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A four member delegation from the United Service Institution of
India (USI) visited Russia from 27 November to 1 December 2005 at the
invitation of the Centre for Military Studies and Research (CMSR), the
General Staff Department of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation
(Moscow). The delegation comprised Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar,
PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), Director USI, Lieutenant General Chandra
Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd); Vice Admiral I J S Khurana, PVSM, AVSM (Retd);
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), Deputy Director (Research). The visit
was in response to an earlier visit by the CMSR delegation to the USI
from 16 to 21 May 2004.
The USI delegation and members of the CMSR held extensive bilateral
dialogues on 28 and 29 November 2005. This was followed by a visit, on
30 November, to the Military Chief's Club – an ex-servicemen's
enterprise aimed at strengthening and developing the Russian state
using ex-servicemen's expertise and experience. For bilateral talks
the USI delegation was led by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, and
the Russian side by Lieutenant General Ostankov Ivanovich. The agenda
of the bilateral dialogue focused on contemporary issues including
situation in Iraq and the Middle East, Indo-Russian bilateral
relations, the future of the UN, and the future challenges to peace
and security in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
The Indian Ambassador's Address
The bilateral dialogue was initiated with the opening remarks of the
Indian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Mr Kanwal Sibal. He
welcomed the dialogue between the two institutions and declared it to
be an important track II process to promote common understanding on
issues of common security concerns. He hailed the discussions as yet
another instance of the broadening of Indo-Russian Defence dialogue.
In keeping with the agenda for the dialogue, the Ambassador raised
critical issues pertaining to four broad themes of the dialogue. He
asserted that the deteriorating security scenario in Iraq and the
Middle East, was a matter of deep concern for India and Russia. The
Ambassador raised issues dealing with the overall security and
stability in the Middle Eastern region in general and Iraq in
particular. Concerns that the war in Iraq instead of containing the
problem of international terrorism was likely to worsen it were
highlighted. In addition, there was the added danger of increasing
Shia-Sunni divide. He set forth the question as to whether a Shia
dominated Iraq backed by Shia Iran would alter the balance of power in
the Arab world? He also stressed upon the need to consider the stage
at which India and Russia should get involved in the reconstruction of
Iraq and the level of support to be provided to the present Iraqi
government.
The Ambassador further reiterated the importance of Central Asia and
Afghanistan for both India and Russia. Raising concerns about growing
religious extremism, drug trafficking and international terrorism, he
argued that both countries had vested interests in the stability of
the region. He voiced concerns on the rise of Taliban and what it
portends for the future. Other issues that were raised included :
| (a) |
how far the US policies in Afghanistan were
facilitating the reassertion of Pakistani interests in
Afghanistan. |
| (b) |
The possibility of Pakistan and Afghanistan
becoming bases for the US to pursue long-term goals to gain a
foothold in Central Asia. |
| (c) |
The degree to which the US regional policies
are being conditioned by efforts to contain China. |
| (d) |
The nature of American, Chinese and Russian
competing interests to control Central Asian gas and oil
resources. |
| (e) |
The security role of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO). |
| (f) |
The role other economic and security
organisations, promoted by Russia would play in stabilising the
Region. |
| (g) |
Why Russia wants Central Security Treaty
Organisation (CSTO) to cooperate with North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). |
Speaking on the United Nations (UN) Reforms, the Ambassador attributed
the crisis in the international collective security mechanisms as well
as the UN to the unilateralist thrust of the current US
administration. He raised the issue of how to reform the UN Security
Council? He pondered on whether India and Russia could work together
especially when Russia's definition of consensus was closer to the
Chinese position? On the role of regional security organisations, he
questioned the extent to which the UN would be undermined in case of
enlargement of the role of the organisations like the NATO, which are
seeking a much larger geo-political role through "out-of-area"
operations.
On Indo-Russian relations, the Ambassador mentioned a convergence of
the long-term geo-political interests of the two countries, of which
Defence remains the key pillar. The Ambassador allayed concerns over
the impact of India's growing bilateral relations with countries like
the US and Israel by pointing out that Indo-Russian relations in the
defence field were time-tested and will not be diluted. He stressed on
assurances given in this regard by the Defence Minister during his
recent visit to Russia. In terms of growing defence cooperation
between the two countries, he mentioned agreement in principle on
joint development of multi-role transport aircraft and discussions on
the fifth generation aircraft together with acquisitions of almost US
$10 billion from Russia.
He, however, brought out the serious concerns that persist on product
and after sales support for Russian equipment in the Indian Armed
Forces inventory, which need to be addressed. The move away from
buyer-seller relationship, towards joint research and development,
production and marketing should be the model for the future. He
concluded by mentioning that both sides were holding joint exercises,
which was a welcome development.
Director CMSR thanked the Indian Ambassador, both, for his
enlightening remarks and defining the direction of the bilateral
dialogue for mutual benefit. He assured that the joint deliberations
will endeavour to find solutions and commonalities of interests.
The Sessions
There were a total of four sessions spread over two days. The first
session pertained to Impact of War in Iraq: Emerging Security
Challenges in the Middle East. Papers in this session were presented
by Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar and Captain Kravanchko Vadim.
Session two pertained to Indo-Russian Bilateral Equations Including
Military. The speakers were Vice Admiral I J S Khurana and Lieutenant
General K Anatoly Filippovic (Retd).
Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and Captain Kucerib presented their
papers on The Current Crisis in the International Collective Security
Mechanisms and the Future of the United Nations, in the third session.
Challenges to Peace and Stability in Central Asia – Afghanistan Region
in the Coming Decade was the subject of assessment by Brigadier Arun
Sahgal and Lieutenant General Grigoriev, in the concluding session.
Session I : Impact of War in Iraq: Emerging Security Challenges in
the Middle East
This session was devoted to understanding major lessons emerging out
of the Iraq conflict and their impact on Middle East regional
dynamics. Essential aspects highlighted in this session included the
overall American strategy adopted in this one sided war fought in
multiple dimensions i.e. political, diplomatic, economic and military
leading to the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi forces. The combat
phase lasted 42 days including a 100 hours ground war. The operational
environment witnessed excellent co-ordination of multinational assets
by the coalition. Some of the important lessons highlighted included
:-
| (a) |
Air Space Management. The campaign was
hallmarked by extraordinary coordination of all air and ground
assets spread over long distances from continental US, Europe
and the Middle East. It was mentioned that it was not only the
control of various platforms in the air, but also the tremendous
clutter of communication transmission that would call for strict
control and management. In spite of effective management in the
first weeks of war, a dozen opportunities to strike
time-critical and high-value targets were missed due to the wide
sensor-shooter gap. This was markedly reduced to just 12 minutes
as the operation progressed, displaying substantive strides in
improved joint operations, inter-operability and seamless data
linking. |
| (b) |
Civil Affairs. This is described as
facilitating military operations and consolidating operational
activities by assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining,
influencing or exploiting relations between military forces and
civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and
the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area
of operation. Language and culture training of target countries
is essential. Cross-cultural proclivities and sophistication can
be developed by study of a target country and by living there
for some time and unless this is done, civil affairs will not
succeed. This is a Special Forces mission and selected Units
have to train for it. The American forces did not plan this
aspect well in Iraq. They firstly antagonised the local
population unlike the British forces who were friendlier and
polite. Secondly, rather than be the liberator of the oppressed
people, the behaviour of the American forces at times was
oppressive and brutal. Thirdly, coalition forces in the first
flush of victory disbanded all the law enforcement agencies
including the Army and the Police, thereby removing a vital
interface between local population and the troops. Strong arm
methods used by the security forces have antagonised the local
population, which persists to date. A selective screening
process to weed out hardcore and regime loyalists while
retaining the core infrastructure could have been a useful
approach. The impact of this has been that the Iraqi society has
been divided on sectarian and ethnic lines. |
| (c) |
Use of high technology. All weather continuous
surveillance by 'Global Hawk' Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and
aerial platforms, satellite digital communication, Precision
Guided Munitions (PGM) strikes, use of tank busters (40 bomblets),
and use of smart bombs, both from air and warships achieved
total degradatin of Iraqi war machine. Iraqi equipment was
mostly of pre 1991 vintage Soviet origin, which could not be
upgraded or even maintained due to lack of spares as a
consequence of the imposition of the UN sanctions. It had few
"Scud" missiles and Air Defence (AD) guns, which were no match
for the allied Air might. The Gulf war provided a testing ground
for new space based technologies. There was a constellation of
over 50 US satellites providing space support to the US Armed
Forces. There were great strides exhibited in all the areas of
C4ISR capabilities. |
| (d) |
Post Conflict Issues: Western media had created
an impression of the American forces being seen as the
liberators by the Iraqi people. The obsession with the conquest
was so paramount that the coalition forces did not take the
necessary steps for preventing the administrative collapse of
Iraq or closing the porous borders with Jordan, Syria and Iran
to prevent escape of Saddam loyalists. Similarly, the damage to
infrastructure was so total that even the basic amenities like
water and electricity supply became a major problem. This
alienated local population. The American political leadership
believed that new technologies had transformed the US forces and
a smaller component of the ground forces was adequate for
victory. Consequently, it did not cater for the continuing
insurgency conditions, which are manpower-intensive. Some of the
important aspects highlighted included :-
| (i) |
Re-establishing security in Iraq would
become the prime concern of the international community.
According to the Russian presenter, the US is caught up in
a terrible situation in Iraq. Withdrawal poses serious
problems and, if it were to quit Iraq, the space will be
occupied by the Jihadis and fundamentalists leading to
further instability. |
| (ii) |
Another interesting point made was that
large scale insurgency operations were not possible due to
lack of favourable terrain and population. Current wave of
terrorism is a consequence of sectarian divide and
mishandling by the US forces by use of heavy weapons, air
strikes etc., which appear to have infuriated even the
majority Shia population. |
| (iii) |
Five tactics adopted by resistance
fighters were highlighted. These included capture of
hostages, killing of political leaders, security forces,
and civil officials, destruction of infrastructure making
governance difficult. It was indicated that joint
operations by local and trans-national organisations were
being undertaken who, after hit and run raids, escape
through porous borders. |
| (iv) |
Given the enormity of task involved in
controlling the post-conflict scenario, it was brought out
that in Iraq, dispersed deployment has resulted in small
band of terrorists or insurgents provoking local garrisons
into using extraordinary force, increasing collateral
damage, thereby further alienating local populace. Lack of
adequate interpreters was another problem highlighted. |
| (v) |
Difficulties faced by the US forces in
stabilising the situation were attributed to lack of
planning, inexperience in fighting urban warfare, over
dependence on shock and awe tactics, and inability to
handle two local conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan)
simultaneously. |
|
| (e) |
Future Trends in Urban Warfare. "The need for
sufficient ground forces and the power of the boot" in urban
warfare in Iraq was not appreciated by the American forces.
According to analysts, future battlefield is likely to include
the whole of enemy's society and warfare will be widely
dispersed where the distinction between war and peace may
vanish. The difference between civilian and military may
disappear, as there would be no definable battlefields or
fronts. Major military and civil facilities will become targets.
The characteristics of this type of warfare combined with new
technology would possibly be the outline of the fourth
generation of warfare. However, urban warfare involves people,
and unless deliberate attempts are made to win them over,
nothing else will succeed. |
| (f) |
Security Scenario in the Iraqi Neighbourhood.
| (i) |
Although Iran was not an immediate
threat to the US in Iraq, it was acknowledged that, in the
long term, Iran may pose a threat to US interests in the
region primarily on account of sectarian Shia-Sunni divide
and continued instability and its impact on Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. |
| (ii) |
The US intrusion into the traditional
Russian turf of Central Asian Republics (CAR) worries
Moscow. What began as temporary American military presence
in Central Asia to facilitate the anti-terror war in
Afghanistan, far from winding up, is expanding. In
addition to Air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the US
is helping Kazakhstan to set up a naval base on the
Caspian Sea close to the Russian border, besides seeking
to lease three military bases in Tajikistan. |
| (iii) |
Lastly, unstable conditions in Iraq
impact India in many ways. Firstly, such conditions in the
strategic neighbourhood of India could become a rallying
point for jihadis and fundamentalists which could
adversely affect India's security environment. Secondly,
India's energy security is also impacted upon by the
continued instability in Iraq and the Middle East.
Thirdly, Middle East has a large migrant Indian population
and any spillover of instability in Iraq would affect
Indian interests |
|
Session II: Indo-Russian Bilateral Equations Including Military
This session examined the current and prospective dimensions of
bilateral defence and security relationship. An interesting facet of
the session was the contrasting perspective underscoring different
national concerns and perceptions. Tracing the history of Indo–Russian
bilateral cooperation Vice Admiral Khurana highlighted the following
:-
| (a) |
For a brief period, after the Cold War, India
did not find a place in Russia's strategic perception. The visit
to Russia by the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao,
in June 1994, culminated in the Moscow Declaration on
"Protection of Interests of Pluralist States". It became the
cornerstone of Indo-Russian relations. The strategic partnership
was also spurred by the mutually shared interest in Central
Asian Region (CAR). |
| (b) |
Russia's unequivocal support on the issue of
Jammu and Kashmir and its critical support during crisis periods
underlined the long standing friendship between the two
countries. In the changed geo-strategic environment both
countries share common perceptions on most international
security issues including total commitment to fighting religious
extremism and terrorism. |
| (c) |
The area of Defence cooperation also
reflected the growing relationship. This relationship, in fact,
has moved beyond buyer-seller relationship to that of wider
concept of transfer of technology. The term used by the Russians
in this context is – Equipment and Defence Technology (EDT).
Military technical cooperation was gaining ground. Brahmos was a
shining example of this joint venture in Defence technology.
Another example was of Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). |
| (e) |
Another aspect highlighted was multinational
joint collaborative efforts, which incorporated latest
technological achievements of other countries such as France and
Israel. Some of these technologies have already been dovetailed
and integrated into Russian systems. SU–30MK1 is an example of
such cooperation between Sukhoi Design Office and French SNECM. |
| (f) |
It was reiterated that the problems of
maintenance of equipment and inadequate supply of spare parts
with suitable clauses being incorporated into the new contracts,
would be addressed. The creation of Rosoboron Services (India)
Ltd, consequent to a decree by the Russian President, was a
welcome step. The creation of a bonded warehouse to stock
Russian equipment and the nucleus of Russian and Indian
specialists to provide technical back up are some of the other
confidence enhancing steps. |
In his presentation, Lieutenant General Khlimenko A F (Retd) indicated
the strong bilateral relations enshrined in mutuality of interests
signified by the Treaty on "Friendship and cooperation between India
and Russian Federation", signed in 1994, "Declaration on Strategic
Partnership" signed in 2000, and strong Indo–Russian defence
relationship in terms of "Long-term programme of military and
technical cooperation upto the year 2000". As a consequence, by the
end 2000, export of Russian arms and equipment to India totalled
nearly US $ 3.7 billion (about 30 per cent of all export supplies from
Russia).
Lieutenant General Khlimenko also highlighted some problems in Indo –
Russian relations such as maintenance of the arms and equipment
delivered by Russia to India and the delivery of spare parts.
Furthermore, Russia is unable to cover some Indian needs and does not
have certain technologies that meet the world standards. In the case
of delivery of arms, delay was attributed to the absence of the treaty
on the protection of intellectual property. he acknowledged that the
time schedule of delivery of arms and equipment from Russia to India
was slower in relation to world standards.
Given these limitations, concern was expressed over growing Indo-US
military cooperation. To buttress Indo-Russian cooperation in the new
environment, three perspective spheres were mentioned. These included
continuing struggle against terrorism; revival of Afghanistan's
economy; and the exploitation of hydrocarbon sources in the Caspian
and Central Asian basins.
On the issue of strategic partnership, Russians provided an
interesting perspective. The term "strategic partnership" signifies a
form of mutual activity of countries that is considered to be
long-ranged, based on the legal recognition of their mutual interests,
equal rights, advantages as well as commitment and mutual
responsibility directed to achieve certain strategic goals. Strategic
partnership in the military sphere relates to the high level of
cooperation. This partnership unlike the military-coalition vision
does not bear any military threat to other countries. Its main task is
to find an alternative to force oriented solutions. The main method of
solving problems is finding concerned partners and mutually working
out appropriate measures in a wide range of political, diplomatic and
economic assets, short of military action. The main aspect of the
practical policy of strategic partnership is to analyse upcoming
situations and act pre-emptively against destabilising factors. Within
the above construct the main spheres of strategic partnership
include:-
| (a) |
Pre-emptive approach to solving security
problems, which can influence a situation before the negative
consequences appear. |
| (b) |
Priority of political and other peaceful
measures in solving emergent problems and conflict situations. |
| (c) |
Coordination of security policy, not causing
damage to one another and other partners. |
| (d) |
Refusal to enter into a military coalition
without approval of all partners and refusal to take part in any
actions against an ally that can impair its interests. |
| (e) |
Transparency of activities in the military
sphere. |
He gave an example of step-by-step preparation for multilateral
cooperation within the framework of the SCO to highlight the above
principles. In this regard, the following aspects were highlighted :-
| (a) |
Russians laid stress on the
multilateral cooperation frame work of the SCO and advocated
India's case for full membership of the SCO. They suggested that
India join the Regional Counter Terrorism structure (RCTS) of
the SCO. |
| (b) |
Russia, India and China could
move towards a multipolar world. |
| (c) |
SCO mechanism could be used to
solve the Indo-Pakistan problem, which inter alia would reduce
terrorist threats all around including from Pakistan's
territories. |
| (d) |
It advocated India and China
working together with Russia, Kazhakstan and Iran to ensure
energy security. The Ministerial Round Table organised by India
on 25 November 2005, on cooperation between North and Central
Asian producers and principal Asian consumers for stability,
security and sustained availability in Asian hydrocarbon
economy, was welcomed. This meeting was attended by CAR, China,
Japan, South Korea and Turkey. |
| (e) |
An interesting suggestion
related to consolidation of Chinese military technologies and
productive capacities, which had a great potential for exchange
on trilateral basis. |
Observations on Session II
This was an interesting session which highlighted the Russian military
perceptions of the direction in which Indo-Russian security and
defence ties were shaping, their particular concern related to the
military dimension of the Indo-US relations, in particular US emerging
as the main armament supplier to India. It was clarified that India
will take an independent decision on arms procurement in relation to
its technological and strategic requirements. Other issues included
the following :-
| (a) |
SCO appears to be the vehicle through which
Russia wants to keep an economically strong China engaged.
Russia has a huge border with China but does not have the
capacity and capability to defend it. |
| (b) |
Russia's own economic might
rests only on three pillars namely energy reserves, natural and
raw materials and military hardware itself. It does not have any
industry and infrastructure to boast of. Its transition from
Soviet days to market economy and globalisation has ensured that
most of its consumer goods requirements have to be met through
imports. China did not shed its communistic hold while opening
its markets and got into a massive manufacturing potential and
creation of infrastructure in industrial belts along the eastern
seaboard. Russia is yet to gain direction and be in a position
to boast of any fresh infrastructure or manufacturing capacity. |
| (c) |
Exploration of oil and natural
gas particularly in Western Siberia is very capital intensive
and it needs investment which the Chinese are very eager to
provide. Going whole hog with China would, however, be
foolhardy. It finds that equal investment from India will
provide a safeguard against loosing major control to the
Chinese. |
| (d) |
Russia perceives numerous
pressures from China in the not too distant future, be it
population influx or Chinese influence in CAR. |
| (e) |
On the issue of arms supply and
joint design and development, Russia was keen to maintain
existing relationships but continued to harp on Intellectual
Property Rights (IPP) related constraints. |
Session III: The Current Crisis in the International Collective
Security Mechanisms and the Future of the United Nations
The session discussed the current crisis in the international security
mechanisms of a unipoiar world as well as the role of the United
Nations and regional organisations. Important aspects emerging out of
this session included:-
| (a) |
The very premise of creating a collective
international system, it was argued had been violated, for
example principle of sovereign equality, settlement of disputes
peacefully, no authority to intervene in domestic affairs of any
state etc. Interestingly while the UN was excluded from many
conflict situations it can claim justifiable credit for
assisting in decolonisation and dismantling of apartheid,
promoting some degree of democracy, and efforts at control and
reduction of nuclear arms and production of chemical weapons.
This has been possible on account of agencies like UNHCR,
UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, etc, as also on account of peace keeping
operations in many parts of the globe despite the Cold War
constraints. |
| (b) |
In the post cold war world, the UN has been
reduced to being a tool to serve the interests of major players,
often to the detriment of developing or less developed
countries. The tendency of unilateral action has considerably
undermined the authority and sanctity of the UN. Even the
quality and content of UN Peace Keeping (UNPK) operations has
changed for the worse. |
| (c) |
Following were some of the major reasons for
international crisis :-
| (1) |
first, the term security relating to
sovereignty of state has gradually been replaced by other
self serving terms beyond traditional international law,
exemplified by shift of emphasis from protection of
"collective security" to "collective interests". |
| (2) |
Second, the creation of new structures
parallel to the UN by a small circle of powerful
international players, who are extremely influential in
security matters. By working outside the system and
pressurising the UN on issues like funding, they were
attempting to marginalise the UN and reduce it to a
performa role
|
|
| (d) |
Regional multinational and regional
operations were welcomed, especially given the growing
constraints of the UNPK operations, provided they had the
endorsement of the UN Security Council. |
| (e) |
American unilateralism in Iraq was severely
criticised, especially in the face of devastation within that
country. While the tragedy that had befallen Iraq could not be
undone, the key issue remains as to how long will the
international community allow this tragedy to perpetuate. |
| (f) |
For the UN this is a defining moment. Recent
events have shaken the foundations of collective security and
undermined confidence in possibility of collective responses to
our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to fore
deep differences of opinion on the range and nature of
challenges we face and are likely to face in future. |
| (g) |
The principles of containment and deterrence
are increasingly being replaced with pre-emption. This threatens
to challenge the very fundamental core on which the collective
security paradigm rests. It is crucial to go beyond denouncing
unilateralism, by recognising these concerns and showing that
these can be addressed effectively through collective action. |
| (h) |
The fundamental issue is to decide whether we
can continue on the basis of our past beliefs and agreed
principles or introduce radical changes. It is in this context
that we need to examine the composition of the Security Council
to make it more representative; strengthen the General Assembly
and examine the role of the UN as a whole on economic and social
issues, including its relationship with Breton Wood's
institutions. It is also important to review and strengthen
international regimes on issues like proliferation of NBC
weapons and counter terrorism. |
| (i) |
Based on the Report of the high level panel
and the UN Secretary General's report to the 2005 World Summit,
an Outcome Document was prepared and adopted, which lays down
the overarching framework of structural reform process for the
United Nations more attuned to emerging global realities. While
some important steps have been taken like creation of a Human
Rights Council and a Peace Building Commission, there is little
consensus either on implementation of these proposals or on
critical issues like definition of terrorism. |
| (k) |
Recognising that regional organisations are
part of the UN Charter, stress was laid on their constructive
role in complementing the UN activities particularly
peacemaking, provided they have Security Council's endorsement.
Nevertheless, the expanding charter and role of military blocs
such as NATO was viewed with concern. |
| (l) |
During discussion, the role of regional
organisations such as SCO and CSTO for maintenance of regional
security was discussed. This was particularly so as in some
countries there was reluctance on the part of the UN to get
involved on account of larger geopolitical considerations.
General consensus was that such roles were acceptable if
mandated by the Security Council |
Session IV: "Challenges to Peace and Stability in Central
Asia-Afghanistan Region in the Coming Decade
This session was devoted to dealing with regional security issues of
common concern. The Russians laid great stress on the SCO as a model
for multilateral cooperation particularly from the point of view of
maintaining military and political stability in Central Asia. Some of
the important perspectives emerging out of this session are discussed
in subsequent paragraphs.
First and foremost there was a three way power play underway in
Central Asia. The American foothold in Central Asia has helped
accentuate Western soft power through colour revolutions, friendship
for peace programmes etc. Russia, on the other hand has always seen
the region as a strategic buffer against outside threats.
Consequently, many strategic interests compel Russia to retain Central
Asia within its sphere of influence. Further, Russia was attempting to
regain its leverages through both bilateral and multilateral
instrumentalities such as CSTO and the SCO, apart from a plethora of
economic cooperative arrangements. There are four major strategic
interests driving Russian interests in CAR. One, transform Central
Asia into a politically and economically viable entity that is
friendly towards Russia. Second, secure Russian economic interest in
the region particularly the regional energy resources including
transportation corridors. Third, to counter the threat of religious
extremism while encouraging the prevention of drug trafficking and
arms smuggling. Fourth, secure the rights of the large Russian
diaspora living in the region. China believes that the region holds
the key to maintaining momentum of its economic growth as also
security of its troubled periphery. Development of economic, political
and security relations remain an important construct of its "Look
West" policy, for which SCO remains its principal instrument.
Second, there was a growing strategic convergence between China and
Russia and increasing isolation of the US – made imminent in the
withdrawal of troops from bases in CAR. Nonetheless, the consequence
of unease was being felt, both, by political elites of CAR as also
Russia and China over the inroads and democratisation drive being made
by the US and NATO. Interestingly, despite the utility of the US
forces being limited in local political conflicts, the US was in no
mood to downgrade its engagement. It was in fact impervious to such
involvement.
In contrast, the growing Russian engagement promised investment and
creation of a collective security force to deal with internal security
issues. This was seen in the attempts at resurrection of CSTO and
creation of a standing force to deal with regional conflicts.
China is clearly attempting to enhance its strategic influence,
through military cooperation, and infrastructural and trade linkages.
It is the leading force in pushing the SCO agenda, transcending to
full fledged security outfit with military connotations. It was also
seeking bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The Russian and Indian Perspectives
From the Russian perspective, CAR was gradually moving towards
being a significant geopolitical and yet vulnerable region. It was
emerging as much a geopolitical centre as being a part of "instability
arc" comprising the Balkans-Caucasus-South Asia-South East Asia.
The geo-strategic and political picture in CAR was likely to be
significantly different in 2015 from what is perceived today. The
region could face a range of security threats, both conventional and
unconventional, including extremism, terrorism, and other
transnational and global threats. It was likely to remain mired in big
power jockeying for influence and control over hydrocarbon resources.
Russians felt that the objective need was for a systems approach to
address regional concerns through collective efforts -aimed at both
political integration and economic development for regional stability.
There is a need to evolve a consensual approach for inter regional
cooperation and multilateral engagement defined by SCO, the CSTO etc.
They stressed that owing to its geopolitical location, Russia alone
was best suited to provide desired level of security guarantees.
Given the evolving regional political dynamics and developing
economies, comprehensive cooperation and resolution of issues through
peaceful means provided the best guarantee for peace and stability.
And, to ensure peace and stability, it was important to validate
existing mechanisms in relation to emerging challenges – growing
external influences, intra-regional problems and nontraditional
threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking and small arms-smuggling
etc. For future conflict prevention and stability, it was imperative
to safeguard territorial integrity and preserve national interests of
all states in the region. The Russians suggested that new security
architecture could be created only through gradual process of
integration brought about by bilateral and multilateral engagement
based on regional institutions. The main directions of Russian
security policy were defined as:-
| (a) |
Choice for multilateral world order, based on
respect for international law. |
| (b) |
Equal opportunities for all states without
political or military coercion (forced democracy). |
| (c) |
Policy of mutual understanding, conflict
prevention and resolution, based on collective security that
supports decreasing use of force. |
| (d) |
Central Asia should not degenerate into an
area of big power competition. It is important that all regional
states are brought on board to ensure peaceful regional
development and to address multifaceted security challenges. |
| (e) |
Recommended a multilateral approach, wherein
CAR, China, Russia and important countries on the periphery to
include India, Pakistan and Iran, worked in tandem. This was the
rationale behind Russia pushing for India's inclusion as an
observer in SCO and in future for its membership. |
India's interests in CAR on the other hand including the SCO observer
status was based on its need to diversify energy requirements; create
strong economic and political linkages by extending trade networks;
prevent hostile combination or strategic repositioning in CAR inimical
to Indian interests; and to deal
with the challenge of terrorism and their transregional linkages e.g.
IMU.
The Likely Scenarios
Three possible scenarios were postulated – the Near Term (2005-2010),
Medium Term (2010-2020) and the Long Term (2020 and beyond. In the
near term, it is estimated that the Sino-Russian cooperation would go
a long way to balance US influence. The US and NATO policy would be
one of engagement and containment of CAR, Russia and China. CAR
meanwhile would try and balance policies between the two competing
interests to maximise advantage for itself. However, there were
certain critical uncertainties in the form of developments in
Afghanistan and West Asia, the extent of revival of fundamentalism in
Central Asia and the level of competition between China and Russia.
Another contentious issue will be dynamics of energy politics.
In the medium term, the rise of China could induce greater
Russian-American accommodation. The Russian influence if leveraged
properly could grow. There could also be an increase in NATO's
influence as part of overall eastern engagement strategy. Two wild
cards in this scenario are reaction of China towards growing
Russo-Chinese and possible Indian convergence over Central Asia as
also possible emergence of a Russia-China-Iran axis, exacerbated by
American intervention in Iran. On the other hand, depending upon
developments in Afghanistan and fructification of AP pipeline,
salience of Pakistan could enhance, aided by growing Sino-Pak
relations.
The long term scenario fashions a growth of Chinese economic and
military power, Russian economic revival and India's economic growth
and power potential. In addition, the scenario could be impacted by
the consequences of the success or failure of the US, West and Central
Asian policies.
Areas of Future Cooperation
In the concluding session both delegations agreed that deliberations
over the last two days were of great interest and helped in greater
understanding of issues of common concern. It was also decided to take
the dialogue forward. The following areas of joint interaction were
suggested by the USI delegation:-
| (a) |
Identify joint projects including simulation
exercises that can be taken up by two Institutions on
cooperative basis. |
| (b) |
Consider multilateral dialogue to include China
and Japan. |
| (c) |
To give fillip to peace keeping efforts joint
seminars under the auspices of USI Centre for United Nations
Peace Keeping (CUNPK) should be held. |
| (d) |
Special forces joint training and exercises on
reciprocal basis was suggested which USI could help taking
forward through both Service Headquarters and the Ministry of
Defence. |
The Russian side while appreciating the suggestions, promised to take
up these suggestions with their Ministry of Defence.
The Military Chief's Club
The Indian delegation paid a visit to Military Chiefs Club founded
by the veterans from the Military, Diplomatic and Civil Services as
also Intelligence agencies. However the prime motivators remain
retired senior military officials. The founder President of this club
is the Marshal of Russian Federation and Hero of Russia, ID Sergeev.
In the words of VP Ivonov, Assistant to the Russian President Vladimir
Putin, "the task of the Military club is to combine intellectual,
official, and professional potential of senior military officials in
strengthening and developing the Russian society and state". The Club
is a nascent organisation established as an independent NGO, which is
still in the process of establishing itself. Broad areas of its
activities include :-
| (a) |
Promotion of steady development of Russia in
political, economic and social fields, international relations,
education, culture, science, and so on. |
| (b) |
Development of cooperation with international
organisations involved in similar tasks. |
| (c) |
Mobilisation of country's social potential, for
raising national prestige by highlighting courage, resilience
and heroism of the Armed Forces. |
| (d) |
Improving social protection and guarantees of
Armed Forces personnel, by laying down conditions for their
social integration. |
Meeting with the USI delegation was at best exploratory in nature to
find common areas of interest. Mutual dialogue helped in providing
understanding of each other's activities and opening up number of
areas which could be considered for future cooperation. Marshal
Sergeev summed up the interaction by suggesting "there are a lot of
possibilities of cooperation with the Indian Institute to resist
global challenges".
Concluding Observations
Some interesting facets of our interaction are discussed below:-
| (a) |
There appeared to be an
apprehension in the mind of Russians that growing Indo-US
bilateral relations could in the long run impact bilateral arms
sale relationship. This correlation is looked upon as the major
plank of overall defence relationship. For the Russian military,
sustenance of strong buyer and seller relationship appeared
important even if these were subsumed within joint production or
design and development like the fifth generation transport plane
programmes. |
| (b) |
Strengthening of bilateral
trade and economic relationship was something that was not
discussed. They remain Eurocentric in their thinking on trade
and related issues. However, in private interaction our
Ambassador remained upbeat about the inevitable growth of
Indo-Russian trade relations from its present level of close to
just over two billion dollars. |
| (c) |
On joint exercises and greater
military to military interaction, certain amount of reticence
was noticed. They appear to be quite impressed by Chinese
technological and force modernisation strategies. In private,
they acknowledged that while major wars were unlikely, border
and regional conflicts are a distinct possibility. Therefore,
the current military transformation effort is linked to
developing capabilities to fight such wars. |
| (d) |
In private conversation they
acknowledged the declining edge of their conventional
capabilities, which is something they are looking forward to
address through structured modernisation programme.
Interestingly, great emphasis was placed on nuclear deterrence
which was being maintained at relatively advanced levels,
inspite of financial constraints. |
| (e) |
Prominance was accorded to the
SCO as a model of regional cooperation, where the interests of
all the three major Asian powers coincide. It appeared that
Russia was keen on India coming on board in the regional
framework essentially to contain growing Chinese influence. |
| (f) |
On the issue of joint
Indo-Russian-Chinese interaction, often speculated by media,
Russians were categorical that these were unlikely in the near
future. However, they were keen to promote such interaction
within the framework of the SCO. |
Overall, the visit was marked by a great degree of conviviality and
forthrightness resulting in free and frank exchange of ideas and
understanding of each other's perspectives. The Russian hosts were
extremely hospitable and went out of the way to make the delegation
comfortable. It is also important to put on record the extremely
supportive and caring role played by the Indian Embassy in Moscow and
the personal interest shown by the Ambassador in making the visit of
the USI Delegation a great success. Our sincere thanks to the Military
Wing of the Indian Embassy including the Military attaché who provided
complete administrative support. On the whole, it was a useful
interaction, which the USI would certainly like to sustain.
|
