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Apioneering paratrooper of the Indian Army and a soldier of great
distinction, Major General Sinha, in his eventful career of 40 years,
saw action in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, participated in the Goa
operations in 1961 and played a vital role in the administration of
post-liberation Bangladesh. In every rank, he was selected, not only
for command of fighting formations, but also to hold key staff
assignments. The General’s military virtues were matched in equal
measure by his intellectual acumen and the USI gained tremendously
from his lifetime association with this institution; especially his
long tenure as the Director. Today, I am here to deliver a talk on
India's Maritime Strategy as a part of the annual tribute that we pay
to this gallant and distinguished soldier.
In October 2006, the Indian Navy (IN) promulgated a document titled,
“Freedom of the Seas...India’s Maritime Strategy”. This was a
classified publication, to which the general public would have had no
access. However, since it was desirable that sections of society,
other than the defence community, should be familiar with the elements
of the maritime strategy, naval headquarters (Naval HQ) have decided
to issue an unclassified version. So now, both the Maritime Doctrine
and the Maritime Strategy will be available to those sections of the
civil society who have an interest in such arcane matters.
Not wishing to steal the thunder from Naval HQ, I have tried my best
to ensure that the talk which follows, while adhering to the spirit of
these documents, takes as little from them as possible. Therefore, as
they say in the title of any movie : "any similarities that you may
note are purely unintended and coincidental."
I would like to start by giving a perspective on the subject of
strategy, and why one is required at all. This aspect assumes more
importance today, because each Service has promulgated a Doctrine and
we also have a Joint Doctrine. Often the terms "doctrine" and
“strategy" get confused, or are even used inter-changeably. So I think
it will be useful, if I spend some time to provide a distinction
between the two.
Doctrine and Strategy : The Distinction
According to dictionary meaning, doctrine is simply "that which is
taught", and a NATO definition describes it as "the fundamental
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives.” It is also defined as a "framework of principles,
practices and procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis
for action." It is meant to be authoritative and yet requires judgment
in application. Doctrine is based on the enduring lessons of history
and experience, and the repeated success or failure of certain actions
over time, tends to elevate them to the level of axioms, which remain
relevant to the present and the future. On the other hand, a strategy
has to be essentially based on a threat. Without a coherent threat,
whether existing or projected in the future, there may not be a raison
d'etre for a strategy. As the threat alters its form and shape, the
strategy too, must keep evolving and changing in response.
Traditionally, strategy has been associated with the preparation and
waging of war. However, since the nature of conflict, the fabric of
society and our geo-political environment has undergone a change
post-world war II, the threat has assumed different proportions.
Strategy is now, more than merely a military concept since it
increasingly requires consideration of non-military matters, with
economic, political, sociological and environmental issues driving it
into the realm of state-craft. Strategy can, thus, be summed up as an
overall plan to go from the present situation to some desired goal in
the face of a threat, whether in peacetime or a conflict scenario. A
strategy will always be set in the context of a given
politico-military situation prevailing over a finite time-frame and
within the ambit of overall national aims. Doctrine, on the other
hand, is a body of thought and a knowledge base, which should underpin
the evolution of strategy. Without doctrine, strategists would have to
make decisions without points of reference or guidelines.
In this context, the US provides a useful illustration. In pursuit of
victory over Nazi Germany, it evolved a strategy for World War II
which-required it to strike a Faustian bargain with the Soviet Union
and make her an ally. No sooner had the war ended, that the US
launched a new strategy of "containment" to prevent a powerful USSR
from reshaping the post-war world order according to its own ideology.
The strategy to implement containment went through several iterations
because the threat from Communism kept changing in intensity and
geographical focus throughout the Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War brought with it, a complete change in the
threat scenario, and the Global War on Terrorism that followed a
decade later resulted in a flux in international affairs. All this has
caused the US Department of Defense and the US Navy to continuously
evolve new strategies and bring out vision documents at the rate of
one every 4-5 years.
Why a Maritime Strategy?
The well known defence analyst Edward Lutwak asks the question, "What
is a Navy in the absence of a strategy? It is, in effect a
priesthood." Because, without strategy to guide and inform naval
officers, he argues, it is all merely ritual and routine, gold braid
and glitter. In the mid-1980s, I recall reading with great
indignation, a statement by the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships in one
of his Forewords, which said something to this effect: "...the Indian
Navy is probably one of the few major navies which first acquires
hardware and then thinks about how to use it.” In retrospect, I can
understand the reason for such a statement, because at that juncture,
not only did the Navy lack a doctrine and strategy, but was truly a
"Cinderella" Service whose fortunes were hostage to the whims and
fancies of the annual budget.
A maritime strategy, however, does not concern naval officers alone,
and cannot be anything but a sub-set of national strategy. Every
nation must have a vision of its place in the world, as well as the
role it wishes to play in the international order. Regrettably, in
India's case, we have historically suffered from an intellectual
vacuum as far as strategic thinking is concerned, and that is why,
after 60 years as a sovereign republic we lack a clearly articulated
statement of national aims and objectives. This is a cultural handicap
which has not just deprived us of a healthy tradition of strategic
debate and discourse, but also had a deleterious impact on internal
security as well as foreign policy issues at the national level. We do
not seem to realise that this shortcoming has often been mis-interpreted
as a sign of weakness and lack of national resolve, and perhaps even
acted as a provocation for aggression.
If I were to state the reasons why the IN considered it essential to
generate a strategy at this particular juncture, I would sum them up
as under :-
| (a) |
Firstly, the sustained induction of hardware
from diverse foreign sources that we have seen over the years,
was never accompanied by any operational expertise or doctrine,
because such things are not to be had for money. The hiatus that
I just spoke about, has in the past often impacted adversely on
doctrine, force planning, equipment acquisition and
infrastructure development processes.
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| (b) |
Secondly, in the absence of higher strategic
direction, the Constitution of India has given us the core
national values and interests to be protected. But as notional
substitutes for a national security document, we have often had
to use the Raksha Mantri's Operational Directive, and even the
MoD Annual Report. Thus, while the formulation of a maritime
strategy was clearly considered overdue by the navy, there was
also the possibility that it might provide an incentive for the
national security establishment to shake off its inertia, and
get to work in this field.
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| (c) |
And finally, India's emergence as a nation of
global significance has brought with it the recognition that not
just our national security, but also our economic prosperity has
deep linkages with the maritime environment. While a
comprehensive National Maritime Strategy may take time to
evolve, the navy considered it prudent to make a start with the
Military Maritime strategy. |
At one level, our decision makers are recognising the key role of the
navy in insulating the nation from external intervention, as well as
its vast potential as an instrument of state power. At another level,
the realisation has also begun to dawn on the intelligentsia that
trade and energy, the twin pillars of our economic resurgence, are
inextricably linked with maritime power. A clear cut roadmap is,
therefore, necessary at this juncture to synergise our national
maritime endeavours.
India's Geo-strategic Environment
The Indian peninsula juts out over 1,000 miles into the Indian
Ocean, and her geo-physical configuration makes her as dependant on
the seas as any island nation. This predicates the profound influence
that this ocean, the only one named after a country, will have on
India's security environment. KM Panikkar summed it up neatly, half a
century ago, in these words: "while to other countries-the Indian
Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a
vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area; her freedom is
dependant on the freedom of the sea-lanes."
The Indian Ocean Region (lOR), at whose focal point India is located,
has some unique general features, of which we must take note before
examining specific issues :-
| (a) |
Amongst 56 nations of the lOR, some of the
fastest growing economies of the world co-exist with some of the
poorest. Many of the countries are afflicted with serious
problems of backwardness, fundamentalism and insurgency. Most of
them are under military dictatorship or authoritarian rule.
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| (b) |
This region is the largest repository of the
world's hydrocarbon resources, and apart from producing the most
rubber, tin, tea and jute, is well endowed with strategic
materials like uranium, tungsten, cobalt, gold and diamonds.
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| (c) |
The region is home to 1/3rd of the world's
population which is regularly struck by 70 per cent of the
planet’s natural disasters.
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| (d) |
Most of the post-Cold War conflicts have taken
place in this region. today, the global epicentre of terrorism
as well as nuclear and missile proliferation exist right next
door to us.
|
| (e) |
Areas of the lOR like the Horn of Africa and
the Malacca Straits are rife with incidents of piracy,
gun-running, drug-trafficking and hijacking. |
Territorial and maritime boundary disputes, runaway population
growth and the migrant labour economy of South Asia are some of the
other generic factors which need to be noted as containing the seeds
of future conflict. As far as the regional and other players are
concerned, we need to spend a few minutes to make a brief assessment
of their current and future impact on the region.
First, a look at the sole superpower the USA, which has to be counted
as a regional player by virtue of her large and ubiquitous maritime
presence in the lOR.
| (a) |
It is clear that for the foreseeable future,
the US will continue to remain deeply engaged in the lOR and the
wider Asia-Pacific region. The two abiding US interests in this
region are: safeguarding the hydrocarbon resources of the Middle
East and Central Asia; and the containment of China to protect
the autonomy of Taiwan. The Asia-Pacific geographic area has
been divided along the Indo-Pakistan border, between the
Hawaii-based Pacific Command and the Florida-based Central
Command.
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| (b) |
Currently, America's resources and attention
are intensely focused on the ongoing operations in Iraq, and the
requirement to keep the terrorist hubs in Pakistan and
Afghanistan under check. Monitoring and finding ways to
circumscribe the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, are
the other two issues that have critical significance for the US
today.
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| (c) |
It is now becoming obvious that while she can
try and set an agenda to suit her interests, the US cannot by
herself implement such an agenda world-wide. Signs of “imperial
overstretch" are surfacing, as are low key feelers seeking help
and support, especially at sea. Under these circumstances, a
helping hand from a respected regional power like India would
bring welcome relief. The stage for this has been set by the
passage of the Henry Hyde Act and rapidly warming relations
between the armed forces.
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Next, let us take a look at China which, though not on the littoral,
looms menacingly over the lOR as a rapidly emerging entity with her
sights set firmly on super-power status. In the context under
discussion, there are just four major points to be noted :-
| (a) |
Firstly, China's nearest competitor in both the
military as well as economic spheres is India. Since both are
Asian powers, it is a historical inevitability that they will
have to compete and even clash for the same strategic space.
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| (b) |
Secondly, with Sino-Indian bilateral trade
having crossed the US$ 20 billion mark, China is well on the way
to becoming our largest trading partner. This is a welcome
development, but one which also contains a contradiction. We
must not allow it to lull us into a sense of complacency,
because the Chinese have not forgotten our territorial disputes.
Just a fortnight before the visit of President Hu Jintao in
November 2006, in a most undiplomatic gesture, the Chinese
ambassador in New Delhi reiterated an emphatic public claim to
Arunachal Pradesh. It is significant that China has settled
boundary disputes with 12 out of 14 neighbours; the only
exceptions being India and Bhutan
. |
| (c) |
Thirdly, the "string of pearls" strategy is
another source of concern, due to the clear connotation of
military encirclement that it conveys to India. In this context,
Gwadar situated at the mouth of the Persian Gulf is probably the
first in a chain of ports that China is helping our neighbours
to develop, and which could provide future facilities to the PLA
Navy ships and nuclear submarines. The other ports in this chain
are likely to be: Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in
Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar.
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| (d) |
And finally, to all those who get dreamy-eyed
about the future of Sino-Indian relations, I would put just one
question. Where in the annals of international relations can one
find a precedent for one nation handing over to another, not
just the designs and expertise, but also actual hardware
relating to nuclear weapons and a family of ballistic missiles?
Even the British were denied atomic secrets by their Anglo-Saxon
cousins, the Americans, using the post-War McMahon Act.
|
| (e) |
By arming Pakistan with conventional and
nuclear weaponry, China has, by proxy, forced India to divert
scarce resources, and thus tried to checkmate her as a military
and economic rival. |
Coming to our immediate neighbourhood, India's attitude of detachment
with regard to most geo-political developments, is often worrisome.
Unless we are involved, we will have no leverage, and unless we have
some leverage, we are powerless to influence the course of events
vital to our national security. In this context, two examples are
illuminating :-
| (a) |
India's national security interests have
suffered the most from the sinister nexus between China,
Pakistan, and North Korea, to accomplish nuclear and missile
proliferation, much of which has taken place by the sea route.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was meant for the
specific purpose of interdicting transportation of WMDs by ship,
but we have yet to make up our mind about joining it.
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| (b) |
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in our close
volatile neighbourhood, are countries where we have chosen to
remain hands-off, but where things could blow up in our face
overnight, and catch us unprepared, because we have no
"trip-wires" in place. |
Next, a brief look at Pakistan. While Pakistan will remain a factor in
our security calculus for the foreseeable future, we need to be
careful that this troublesome neighbour does not dominate our radar
scope. It is certainly in our interest that she should remain a stable
and integral nation, and outgrow the sense of insecurity which has
haunted her since independence. Our national security policy should
convey a couple of clear messages to the Pakistani leadership, such as
:-
| (a) |
Firstly, that India has vast resources of
strength and has demonstrated the resilience to withstand
whatever Pakistan could throw at us. We will, therefore, never
be cowed down either by force or by terrorism
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| (b) |
Notwithstanding threats of a "thousand cuts",
India will continue her march on the road to economic,
industrial and scientific progress with resolve. Engaging in an
arms race with India could break the Pakistani economy's back.
|
| (c) |
And finally, modern day governments need to
focus energies on providing a better quality of life to their
citizens through social change and economic development, rather
than by breeding fundamentalism in madarsas. |
We need to bear in mind that the drug traffic emerging from the Golden
Triangle and the Golden Crescent on either side of India provides
funding for international terrorism. Organisations like the Al Quaida
and the Jemmah Islamiah find both recruits and financial sustenance
here, and use the sea routes for their nefarious activities. The LTTE
not only has a "Sea Tiger" wing, but also runs a clandestine merchant
fleet which provides efficient logistic support for its insurgency.
The emergence of an LTTE aviation component and the recent air attacks
carried out by it, have added an altogether new dimension to this
insurgency. In addition, the Horn of Africa, Bay of Bengal and the
Malacca Straits are witness to frequent incidents of lawlessness
including piracy, hijacking and human trafficking. In the midst of
such a scenario, the smaller island nations of the lOR are beset by a
feeling of insecurity and seek reassurance from neighbouring maritime
powers that their sovereignty will remain protected, and that they
will receive succour in times of need.
The last word in any discussion on geo-politics must go to Lord
Palmerston who so rightly reminded us that in international relations,
core national interests always take precedence over sentiments like
friendship or enmity. As a corollary, it must always remain etched in
our minds that should a clash of interests arise between India and any
other power, regional or extra-regional; the use of coercive power and
even conflict remains a distinct possibility.
Security of Energy and Trade
India's own dependence on the seas, and her geographic location
astride major shipping routes of the world place a dual responsibility
on her. Not only does India have to safeguard the maritime interests
vital to her own security and economic well-being, but she must, as an
obligation to the larger world community, ensure the free flow of
vital hydrocarbons and commerce through the lOR sea lanes.
India, with a merchant fleet of 760 ships totaling 8.6 million tons
GRT, ranks 15th amongst seafaring nations. This fleet, operating out
of 12 major and 184 minor Indian ports can carry a little less than a
sixth of our seaborne trade, and has much scope for expansion. As far
as our foreign trade is concerned, I reiterate three oft quoted facts
to emphasise the role of the sea:-
| (a) |
Of our foreign trade, more than 75 per cent by
value, and over 97 per cent by volume is carried by merchant
ships.
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| (b) |
Our exports were US $ 100 billion in 2006.
These are slated to cross US $ 200 billion in the next five
years.
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| (c) |
India's share of total world trade has been
hovering around just one per cent. The government is aiming to
double it by 2009. |
Currently, at a very energy-intensive state of its development, India
is predicted to become the world's largest importer of hydrocarbons by
2050. A new development in this context is our acquisition of oil and
gas fields across the globe by oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)
Videsh. While investments worth billions of dollars have been made in
these overseas assets extending from Sakhalin across Africa to Brazil,
little thought has been given to their protection, which will
certainly have maritime security connotations. Above and beyond
whatever our offshore oilfields are currently producing, the seas hold
out tremendous promise in terms of oil, gas, and mineral seabed
wealth, as well as organic resources. We need to, therefore, not only
safeguard our vast exclusive economic zones (EEZ), but also mobilise
the technologies required to exploit these resources.
Annually, over 100,000 merchantmen including bulk carriers, container
ships, car ferries, oil tankers and liquefied gas carriers transit the
waters of the Indian Ocean, carrying cargo worth about a trillion
dollars. Both east-bound and west-bound shipping has to pass through a
number of choke points where it is vulnerable to interdiction or
interference by state and non-state entities. Any disruption in the
supply of energy or commodities, would send prices skyrocketing and
destabilse industries as well as economies world-wide. It is against
this backdrop that India, as a major maritime power in this region,
has to shoulder responsibilities in the maritime domain. Let us then
look at how our maritime strategy envisages the employment of national
assets in peace and in war.
Strategy in Peacetime Conditions
Let me start by quoting a passage from the first version of the US
Maritime Strategy promulgated by the CNO Admiral James Watkins in
1986. It says "Sea power is said to be relevant across the spectrum of
conflict, from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the
most survivable component of a nation's forces for deterring strategic
nuclear war. The maritime strategy provides a framework for
considering all uses of maritime power. Amongst the greatest services
we can provide to the nation is to operate in peacetime and in crises
in a way that will deter war."
Our Maritime Doctrine has clearly outlined the four basic missions
assigned to the Indian Navy, which span the full spectrum of conflict,
and these are: military, diplomatic, constabulary, and benign roles.
Of these, the diplomatic, constabulary, and benign roles are
undertaken in peacetime, and shall receive priority in discussion.
However, from the wartime military role, I will de-link deterrence,
which happens to be a peacetime function, and discuss it first of all.
Strategic Deterrence
Having crossed the nuclear rubicon in 1998, we are committed to
maintaining a minimum credible deterrent under a self imposed
condition of ‘no first use’ (NFU). Having also gone public with a
nuclear doctrine, there is no room for second thoughts now, because
our adversaries have designed their strategic forces and crafted their
nuclear posture based on our declarations.
India's Nuclear Doctrine clearly envisages, and is based on a
deterrent in the form of a "triad" with land-based, aircraft-borne,
and submarine launched weapons. Of this triad, we only have the first
two in our inventory at present. Nuclear weapons are not meant for war
fighting, and achieve deterrence by convincing the enemy of the
futility of a nuclear first strike, because the response would be so
devastating that it would render the strike meaningless.
Two specific attributes are necessary to convince the enemy of the
credibility of your deterrent; it should have massive destructive
power, and it must be substantially survivable in the face of a sneak
first strike. The only platform which can claim to be virtually
invulnerable to attack, and ready for instant response is the nuclear
propelled submarine armed with strategic weapons. We do have
ship-launched ballistic missiles in our arsenal, but our nuclear
deterrent would attain true credibility only when its underwater leg
becomes operational. However, operating a submarine-based deterrent is
a complex undertaking, and requires not only fail-safe communications,
but also a full fledged command and control system, backed up by
extensive intelligence, planning, training and maintenance
infrastructure. We did operate a Charlie I class nuclear submarine on
a lease from the USSR for three years, and that provided useful
exposure to navy personnel and perhaps scientists. But INS Chakra as
she was called, carried no nuclear weapons, and we are, therefore,
still to learn the complexities of operating a seaborne deterrent. If
we are looking forward to deploying such a weapon system in the next
few years, perhaps now is the time to start putting its components in
place.
The unique doctrine of NFU, does raise the threshold of a nuclear
conflict, but requires us to maintain adequate conventional forces in
addition to our strategic assets. And that brings us to the issue of
conventional deterrence.
Conventional Deterrence
As I just said, nuclear weapons are not meant for the purpose of
fighting wars, and every soldier, sailor and airman would do well to
remember that these are actually political tools to be used only for
sending a message of deterrence, compellence, or coercion to an
adversary. But such a situation should arise only when persuasion or
dissuasion by all other means has been tried without success, and
herein lies the need for conventional deterrence.
The main objective of a peacetime strategy is to deter conflict, and
ensure peace and stability in our areas of interest. This is best done
by maintaining a preponderance in maritime capability; the idea being
to never leave friends as well as adversaries or potential adversaries
in doubt about India's superiority at sea. In this context, it is
important to convey a clear and unambiguous message to all concerned,
so that there is no room for misunderstandings. A message to convey
reassurance or deterrence can have many nuances, and I shall just
mention the three main elements:
| (a) |
First of all, comes what we now call maritime
domain awareness (MDA). It encompasses the ability to keep our
oceanic areas under sustained surveillance so that we can
compile a comprehensive picture of the peacetime merchant
traffic as well as deployment and operating patterns of naval
forces. The availability of such a picture not only reduces the
"fog of war" but also gives us an early warning of any
deviations from the normal state. MDA requires many input
sources; from satellite surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and
scouting by warships, to direction finding (DF) stations and
merchant ship tracking systems. Making this information
available in real time to all our widely dispersed platforms at
sea will call for networking of a sophisticated nature.
|
| (b) |
The second element involves our ability to
ensure presence, or physically position units in an area of
interest, no matter how distant, and sustain them for as long as
necessary. Our vision encompasses an arc extending from the
Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits as India's legitimate area
of interest. The presence of our maritime units not only
enhances our familiarity with those waters, and boosts
intelligence gathering, but also demonstrates our commitment to
friends in that area, and willingness to protect our interests.
|
| (c) |
The third and most important element of this
message that would reinforce deterrence is one of combat
efficiency and readiness. While we may consider these as
inherent attributes of a professional maritime force, overt
demonstrations through overseas deployments, joint exercises,
training exchanges and even humanitarian relief operations are
keenly observed and noted by friends and rivals alike. |
Diplomatic Role
"Gunboat diplomacy", used to be considered one of the less pleasant
coercive tactics used by colonial powers in the heyday of imperialism.
Today, however, maritime diplomacy obviously has no such connotation,
because navies are now being increasingly used to build bridges, to
foster mutual trust and confidence, to create partnerships through
inter-operability and to render assistance, if required. Of course,
post-Cold War they are also being increasingly used to project power
across the littoral of third world nations.
For our maritime strategy, this role has two-fold importance. Firstly,
the navy can discharge its peacetime functions in a far more efficient
manner, if we have an atmosphere of cooperation with our neighbours
and we have friendly ports and airfields available to our units.
Secondly, in times of crisis or war too, operations proceed much more
smoothly, if the environment has already been shaped, and a certain
level of comfort established. This aspect emerged clearly during both
the tsunami relief and the Lebanon refugee evacuation operations.
However, this role would acquire true significance only, if it forms
an integral part of the nation's overall diplomatic initiatives, and
the political establishment as well as the MEA learn how to use the
navy as an instrument of state policy. On its part, the IN has
accorded the highest priority to what it calls "International Maritime
Cooperation" and has created structures, schemes and financial heads
to pursue it vigorously. Friendly IOR neighbours, on their part have
offered us refuelling and re-supply facilities in a number of ports.
Constabulary Role
The constabulary role in our context, must be seen in two dimensions;
ensuring good order at sea, and managing low intensity maritime
operations (LIMO).
As mentioned a little while ago, a combination of factors and an
unfortunate convergence of interests, make the high seas a fertile
ground for criminal orgnisations and terrorist activities. So when we
speak of threats to "good order" at sea, it encompasses the full gamut
of lawlessness: from piracy, hijacking and trafficking in arms, drugs
and humans to smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In our own
context, the effective sealing of land routes from Pakistan has forced
clandestine traffic into the sea, and opened a new window of
vulnerability all along our western seaboard. Therefore, while good
order at sea is certainly an internal security imperative for India,
it is also an important bilateral and international maritime
obligation.
LIMO involves countering non-state entities using the sea for unlawful
purposes or indulging in violent activities against states. In this
context, we have a tangible threat from our west where terrorism
breeds unfettered with state support, and is likely to spill over into
the sea. To the south, the Sea Tiger wing of the LTTE which has
attained proficiency in maritime operations, operates at our door
step.
The Service has to tread with a degree of caution in the constabulary
role because it is very easy to become excessively involved in low end
or "brown water" operations, to the detriment of the navy's prime
tasks which lie in the "blue waters" or the high seas. With the
creation of the Indian Coast Guard in 1978, most law enforcement
aspects of the constabulary role within the Maritime Zones of India
have been assigned to them. The navy needs to stand behind its sister
maritime Service and render support and assistance, when required.
Benign Role
The navy is the repository of certain capabilities and specialist
knowledge which are instrumental in the discharge of its benign role.
This role involves tasks such as humanitarian aid, disaster relief,
search and rescue diving assistance, salvage and hydrographic surveys,
and is essentially defined by the complete absence of force or
violence in its execution.
The tsunami of December 2004 provided an example of how the basic
attributes of maritime power enable it to react at short notice, and
respond to emergent situations. The disaster struck on a Sunday
morning, and as our ships were sailing for our own east coast and the
Andaman Islands we received requests for help from Sri Lanka and
Maldives. We mobilised more ships, helicopters, medicines and stores,
and by the same evening they were on their way to Male and Galle.
Government approval came later by phone, but we knew that if there was
to be a problem (government approval), our ships would just anchor 12½
miles offshore and await further directions. Similarly in June 2006,
our ships were returning from the Mediterranean when the Lebanon
refugee crisis arose. We ordered them to anchor in the Suez canal
while the MEA pondered over the issues involved. As soon as the
Government decision was received, they turned around and sailed into
Beirut to commence the evacuation operations within hours.
These two operations have had a significant impact and have served to
enhance India's image in the international community. It is to be
hoped that the establishment has drawn the right conclusions about the
employment of the navy as an instrument of diplomacy.
Strategy in war
I have dwelt at some length on the navy’s peacetime strategy, because
peace fortunately prevails about 90 per cent time. But we have to
remember that the prevalence of peace is an indicator that deterrence
is working. Should deterrence fail, war will surely follow, and war is
what navies train and prepare for. An essential element of this
preparation for war is the evolution of a new maritime strategy. Apart
from the other imperatives that we have discussed earlier, this
evolutionary process has been accelerated by economic, geo-political
and technological developments that have come about in the recent
past.
Before embarking on a discussion of the strategy, I would like to make
two important points, which may call for a paradigm shift:-
| (a) |
Firstly, under the influence of Mahanian ideas,
most navies including our own, imagined that their raison d'etre
was only to engage the enemy in a big battle at sea, and plans
were shaped accordingly. However, the lessons that emerged from
exercise after exercise clearly conveyed that navies cannot
achieve a great deal, conducting maritime operations in
isolation. Unless our actions at sea had a linkage, no matter
how indirect, with events on land, the navy's potential would be
wasted. There is now acknowledgement that wars are won only on
land, and that the navy must ensure that its planning process as
well as operations are synchronous with those of the army, so
that we obtain the maximum synergy.
|
| (b) |
Secondly, there is a section of opinion,
especially in the army and air force, which firmly believes that
all future wars in our context, should be "short and sharp".
Perhaps it is a Hobson's choice for these Services because the
intensity of fuel, oil and lubricants (FOL) and ammunition
consumption as well as attrition can be limiting factors for
them. As far as the navy is concerned, the longer a conflict
lasts, the greater the pressure that it can bring to bear on the
enemy. As the Vietnam, Iran-Iraq, Kosovo, and current Iraq wars
have shown, short conflicts are not an inevitability, and we
should retain the option to prolong a conflict, if it suits our
national interests. |
Maritime forces can be deployed in two ways to influence the outcome
of war on land. They can be used to interdict the enemy's foreign
trade lifeline in an attempt to starve his industry, economy and
people, and bring his military machine to a halt. The impact of this
"commodity denial" or "indirect" regime requires a finite time to be
felt by a nation. Factors like the enemy's dependence on imports, his
buffer stocks and ability to re-stock via land routes will decide the
effectiveness of these indirect operations, and that is why a superior
navy would like to prolong a war.
In the other, "direct" mode of creating an impact on the land battle,
the enemy's homeland is targeted by naval platforms delivering weapons
from the sea, undertaking amphibious operations or inserting special
forces. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the open-ocean warfare
challenge disappeared, and the USN-Marine Corps combine shifted their
focus to crisis-response and interventions in the third world. Herein,
lies the origin of concepts like "littoral warfare" and "naval
expeditionary forces". Adapting these concepts to our environment, the
maritime strategy must encompass the resolute and judicious deployment
of our maritime forces in both direct and indirect operations. This
will ensure that the impact of sea power is felt on the land battle,
both in the short term and long term time frames.
Neither littoral warfare nor expeditionary warfare are new functions,
but essentially involve a geographic relocation of the theatre from
mid-ocean to a zone extending about 50-100 miles inland and seaward
from the enemy coast of interest. All the other traditional forms of
naval warfare, like amphibious, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft,
electronic and mine warfare would retain their importance. However,
there are some concepts and factors, mostly technology based, that we
would need to incorporate into our new strategy :-
| (a) |
The littoral of an adversary is an inherently
dangerous area for maritime operations due to threats from
submarines, strike aircraft and mines etc. Therefore, it would
be essential to impose a sequencing of operations so that the
battle space is adequtely sanitised and favourable conditions
created prior to launching any operations. |
| (b) |
In such sequencing or phasing, it would be
imperative to first establish information dominance in order to
disrupt the enemy's command and control systems and deny him
information about our intentions. Thereafter, sea control, a
favourable air situation, or mine counter-measures as
appropriate, could be pursued before the actual operation is
launched. |
| (c) |
Although a new buzz word, all that information
dominance, means is attaining superiority in the electromagnetic
as well as information warfare domains for one's own forces
while destroying, degrading and even deceiving the enemy's
intelligence and surveillance assets. We should have no doubt
that this would be a decisive factor in any future conflict. |
| (d) |
Today, our fleets possess tremendous striking
power in terms of number of SSMs, ASMs and SAMs that can be
launched from our ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters.
However, this punch would be wasted in a conflict, unless we can
bring the enemy to battle. Our forces would, therefore, have to
aggressively seek out enemy units and bring them to action, so
that we can inflict adequate attrition prior to attacking his
homeland. |
| (e) |
In order to obtain the maximum synergy and
advantage from our superior numbers as well as capabilities, it
is necessary that we fight what the Soviets used to call a
"combined arms battle" at sea. By ensuring reliable and secure
communications, between warships, aircraft and submarines, it
should be possible to concentrate their firepower in a
geographical location and inflict heavy attrition on the enemy.
Shore based IAF strike aircraft would make an important
contribution here. With network centric operations on the
horizon, implementation of this concept should not pose a
problem. |
| (f) |
Combined arms operations fit neatly into
another concept termed: "maritime manoeuvre from the sea". Given
their inherent mobility and the access provided by the sea,
maritime forces can exploit the principles of surprise,
concentration, and flexibility to deal the enemy a sudden blow
which will unbalance him and shatter his morale and cohesion.
Essential ingredients for such an operation include naval
aviation, land attack missiles, amphibious shipping and special
forces. These are all available to the IN, and manoeuvre warfare
should be an important part of our strategy. |
| (g) |
In the final phase, our strategy should
envisage the linking up of the three Services in a joint
operation, no matter how widely dispersed these forces, or brief
this phase may be. |
Ideally speaking, maritime force structures should evolve from an
approved strategy. But having made a late start in this domain, we
will have to make some compromises, till the cyclic process in which
strategy leads to capability requirements, which in turn influence the
force planning progress, stabilises. Nevertheless, the IN has not done
too badly; having generated a doctrine, a maritime capabilities
perspective plan, and a strategy withing a span of two years. The
thought process and discussions that went into the evolution of these
documents has generated a need-based, budget-linked force structure
for the next 15 years which has been accepted in principle by the MoD.
Epilogue
It is not entirely happenstance that the navy as it evolves, will meet
most of the demands of India's maritime strategy over the next decade
and a half. It did not happen overnight, and great deal of credit for
this should rightly go to our farsighted predecessors who laid sound
foundations and put the Service on the right track
This talk would, therefore, not be complete, if I fail to make mention
of one last set of issues. Just as strategy forms the basis of
operational plans, it must itself be supported by a philosophic
underpinning which will help the navy retain a clear vision of the
future and steer a steady course. This underpinning is provided by a
set of five factors which I would commend to the navy for close
attention :-
| (a) |
Indigenisation. India today has the dubious
distinction of being the largest arms importer in the world,
having signed deals worth US$ 11.7 billion over the past two
years. Experience has shown us that every time we induct a
system of foreign origin, we are entering a dangerous cycle of
spiraling costs, uncertainty, and dependence on an unreliable
supply source. Self-reliance should remain a key result area
and, for all their clumsy ways, we should continue our symbiotic
relationship with the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO). Firmly rejecting "screwdriver technology",
we should insist on the DRDO entering collaborative development
and co-production arrangements, wherever we are offered transfer
of technology.
|
| (b) |
Shipbuilding Industry. Our current status as a
maritime power is due in substantial measure to the 40 years of
warship building endeavous of our shipyards. The shipbuilding
industry is a strategic asset which must be carefully nurtured
and guided by the navy. Apart from undertaking urgent
modernisation, the shipyards must be encouraged to seek
partnerships with the private sector and technical
collaborations abroad.
|
| (c) |
Foreign Cooperation. The Navy’s most important
contribution to the nation during peacetime is going to be as an
instrument of diplomacy, providing support for political
objectives and foreign policy initiatives. In coordination with
the Ministry of External Affairs a sharp focus will have to be
retained on coordinating assistance to our maritime neighbours
in the Indian Ocean littoral in areas of training hardware and
expertise.
|
| (d) |
Networked Operations. Our maritime forces
currently encompass weapons, sensors and platforms of formidable
range and capability. With the induction of the aircraft carrier
Vikramaditya, systems like the Brahmos missile and new classes
of submarines, our capabilities at sea will be further enhanced.
In order to exploit their full potential, we will need to have a
sophisticated communication network covering the entire IOR.
With a dedicated maritime communication satellite and the help
of our Information Technology (IT) industry we should aim to
have a would class network in place by the middle of the next
decade.
|
| (e) |
Transformation. Change of any kind does nor
come easily to us, because we dislike the associated turbulence,
and dread the thought of failure, But the choices are stark; we
either look ahead and bring about an orderly sequence of change
through “transformation”, or get overtaken by events and react
to them post facto. Transformation is the engine which will help
the Service absorb new technologies, move towards networked
operations, make organisational improvements, embrace joint
philosophies and incorporate other ideas to improve combat
efficiency. |
That brings me to the end of my talk, and I hope that I have been able
to convery an idea of our maritime aspirations and a roadmap for the
future.
|
