembu to Daru. This was met by
stiff opposition from RUF who resorted to road denial and ambushes.
One of the RUF ambushes was successful at a place 4 kms North of Kuiva
when, at 1330h, the rebels shot at a vehicle of ours using RPG
missiles. In this attack one driver and a co-driver were seriously
wounded. Although, they were evacuated immediately by air to Daru and
treated by the mobile surgical team, one of them, Havildar Krishan
Kumar of 14 Mechanised Infantry, succumbed to his injuries.
18 GRENADIERS and 5/8 GR groups including the composite battery and
vehicle column ex Kailahun reached Daru by 1900h. At about the same
time, the Ghanaian companies also returned to Kenema and the operation
was completed successfully.
Fortunately, at that point of time, a TV team from India was visiting
Sierra Leone. They captured first hand some of the action during 'Op
Khukri' and this has been made into a film called "Operation Khukri".
It is a film worth seeing.
Terrain
The biggest problem in the conduct of operations was the terrain, as
the single road axis available between Daru and Kailahun forced
extrication along the same axis thereby compromising surprise. lack of
local knowledge of terrain vis a vis the rebels, put us at a
disadvantage. Due to dense overgrowth and undergrowth, attack
helicopters had problems of target identification. The densely wooded
country allowed the rebels to effectively snipe at our road columns.
Intelligence
Lack of real time intelligence was due to organisational constraints
of the UN which does not cater to gathering intelligence in a host
country. We could obtain hard intelligence of limited value through
intercepts during the operation itself. Coupled with this was the fact
that ELINT and HUMINT capabilities were non existent. Despite being in
Kailahun for 75 days, the satellite imagery of the areas was not made
available.
The exact location of their reserves was also not known. Nor, did we
have any knowledge of the type and quantity of weapons and ammunition
that they possessed. It was subsequently revealed that they had a
substantial amount of warlike stores and equipment with them. Another
advantage that the rebels had, of which we were not aware, was their
good radio communications, which enabled them to use their reserves
effectively.
Weather
As the operations were launched in the middle of the rainy season, it
impacted adversely on own observation, mobility and added to the
logistic difficulties. Further, bad weather seriously hampered strikes
by own attack helicopters at first light on D Day. Insertion of troops
by helicopters to their locations as pivots was delayed due to bad
weather. High humidity during the day led to severe exhaustion of
troops due to dehydration.
Paucity of Troops
The operation had to be phased due to paucity of troops and
helicopters for establishing pivots along the road. All troops of Daru
garrison were launched for the operation at the cost of denuding Daru
defences. Elements of Nigerian battalion, untried and untested by me
and own Engineers were, thus, employed to man these defences.
Collateral Damage
To avoid collateral damage, artillery was initially tasked to fire
smoke shells a little off the target to enable civilians to escape.
All efforts were made to target only known confirmed RUF held
buildings and huts and to avoid collateral damage.
Artillery.
It was probably for the first time that 105mm Light Field Guns (LFG)
were used in any UN mission. The difficulties faced in the employment
of artillery were as under :-
| (a) |
A battery, which is designed to fire as a
single entity from one location, was required to be divided into
four segments, each firing from a different location. The
authorisation of fire control equipment and technical
instruments in a battery was a major problem in this regard.
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| (b) |
Prime movers for guns were not available in the
operational area and, therefore, 2.5 ton vehicles had to be
modified to serve as towers.
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| (c) |
The desired speed of operations necessitated
speedy movement of guns by keeping one or two guns within the
battery on ground to cover the move of advancing infantry.
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| (d) |
Limited available artillery resources were used
to cover a very large number of targets spread in all
directions, over large distances, in order to achieve deception
and surprise.
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| (e) |
The problem of communication and observation in
undertaking shoots in jungle terrain was partially overcome by
employing Air OP. |
Air
Air effort was a very complicated part of the operation as it entailed
coordinating the efforts of the British Chinook helicopters, the
helicopters of the Indian Aviation unit and the helicopters of the
Russians who were flying as per their own rules. To highlight this
further, the initial plan was to strike at the rebels at Pendembu and
Kailahun with the attack helicopters and, thereafter, use the Chinooks
to land 2 PARA (SF) as pivots after which they were to land at
Kailahun to pick up Military Observers (Milobs), unfit peacekeepers
and warlike stores. This plan had to be modified due to the reluctance
on the part of the British to fly after the surprise was given away.
As Indian attack helicopters did not have night flying capabilities, I
had to accede to this change of plan. Further, the Chinooks who were
to do additional sorties after the initial insertion of pivots and
evacuation of Milobs and others, chose not do so and flew off to
Freetown leaving us in the lurch.
The Russians, on the other hand, did not wait for the link up to take
place on D Day but flew back to Freetown around noon. This foreclosed
my option of completing the operation in one day. Additionally, the
lack of flying in all weather conditions, except for the Chinooks, was
a problem for the other helicopters; thus delaying operations.
Refuelling of helicopters was also a problem as facilities for the
same did not exist at Daru.
Other problems pertaining to air operations were as given below:-
| (a) |
UN helicopters lack all weather capability,
which is so essential for such operations undertaken during the
monsoons and bad weather.
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| (b) |
Operational area being covered by thick jungles
offered limited landing zones to insert and extricate troops.
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| (c) |
Secure radio communication with the ground
forces elements was lacking.
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| (d) |
Due to the non-availability of fuel pumps at
Daru and Kenema, fuel bowsers had to be transported between
Hustings and Kenema/ Daru by using MI 26 helicopters.
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| (e) |
Lack of armour plating and integral self-defence
measures on MI-8 made the helicopters extremely vulnerable to
ground fire by the rebels. The terrain which is highly
undulating with wide spread hillocks all around posed major
problems for Nape of the Earth (NOE) flying. Terrain following
radars and ground proximity warning systems would have been of
great assistance in these kinds of operations.
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| (f) |
At any given time, there were more than eight
helicopters operating from a makeshift helipad measuring 300m x
100m at Daru making the helipad space extremely restricted.
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| (g) |
Air space management with 12 helicopters
operating in a very restricted area in adverse weather
conditions was extremely difficult.
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| (h) |
Only the Special Forces team possessed gloves
for slithering. This restricted the options for troop insertion
in the area where no landing sites were available. Under
slinging of loads could not be carried due to absence of slings.
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| (i) |
The civil contracted MI 26/17/8s restricted
their employment to specific areas and specific situations at
the discretion of their crew. This aspect severely affected the
extrication of foot columns by air from Pendembu. |
Logistics
One of the biggest problems was providing logistics support for this
operation. To put it mildly, it was a nightmare. This was mainly
because of the paucity of resources, made worse by the secrecy which
had to be maintained to conceal buildups till the last moment, so that
the plan was not compromised. It took dedicated and professional staff
work to evolve the logistic plan to support Operation Khukri.
Engineers
Engineer effort was a major problem as the only axis along which the
operation was to be conducted was a predictable one and the RUF laid
ambushes on it and cratered it, necessitating air dropping of bridging
equipment i.e Flexible Duck Boards (FDBs) to assist the Kailahun
column in their rearward movement to Pendembu to effect a link up.
Special Forces Operations
In case Special Forces units are inducted into a hazardous UN mission
where it is envisaged that they would, in all probability, have to
conduct military operations, it is essential that they come well
equipped for the same including satellite based Personal Locating
Systems (PLS).
Media
The importance of media in the conduct of military operations cannot
be over emphasised. In Sierra Leone, the only effective media was the
BBC who made much of the so-called assistance provided by the British
to the UN forces, which, in fact, was restricted to making two
Chinooks available for one sortie. It is well known that the primary
aim of the British was evacuation of all the British nationals in
Sierra Leone and, during Operation Khukri, the British participated
with two Chinooks and a handful of SAS personnel, only because they
wanted to ensure the return of a British officer Major Andy Williams,
who was incarcerated along with 233 other peacekeepers at Kailahun. To
quote Michael Fleshman “The UK dispatched warships and a battalion of
elite paratroops to secure Freetown and the strategic international
airport. The UK action, taken to permit the evacuation of UK citizens
from Sierra Leone, is widely credited with stabilising the defence of
Freetown and buying time for the deployment of more and
better-equipped UNAMSIL contingents".
Selection and Maintenance of Aim
The aim of the operation was to safely extricate all the personnel,
vehicles and military hardware from Kailahun with minimum collateral
damage and without violation of Human Rights. This was achieved
successfully.
Maintenance of Momentum
Due to extremely poor conditions of road and its cratering by the
rebels, mobility of our troops was enhanced by using bridging
equipment such as FDBs, which were dropped at these locations by MI-8
helicopters.
Momentum was maintained by the speed of induction and near
simultaneity of contact at Kailahun, Geihun, 3 Bridges Area and by the
ground forces at Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai. Innovative use of air,
artillery and speed of movement by 2 PARA (SF) and foot columns threw
the RUF out of gear.
Tactical Surprise
At the macro level, one of the major achievements was being able to
maintain tactical surprise by resorting to secrecy in planning and
build-up, simultaneity and speed of the operations, bold execution and
imaginative use of bad weather. All these factors and more,
contributed towards this achievement.
Flexibility
Contingency planning was done in a detailed manner to cater for
interruptions due to weather, terrain and lack of intelligence and air
resources. Plans were continuously modified with the changing
operational scenario.
Planning and Preparation
Planning for extrication of the troops at Kailahun was being done from
mid May 2000. The British were involved at the last moment on a need
to know basis, due to their interest in the British Milobs. The same
was the case for the Ghanaian and Nigerians who participated in this
operation. Planning, preparations and rehearsals were carried out
secretly, concurrently and in a coordinated manner.
Functioning under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
Traditionally, the UN forces do not conduct bold and audacious
military operations. There is, therefore, a marked hesitation to use
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was evident, time and
again, since the evolution of UNAMSIL, when rebels got the better of
peacekeepers of many nationalities forming part of UNAMSIL.
Participation in 'Operation Khukri' resulted in a credible
psychological change of the commanders and the troops involved in the
operation who switched over from traditional peacekeeping to the more
robust peace enforcement role under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Use of Mechanised Infantry and Engineers in Infantry Role
Mechanised Infantry and Engineers from the Indian Contingent were
utilised in infantry role to make up the shortfall of infantry
manpower. They performed this role superbly.
Casualties
Despite constraints of terrain and bad weather, stiff opposition from
highly motivated, determined, well equipped and well led rebels, the
casualties to own troops in two days of intense operations were
minimal. Only one soldier was killed and seven wounded. As against
this, the rebel casualties were 34 killed and 150 wounded.
Recovery of Rebels Arms and Ammunition.
This operation yielded a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition
which was a major loss for the rebels. As per records, as many as one
SAM-7 launcher, 4 x RPG launchers, 12 x AK 47/56 rifles, 6 x GPMGs, 3
x HMGs and a whole lot of ammunition including anti-personnel mines
were recovered from the rebels. This broke their back militarily as
all this was acquired by them over a long period of time. The strike
in their heartland also had a highly demoralising effect on them.
Unorthodox Use of Single Guns and Attack Helicopters
Due to paucity of equipment, we resorted to the unorthodox use of
single guns and attack helicopters to provide rear and flank
protection to our columns. This paid rich dividends.
Heli - landing In Virgin Territory and Hot Refuelling
The heli-landing of pivots in virgin territory in small clearings,
without the benefit of any reconnaissance was another major
achievement. Also, hot refuelling (refuelling without switching off
the engine) by helicopters was resorted to for the first time
successfully.
Coordinated Multinational Operations
It is preferable that all offensive operations in the UN environment
are conducted jointly by participation of two or more troop
contributing countries. Such operations then have greater
international acceptance. Dissemination of plans should be done on a
need to know basis in order to avoid loss of surprise.
Despite differences in training, equipment, leadership and motivation,
good coordination was achieved between troops of different
nationalities, and between various arms and services.
Jointmanship
A high standard of jointmanship between ground forces, aviation units,
UN helicopter units and the civilian staff at the mounting bases was
one of the major contributing factors towards success of this
operation.
Use of Helicopters
In the terrain as obtaining in the Area of Operations (AOR),
helicopters are a key asset for achieving speed of operations,
contributing to flexibility of plans and medical evacuation. There is
a need to maintain one company heli-lift with night capability at all
times.
Communications
Fast moving operations involving different contingents require use of
a large variety of communication equipment. A pool of radio sets would
have greatly assisted in the execution of the operations. It would
also have ensured compatibility of equipment. Despite these problems,
we succeeded in keeping contact with each other.
Administration and Logistic
The Chief Administrative Officer's Office is required to provide
logistics support by way of water and Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) etc.
Units operating on wet lease system, however; run into problems in
case their equipment is out of action. There is, therefore, a
requirement to institute procedures in such special circumstances for
the repair and replacement of such equipment. Similarly, the UN
aircraft should have an inbuilt clause in the contract for operating
in the AOR in case of such operations. In the instant case, the UN
hired aircraft having assured me of their arrival back to the area of
operation on 16 July at 0800 hrs, failed to report till 1100 hrs
pleading that they needed rest on account of the work done on 15 July
2000. Despite these logistic constraints, the operations were
conducted smoothly.
Operation Khukri established the professional competence of the Indian
Army and the Air Force internationally. The other spin offs were, it
broke the myth of RUF supremacy and brought them to the negotiating
table. It enhanced the prestige of UNAMSIL internationally. It also
resulted in improvement in response to orders, brought in cohesiveness
in the Force and bolstered the morale of the civil population.
Finally, it has also paved the way for further expansion of the
UNAMSIL Force.
On successful completion of ‘Operation Khukri', accolades poured in
from all over the world including from Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary
General UN, who in a letter addressed to me on 17 July 2000 stated, “I
should like to extend to you my gratitude and admiration for the
thoroughly professional manner in which you, your military staff and
the troops on the ground have planned and executed the extraction of
the surrounded peacekeepers at Kailahun. The fact that there were only
a few casualties on our side is a clear indication of the
determination of the force, as well as of its robustness in dealing
with any threats emanating from the RUF. I am particularly pleased
that this was a truly international operation with the participation
of troops from a number of countries, which all played an essential
and vital role in the operation".
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