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The 18 July 2005 Indo-US Nuclear Deal has provoked tremendous debate,
not only within India, but also in the US. Michael Kripon, a leading
US non-proliferation expert argues that the deal significantly shakes
the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. Amitabh Mattoo,
an expert on nuclear issues in India, indicates that the deal is good
for India as it provides opportunities for further civilian nuclear
cooperation with countries besides the US. In that context, India and
France issued a declaration on 20 February 2006 on "development of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" under International Atomic
Energy Safeguards (IAEA) during the recent visit of French President
Jacques Chirac to India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised that
any such civilian nuclear facilities available to India through
international cooperation would be placed under IAEA safeguards and
that India is committed to "honouring the letter and spirit" of the 18
July 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal. Given that, France expressed
willingness to provide India nuclear power plants and fuel. However, a
full fledged Indo-France civilian nuclear deal would hinge on the
implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the relaxation of
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
With the forthcoming visit of the US President George W. Bush to India
next month, there is a sense of urgency amongst the Indian
establishment to finalize a credible separation plan of the civilian
and military components of India's nuclear programme. This is the
criterion set by the US for civilian nuclear cooperation with India.
During talks with under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Nicholas Burns in December 2005 at Washington D.C., Indian Foreign
Secretary, Shyam Saran had provided a conclusive list of Indian
civilian nuclear sites that would be under IAEA safeguards. India's
fast breeder reactor (FBR) programme was not included in that list.
The two officials met again in January 2006 at New Delhi but made no
headway in clinching an understanding on the separation process.
The obstacle in implementing the deal seems to be the US insistence
that India must not only provide for separation of the two aspects of
its nuclear programme, but also agree to "in-perpetuity safeguards"
and include its nuclear breeder programme under IAEA safeguards. The
nuclear breeder programme consist of the 40 MWth (13 MWe) Fast Breeder
Test Reactor, and the upcoming 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
(PFBR). According to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, Anil
Kakodkar, placing the breeder programme under safeguards would
compromise India's military programme. In an interview to the Indian
Express recently, he said that "both from the point of view of
maintaining long term energy security and for maintaining the 'minimum
credible deterrent', the fast breeder reactor just cannot be put on
civilian list. This would amount to getting shackled and India
certainly cannot compromise one {security} for another". Since a
"minimum credible deterrent" is crucial for India's national security,
strategic tenacity and technological vitality, the FBR, which is a
vital component of India's weapons programme, must be kept out of
safeguards.
However, the US pressure on India continues. Recently, a US
non-proliferation think tank, Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS) came up with a six page report by David Albright and
Susan Basu on how the separation should be carried out. The report
provided that India must place all facilities, not directly associated
with nuclear weapons or production or deployment, under international
safeguards. This criterion should apply "in perpetuity", with minor
standard exceptions. The report also stated that nuclear material, not
under safeguard must not co-mingle with safeguarded nuclear material,
unless it is placed under safeguards. The report concluded that for
civil nuclear cooperation and to administer the prevention of civil
nuclear technology benefiting India's nuclear weapons programme, such
conditions were, indeed, necessary. The implication of this report is
an underlying attempt to influence India's plans on civilian and
nuclear separation, while keeping US national interest at the core. An
exercise such as the report mentioned above reflects the US's desire
to establish that the Indian plans for separation are credible,
acceptable and transparent to them. Interestingly, the 18 July
declaration had placed the onus on India to carry out its own
separation plans.
The Indian establishment's desire to keep indigenous programmes such
as the FBR outside international safeguards is legitimate. Accepting
safeguards on the FBR would amount to sacrificing the integrity of the
weapons programme and compromising on India's right as a sovereign
independent state to take crucial policy decisions. Indeed, the demand
for "in-perpetuity" safeguards on all Indian civilian facilities
including the FBR is an attack on India's sovereignty.
Another interpretation of the 18 July joint declaration is that it
reflects a deft move by the Bush Administration to promote India as a
counter-balance to a rising China in the region. George Perkovich, a
distinguished non-proliferation theologian, refutes this view
expressing his reservations on India being seen as a counterweight to
China. In a significant policy outlook paper brought out by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perkovich indicates that
historically, India has stayed clear of any broad alliances and
political maneuveurs. India is too vital a country for the US to
merely view it as counterbalance to China. Despite his fear that the
Indo-US nuclear deal would undermine an already fragile global nuclear
non-proliferation regime, he applauds the benefits of the nuclear deal
for India: US civilian nuclear technology would provide India with an
important source of energy that is crucial for its economic
development.
What are the significant benefits of the deal for India?
The benefits could be on four counts. First, by proposing to revive
civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries, the Bush
Administration has accepted India as a responsible state with advanced
nuclear technology. Second, President Bush has specifically referred
to India's strong commitments to prevent proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Hence, India must acquire the same benefits
and advantages in nuclear commerce enjoyed by other states in the
system. Third, in 1978, the US enacted the Nonproliferation Act, which
laid down the provision that in order to receive future nuclear
exports from the US, non-nuclear weapon states such as India had to
place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. (India is a
non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty {NPT}
and US laws). In that backdrop, the 18 July 2005 joint declaration is
significant as it has reversed a thirty year US non-proliferation
policy against India. If the Bush administration could convince
Congress and the NSG to implement the Indo-US nuclear deal, it would
amount to a de facto recognition of India's status as a nuclear weapon
state. Fourth, the declaration has facilitated similar civilian
nuclear deals between India and other major nuclear powers, for
example, Russia and France. The UK has also exhibited interest in
concluding a civilian nuclear deal with India.
The crux of the 18 July 2005 declaration now lay in its sound
implementation by both countries. The US has to persuade the 44 member
NSG to amend its guidelines to permit nuclear cooperation with India
without requiring the later to accept safeguards on all its programmes.
Such a move could face obstacles with regard to provisions of the NPT.
For instance, if India is given all the benefits of civilian nuclear
cooperation, specified in Article VI of the NPT, without it having to
fulfill conditions in Article I that endorses forswearing of nuclear
weapons, and Article III implementing full scope safeguards, other
non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT could demand similar
concessions. Moreover, to implement the Indo-US nuclear deal, the US
Congress has to impose further conditions on the US Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Section 123 of the Act requires that any peaceful nuclear
agreement, which the US signs with non-nuclear weapons states must
include amongst others, full scope safeguards. The US must also
approve the reprocessing of nuclear materials in the recipient state.
Amending US domestic laws by US Congress would require a majority vote
in both houses of Congress.
The task of implementation is difficult as the 'devil lies in the
detail'. It remains to be seen how both sides work out an
implementation process, without shaking the foundations of an already
fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, India must ensure
that the process of implementation does not compromise its weapons
programme. Including the FBR under IAEA safeguards could compromise
its sovereign decision making on its weapons programme. Once placed
under safeguards, the FBR cannot be reverted back to the weapons
programme in the future. Herein lays the necessity for prudent
decision making on the part of the Manmohan Singh government to
facilitate civilian nuclear cooperation while maintaining the
sovereignty of its nuclear weapons programme.
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