In Defence of Nuclear Weapons
Iran, the IAEA and International Politics

Dr Sudha Raman

The resumption of uranium conversion by Iran, concluding a two and a half years suspension of research, seems to have pulled the curtains down on the negotiate-process that had got underway in November 2004, between the EU-3 (Germany, France and Great Britain) and Iran. Iran had agreed to freeze its uranium enrichment related activities in exchange for an understanding from the EU-3 that they would broker a deal to provide inducements to Iran to give up its enrichment programme. Iran has broken the UN seals at its nuclear plant in Natanz and announced that it was restarting "small-scale" research¹. The resumption is regarded as a sovereign right and is stated to start under the supervision of international inspectors².

The Background

Iran is rich in oil and gas reserves and is regularly flaring off vast quantities of natural gas. It was during the Shah's regime, in the early 1970s, when it had good relations with both the US and Israel, that the civilian nuclear energy programme commenced³.  The signing of nuclear technology cooperation agreement between the former USSR and Iran saw this programme make leaps.

As of now, Iran has a uranium enrichment plant near Natanz, the Arak "heavy water" production plant and the laser-based uranium enrichment facilities. Tehran could use spent fuel from either the light-water reactor at Bushehr, the Russians are building the nuclear power station at Bushehr, or the heavy-water reactor at Arak to obtain plutonium or it could opt for a uranium based programme employing the enrichment facilities at Natanz. According to Gholamreza Aghazadeh of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, Isfahan is a uranium conversion facility⁴. Iran has allocated $215 million (1,940 billion Rials) for the construction of two new nuclear power plants⁵.

The IAEA Resolution

The IAEA has called on Iran to open its nuclear programme and complete inspections by signing an additional protocol to the NPT. It urges Iran to rectify its failures/breach of obligations⁶. Iran has been asked to suspend all uranium enrichment activities including uranium conversion, give up construction of heavy water nuclear reactor and give agency experts access to certain research and development locations and documentation⁷. The resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted on 24 September 2005 pertaining to implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, was approved by the 35 nation board of the UN's IAEA. It earned 22 votes in favour, one against (Venejuela) and 12 abstentions. In September, when the IAEA Board of Governors had finally declared Iran to be in non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT, it made way for the issue of Iran's nuclear programme to be transferred to the UNSC. It must be noted that Iran signed the NPT in 1968 as a non-nuclear state. Interestingly, it makes no direct allusion of a referral to the Security Council nor of any sanctions.

The IAEA happens to be the same technical body that had refused to endorse the US thesis on Iraqi possession of nuclear warfare in 2003⁸. The agency's safeguard inspections are focused on accounting for enriched uranium and other fissile material rather than on unearthing clandestine atomic weapons programmes.

From Iran …

Iran's response has been a hurt but determined retaliation against all those who had backed the American idea. On 28 September, Iran's Parliament voted to rush discussion of a bill that would oblige the government to scale back its cooperation with the UN's atomic watchdog⁹. With the argument that Iran is permitted under the nuclear non proliferation treaty to pursue such activities for peaceful purposes Iran has clearly indicated its intention of not wanting to give up its right to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel¹⁰. It asserts its inalienable right as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty, under Article IV of the NPT, to "develop, research, production…".

In late 2003, Iran signed the NPT protocol in order to assuage any trepidation that it may develop nuclear weapons under the garb of an atomic energy programme. However, Iran's parliament has not ratified the protocol. Hence the implementation of the protocol is not legally binding. It was given a single urgency status i.e. it takes precedence over regular legislation. If approved, this would urge the government to stop voluntary execution of the Additional protocol¹¹.

Iran is capable of taking recourse to legal right to maintain continuity in its enrichment program, particularly so when other states have the same right. In a clear cut a case of voluntary suspension, Iran had agreed twice with Britain, France and Germany to suspend enrichment activities and then resumed it. But, it has this far avoided any legal sanctions.

The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had approved legislation that would limit international access to the country's nuclear installations if the nation is reported to the U.N. Security Council¹².

The conversion into gas is a key step in generating nuclear fuel. The next step would be the enrichment of the gas into material that could be used either to generate electricity or to build a bomb. It is this stage of the process that Russia has offered to conduct. Russia, in turn, would stand to earn tens of millions of dollars in fees for the service¹³.

It must be remembered that Iran has the purchasing power to augment its nuclear programme. Perhaps, the current oil prices fashion a certain degree of international indulgence. The high oil prices have greatly bettered national revenue; it has also allowed the Iranian government to keep popular disaffection manageable. Infrastructure has improved, and shops are filled with imported electronic goods. And the young entrepreneurs are optimistic about their economic prospects. And the public in general desires various economic reforms to be implemented and soon¹⁴.

The Comments

Iran is located next to Russia, Pakistan and India - the three nuclear nations. Perhaps the first reaction of a nuclear Iran would be from Israel. Once it goes public with its nuclear armament it has been unforthcoming about, it would generate tremendous pressure on Egypt to join the nuclear club. The cascading effect would move towards Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia - who in turn would feel pressed to develop what are supposed to be varying existing programs¹⁵.

Europe, Russia and Japan though reluctant actors in this game because they do not wish to upset bilateral trade and political relations with Iran, they did suspend significant spheres of cooperation with the latter. Japan has decided on extensive investments in the Iranian oil sector if Iran signs the additional protocol. The Europeans suspended the talks with Iran in August when Iran, breaking an agreement to cease all uranium processing activities while the talks were under way, began converting uranium into gas at a plant in Isfahan, an activity that it has vowed to continue. Any progress in trade agreement between EU and Iran will depend on the latter's agreement to sign the protocol.

The United States fears that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the Bushehr reactor once it goes on line¹⁶. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stated that it is a question of whether Iran can be trusted especially after one has come to realise that Iran has not been exactly forthcoming about its facilities and abilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On 21 October 2005, France, UK and Germany did eventually convince Iran to address all IAEA requirements and issues, sign the additional protocol on inspections, and halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. In return they offered assistance to Iran's civil nuclear programme "when their concerns are fully resolved". As far as Germany is concerned, it would only seek U.N. action, if there was agreement within the European Union. The main task of the international community, said Germany's de Mazieres, is to thwart Iran's scientific advancements¹⁷.

Elsewhere, Persian Gulf leaders called for a nuclear weapon-free Middle East. The United Arab Emirates called for more action and less talk¹⁸. . The Gulf countries were apprehensive of Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant¹⁹. Tehran's nuclear ambitions dominated the closed-door meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which groups Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. A draft statement of the group's resolution obtained by Reuters had included a call for Iran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency but was deleted from the final version. One Gulf official said the council wanted to emphasise diplomacy in the case of Iran, "so as not to alienate Tehran."

Russia has the most influence on Iran's nuclear future. Not only do they maintain close cooperation, both also have mutual interest in the form of bordering states²⁰. Russia did persist that Iran sign the additional protocol. Russia is yet to fuel the reactor at Bushehr until Iran agrees to return spent fuel to Russia. It must be noted that the Chinese need Iran's oil and the Russians make billions supplying Iran's civilian nuclear business. Russian compromise formula envisaging that Iran produced uranium gas (hexafluoride), which would be processed into enriched uranium by Russia to fuel Iranian nuclear reactors²¹, has been refused. The reactor spent fuel was to be returned to Russia for safeguarding²². The Russian proposal would have allowed Teheran to pursue its "peaceful" nuclear programme by using Russian territory. Iranian has placed a condition that China be involved in this joint venture²³.

The United States and the European Union are concerned about the turn of events and are fashioning a new approach in pushing for Security Council action. Sanctions is not exactly the right solution but a step taken for what is hoped to e a right deterrent. The Kyodo News has reported that either Iran suspend enrichment activities and return to talks with the EU, or give more authority for inspection to the IAEA.

Looking Back…

The problem of everyone "becoming nuclear ready," Sokolski says, is that "maybe it's not quite the bomb, but it's within a screwdriver turn of it²⁴." Iran's decision to develop nuclear power plants has indeed created ample perplexity and commotion. While the fear of a nuclear Iran coming under the control of a government that is, in the parlance of the many especially the West, "unpredictable, unstable, and aggressive" makes Iran "a nearly existential threat", it is also felt that perhaps Iran, "if it became a nuclear power, could evolve into a serious nuclear power that would demonstrate stronger interests in regional stability.²⁵"

The cause for concern stems more so from the role that Iran's Islamic regime identifies for itself in the Muslim world and from the crucial place it holds as a global oil power. The greatest risk, perhaps, is in the cascading effect of almost certainly setting off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Not to forget that there are states defiant in the face of Western powers, who will support Iran on this issue.

One wonders what exactly the aim of the international community is. Are their efforts aimed at subduing and finally destroying Iran's nuclear ambitions and using it as a precursor for future similar situations and ensure that other such countries avoid uranium enrichment activities that are crucial to weapons production?

What really cannot be fathomed is that the enrichment of uranium for civil nuclear energy purposes is permissible. Then why did Iran not notify its activities to the IAEA? Why did it wish to proceed clandestinely? The conviction that Iran is conducting clandestine nuclear-weapons-related work stem in part from shadowy evidence of activities that do not have to be declared to the IAEA²⁶. The limited mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not clearly authorise it to search for such activities.

Iran argues that the NPT confers the right to acquire uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities as long as they fully comply with their safeguard obligations and do not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. States need to clarify the definition of the particular technologies to which states have a "right" under the NPT. Interestingly, the purpose of the NPT is promotion of civilian nuclear programme while preventing proliferation - a contradiction that has let countries near the nuclear threshold without violating the treaty²⁷.

What needs to be understood are the capabilities of our future adversaries. They would undoubtedly be nuclear weapon states and it is indeed necessary to comprehend as to what capabilities would deter them. Deterrence does not necessarily refer to weapons; it could be economic and diplomatic.

If one were to take a scenario as given by Jason Zaborski²⁸, he has queried as to what would be the outcome of a nuclear state committing atrocities - diplomatically, politically and militarily and yet gets away because there is no way to constrain it? The threatened state has a nuclear capability to threaten a nuclear attack. This is a scenario that Jason has applied to the oil and natural resource rich Caspian Sea - an area where the interests of Russia, Turkey and the US collide²⁹. Threats design deterrence, and against different types of adversaries different threats are fashioned. These may work; may not work. Even forgiving collateral damage would not be enough as the use of nuclear weapons suggest the end of deterrence. Then one has to cater to war winning tactics. And in all this, communication of intention and capabilities play a vital role.

While the doctrine of deterrence has come to the rescue of aim of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is unfortunate yet possible that as time goes by the presence of nuclear weapons and missile defenses may not be enough for deterrence. The greater the precision of weapons, the higher would be the chances of deterrence depletion. And, the greater the power of coercion or compellence the greater would be the trend to counter such moves.

Need to establish rules that would apply not only to Iran but also to subsequent cases. The United States, the IAEA, and the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change all recognise this need to prevent the construction and operation of new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities in countries that do not now have such facilities. The IAEA director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, has wisely proposed a moratorium on the construction of new fuel production and reprocessing facilities. (George Perkovich)

By forgoing illicit activities and pursuing nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in strict adherence to the rules, Iran would make military attacks by the United States or Israel much more politically risky. If Iranian decision makers are clever, they will bring their nuclear program back into compliance with all international requirements, play by the rules while insisting on outmoded rights to develop whatever nuclear technology they want under strict international monitoring and safeguards, and thus gradually acquire the know-how, technology, and material necessary to produce nuclear weapons some day if a dire strategic threat should arise. This scenario, a variant of the Japanese model, is very difficult to counter and could be a model for states beyond Iran. (George Perkovich, "Changing Iran's Nuclear Interests", Carnegie Non-Proliferation May 2005)