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As an emerging free nation in 1947, reaching out to the world,
India's expectations from America were high. For the Americans, India
was only a small player, even if there was no lack of goodwill. As
events played out, Indian disappointment and frustration grew, matched
by American annoyance and neglect. Emotionalism ruled the day.
Personality compatibility or otherwise at the leadership level also
played its part. The two countries drifted apart.
Today, more than fifty years later, we seem to be going through a
repeat performance. The coming together of the two countries is being
invested with much emotion and drama. The American pronouncements
would suggest that America has rediscovered India. The Indian reaction
is highly emotional – one of joy at being at last recognised and the
other of suspicion and apprehension born out of past experience.
The term describing the unfolding relations, Strategic Partnership, is
itself seductive. It is a partnership (signifying that we are both on
the same side, but not in an alliance against any third party). And it
is strategic because it holds out a long-term perspective, involving
resources and capabilities on both sides in a whole range of areas,
including key areas of cutting edge high technology in defence,
civilian nuclear cooperation and space, etc. It also suggests a
partnership in dealing with global and not just bilateral issues.
At the time of independence, Indo-US relationship had everything going
for it. Roosevelt was well disposed towards Indian independence and
there was enormous goodwill when free India unfurled its national
flag. India was one of the few countries outside the Western group
with a written constitution guaranteeing human rights, modelled very
much on the American Bill of Rights and Constitution, and a
functioning multicultural democracy. But soon things started turning
sour and during the years that followed, the relationship has been
shaky, mostly downward, except in the last few years. Perceptions and
policies on both sides had a lot to do with it. On the US side, our
refusal to align with the US during the cold war was the biggest crime
in the US's eyes. Our non-alignment was seen as deviant behaviour and
only an excuse for our pro-Soviet postures and policies. "Anyone not
with me is against me" was the American rule applied to others. Our
mixed economy and socialist pattern of society, projected by
Jawaharlal Nehru, was anathema to them and came in the way of any
significant economic interaction. Nuclear non-proliferation became an
American obsession following the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In
the policy of encirclement of the Soviet Union with Central Treaty
Organisation (CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO),
Pakistan became the focus of an American strategic alliance. Pakistan
could do no wrong in American eyes and in all policies and actions in
relation to South Asia, India and Pakistan were hyphenated. India's
failure to condemn Soviet action in Hungary shocked the Americans, and
years later in 1979, our refusal to condemn their invasion of
Afghanistan was cited as proof of India being firmly in the Soviet
camp.
On the Indian side, non-alignment was its policy, but India was
partial to the Soviets. The US support to Pakistan on Jammu and
Kashmir, the supply of weapons to Pakistan against India's earnest
appeal, in the belief that they would be used to fight communism, the
infamous tilt in favour of Pakistan in 1971 and the sailing of the USS
Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal, convinced India that the US could
see India only through the prism of Pakistan. The goodwill generated
by Food Aid and the support extended after the Chinese invasion in
1962 was easily dissipated, leaving a firm undercurrent of suspicion
and misturst. Post-Pokhran 1974, sanctions were accepted by India as
the price it had to pay; but the denial of fuel for Tarapur, following
the US domestic legislation, in violation of a bilateral agreement,
was seen as an act of perfidy.
The end of the cold war in 1989 and after has brought a sea-change in
world politics, and Indo-US relations are no exception. It would be
fair to say that the change in attitude is more apparent on the US
side than the Indian side. Paradoxically, Pokhran 1998, while
upsetting the nonproliferation regime, and sending shockwaves around
the world, especially in the US, also sparked off a rethinking towards
India and its position in Asia and the emerging world order. This
shift became evident in the Clinton era, but has assumed a big thrust
under President George W Bush. The neo-conservative think tanks have
been busy throwing up the contours of a new vision of the world, in
which India has a prominent role. As a result, Indo-American relations
have received a major boost.
Recognition of India as a prospective major player in Asia with an
emerging global role is central to the new way of looking at India,
even if India is not being billed specifically as a counterweight to
China. Our record as a democracy and in promoting human rights and
freedom is finally acknowledged. But what is new is the liberalisation
of our economy, opening up of our market, combined with the burgeoning
growth rate of our economy. Vistas of cooperation in the knowledge and
Information Technology (IT) sector particularly are opening up,
attracting American entrepreneurs, industry and trade. The vast
reservoir of professionals that India can harness is one of the main
attractions.
A talk given by under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns to the Asia
Society in New York in October 2005 and an article by Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice set out the American perspective. The former
emphasises how, to many policy makers meeting at the Asia Society in
the past, Asia meant China, Japan etc. Now South Asia is on the radar
screen, and especially India will receive particular attention. He
observes "successive Administrations in Washington and Delhi
approached each other alternately with episodic engagement on the one
hand, but with wariness and even downright opposition on the other".
Noting that the estrangement of the past with India is turning into
engagement, given the initiative of President Clinton and now pursued
under the Bush Administration, he goes over the many aspects it has
assumed. He quotes President Bush's succinct summing up of Indo-US
relations.
"This century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the
world. The trend lines of the past two decades suggest clearly that
India will steadily acquire the economic, political, and strategic
capabilities that set it along the path to becoming one of the major
centres of global power. As such, it is in our national interest to
develop a strong, forward looking relationship with India as the
political and economic focus of the global system shifts inevitably
eastward to Asia".
From the Indian perspective, opening up of relations with the US
across the board is obviously very welcome. It would certainly be to
India's advantage to develop cooperative relations with the US, even
if it were not the uni-polar, hyper-power that it is today. In fact,
it would be foolhardy not to take advantage of all emerging
opportunities to this end. Whether America needs India more than India
needs America is a moot question which need not distract us now. We
can benefit substantially from greater bilateral cooperation and by
working together in areas of mutual interest. Rationally viewed, there
should be no disagreement on this point.
A whole series of agreements have been signed in the last two years,
especially after the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
initiative was launched in January 2004 – to open a dialogue and build
mutual trust in a number of sensitive areas as defence, space and
nuclear energy, high technology, aeronautics, economic exchange at
corporate level and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dialogue and people
to people interaction. More and more Indian students are studying in
the US now than in any other country and Indians in the US number
nearly two million, many of them professionals of high calibre.
Unfortunately, however, Indians seem to be surrendering to
emotionalism. The ideologues have raised anti-US slogans and this has
driven the other side into overdrive, seeing more virtue in American
declarations and actions than is warranted. The civil nuclear
cooperation deal, especially, has sparked off a heated debate.
Doubts about the deal were voiced soon after it had been signed.
Official reticence to clarify the issues raised, while lauding the
accord in a self-congratulatory mode, deepened these doubts. When
details of the separation plan started leaking out, the doubts became
real. The scientific community as well as the strategic fraternity is
clearly divided in their views. Everyone seems to agree on the
principle that the autonomy of strategic decision-making should not be
impaired in any way. But, there is a difference of opinion whether
there would be such an impact or not. The media is also having a field
day; but its partisanship has exceeded normal limits, some of the
comments speaking disparagingly of the scientists.
Even admitting that the agreement is a landmark one, which could help
boost our nuclear energy production and defreezing of the constraints
in technology cooperation, the question of what price India would be
asked to pay still remains vague.
It needed the outspoken remarks of an anguished head of the Atomic
Energy Department, about the Americans changing the goal-posts, to
jolt everyone. Now, it appears that the argument over the Fast Breeder
Reactors (FBRs) is over, and it will be kept out. But not entirely, it
would seem. It is speculated that it would be brought into the
civilian list after 10 to 15 years.
Critics on the American side have argued strongly against bending the
rules only to accommodate India, as it would risk jeopardising the
entire non proliferation regime. Against this, the Administration
strongly contends that it would bring India securely into the non
proliferation framework. Even for the Democrat leader, John Kerry, the
main attraction is that the deal would strengthen the global non
proliferation regime by bringing India into it. It is obvious that the
Americans are using the strategy of nuclear energy cooperation to
bring us on board. These statements and the whole discussion on what
should or should not be included in the civil list would provide the
final answer to anyone harbouring the illusion that the deal implies
recognition of sorts of India as a nuclear weapon state. The Americans
sought to cap, roll back and eventually eliminate India's nuclear
weapon and missile programme. This was during the mid-1980s. After
1998, this was no longer tenable. But they are still seeking to
contain the nuclear weapon capability of India. The present deal, in
conjunction with the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) as and
when it is negotiated, would effectively do this. The obligations
undertaken by the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) in respect of
safeguards and inspections are entirely voluntary but the obligations
India is being asked to assume under the deal are not; they will not
only have to get the approval of the US Congress now; but even in the
future, they could be subject to scrutiny and regulation by others.
That India has been a responsible nuclear power and has scrupulously
refrained from proliferation activity, even though it is not party to
the NPT, is acknowledged. We have often alluded, in contrast, to the
sins of omission and commission committed by several NPT signatory
countries. Our rejection of the NPT still holds.
While we have taken several steps to align ourselves with others by
putting in place controls up to the level of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)
and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and passed the Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act, there should have been no need for any
further demonstration of our commitment to non proliferation. The
separation of civilian facilities from the military ones should have
been left entirely to India's volition and not have been allowed to
become the subject of negotiation as was witnessed during negotiation
on the deal.
Similar emphasis was observed in another address in November 2005 by
the Prime Minister at the 40th anniversary function of Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
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"The breakdown of effective international
mechanisms also affects the security of individual countries. As
long as terrorism was seen as a phenomenon that was 'elsewhere',
the international community was unwilling to adopt an effective
coordinated strategy to deal with this menace which constitutes
a grave threat to the civilised world. Similarly, the
international regime against proliferation is also under stress.
It is clear that the existing system of unequal and
discriminatory rules, based on the nuclear NPT is deeply flawed.
It has permitted unchecked proliferation by some, while
preventing countries such as ours from acting in its economic
and security interests. An effective non proliferation framework
that addresses our security interests while simultaneously
encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear energy is in our vital
national interests". |
The reference to an effective non proliferation framework (distinct
from the discredited NPT) is significant. India's signing up on the
American initiatives such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and Container Security Initiative (CSI) are steps in this direction.
The clandestine activity in our neighbourhood has been deplored in the
context of the suspect nuclear programme of Iran. Indians were taken
by surprise consequent to voting at the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna against Iran. The warnings and threats
repeated by influential Americans strengthened the impression that
India voted under pressure. But the Government has denied this. The
statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament stressed that it was
entirely India's decision, not dictated by the Americans. But the
grounds on which India determined its enlightened national interest
merit analysis. Iran's nuclear programme may be suspect; but while
Indians talk insistently of finding a solution through calm reasoned
diplomacy, is it reasonable to expect Iran to come back to the
negotiating table, under the threat of referral to the Security
Council and with an American gun pointed at its head? Presumably,
friends of Iran like India are trying to persuade Iran to be
reasonable, but isn't there an obligation on the others not to up the
ante with attacks and accusations in unrestrained language? Is there
any evidence that Indians are similarly persuading their American
friends to be more restrained and not to demonise Iran and issue
warlike ultimatums? The Prime Minister is on record that India does
not want another nuclear weapon power in its neighbourhood. But
whoever wanted a nuclear weapon power in the neighbourhood, anytime,
anywhere else? Did any of India's neighbours in South Asia want India
and Pakistan to become nuclear weapon powers?
How do we prevent another new nuclear weapon power emerging? By riding
on the backs of the Americans who are going to bomb the Iranians into
submission? Or letting the Israelis do their job? We are reminding
Iran that it should honour its international commitments.
Much has been said also about the Walmart type nuclear weapon retailer
from Pakistan viz AQ Khan. But despite all the exposures no effort is
being made to bring the offender and the powers in control at the time
in Pakistan to book, because, for one thing, no American
Administration is willing to go down that path.
For thirty years, India suffered under a technology denial regime. As
a result of that, we indigenised and managed to develop our own
weapons and civilian nuclear capability. Now there is reason to
celebrate the prospect of the end to that denial era and the beginning
of a cooperation era. But in our enthusiasm, are we not in danger of
embracing conditionalities which might constrain or straitjacket us in
new ways?
It has been forcefully and correctly argued that we should no longer
be guided by the thought processes of the cold war period, that we
should move with the times and adapt our thinking and policies to the
realities and compulsions of the contemporary world and that we should
be ready to seize the opportunities opening up in this new
environment. But it makes no sense to jump at everything that is
offered, without subjecting it to a rigorous calculus of pros and
cons. our response should also be tempered by the lessons drawn from
our past experience in dealing with the US. It is childish to reject
these as manifestations of an old mindset and to categorise anyone who
voices such doubts and warnings as living in a time warp.
A dispassionate examination of the American statements and phraseology
used would well justify greater caution and pragmatism. The repeated
use of "great power" in respect of India is not without tactical
motivations. Condoleezza Rice asserts for a balance of power that
favours freedom, structured on six powers – the US, Japan and Russia,
EU, China and India, which would together build a more durable form of
global stability. How far does this fit in with the Indian world view?
Does India subscribe to this theory of balance of power of six states?
Africa and Latin America find no mention. The "freedom deficit" in the
Middle East is highlighted, but the entire Islamic world, as a force
in world politics to be reckoned with, is not noted. The dynamics
within the weak and failed states are perceived as the greatest
threats to international security – freedom and democracy are the
prescriptions but there is no mention of poverty alleviation through
collective commitment and endeavour. To be sure, freedom and democracy
are essential. But, American priorities and methods may not always
coincide with ours. From the Indian perspective, the preservation of
bio-diversity of humans around the world is important. For the
Americans, this would seem to be not too important, in the context of
their overall concept of world security and stability. For a country
and people whose pride and strength derives from its plurality,
America does not seem to give too much thought to preserving the
plurality of peoples and cultures, or values, around the world.
At the same time, a better understanding of how the American mind
works, their institutions function and the entire system operates is
necessary. In this context, I found fascinating a recent book
published by the Princeton University edited by Michael Ignatieff on
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights. Although its focus is on
human rights, the analysis holds equally for other domains. I would
like to share a few excerpts with you from his introduction.
Ignatieff argues thus :
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"Thanks to Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt,
the United States took a leading role in the creation of the
United Nations and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948. Throughout the Cold War and afterward, few
nations placed more emphasis in their foreign policy on the
promotion of human rights, market freedom, and political
democracy...
The same US government, however, has also supported
rights-abusing regimes from Pinochet's Chile to Suharto's
Indonesia; sought to scuttle the International Criminal Court,
the capstone of an enforceable global human rights regime;
maintained practices -– like capital punishment -- at variance
with the human rights standards of other democracies; engaged in
unilateral pre-emptive military actions that other states
believe violate the UN Charter; failed to ratify the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women; and ignored UN bodies when they
criticised US domestic rights practices. What is exceptional
here is not that the United States is inconsistent,
hypocritical, or arrogant. many other nations, including leading
democracies, could be accused of the same things. What is
exceptional, and worth explaining, is why America has both been
guilty of these failings and also been a driving force behind
the promotion and enforcement of global human rights.
While the focus of this book will be on human rights,
exceptionalism is also a feature of the US attitudes toward
environmental treaties like the Kyoto Protocol as well as the
Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. Since the
attack of 11 September 2001 it has been accused of violating the
Conventions as well as the Torture Convention in its handling of
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and other detention
facilities.
This pattern of behaviour raises a fundamental question about
the very place of the world's most powerful nation inside the
network of international laws and conventions that regulate a
globalising world. To what extent does the United States accept
constraints on its sovereignty through the international human
rights regime, international humanitarian law, and the UN
Charter rules on the use of force? To what degree does America
play by the rules it itself has helped to create?" |
Ignatieff distinguishes three separate strands of Exceptionalism:
Exemptionalism; Double Standards and Legal Isolationism.
The use of the epithet "strategic partnership" is also very deceptive,
though flattering. As of now, given the asymmetry in power between the
two, I am not sure if one can have a meaningful partnership in
strategic matters. But it could well signify the relationship that we
aspire to attain in the near future and let me concede that the
Americans wish to build Indian strengths in such a manner that such a
strategic partnership can be put in place. But what about the
asymmetry in goals and objectives?
Can we say with confidence that we share a common world vision and
that we have a common strategy to achieve it? Or is it that India
would be expected to go along with American objectives and subserve
American interests?
"The US and India are poised for a partnership that will be crucial in
shaping the international order in the 21st century," remarked
Ambassador Mulford. It is an exciting prospect; provided, our ideas on
the shape of the new order are based on a common understanding of each
other's interests.
India must identify its interests and strategies, objectives and
methods and go into serous dialogue with the Americans. It has been
well said that India still does not have long term strategy but only
short term goals. In such a situation, India should be all the more
careful not to rush into strategic frameworks that the American
establishment of the day formulates.
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