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Dynamics of Chinese Policies in Xinjiang
Ms Anisha Kinra |
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Abstract
The paper proposes to examine the manner in which notions of
nationalism and strategic concerns interface in the formulation of
China's policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
Chinese policy towards its minorities is intrinsically linked with its
understanding of nationalism. This concept of nationalism, in turn, is
guided by its strategic concerns. Xinjiang is significant for China,
both in location as well as its resource potential. This significance
is a crucial determinant in Beijing's formulation of its policy for
the region. This paper attempts a critical dialogue between the two
issues. It begins by presenting a thumbnail sketch of Chinese concept
of nationalism and how this determines its policies towards
minorities, including the Uyghurs. The next section underscores the
strategic and economic significance of Xinjiang and posits this as the
prime motivator for China's interest in the region. The paper
concludes with the understanding that by couching its strategic
interests under the garb of nationalism, Beijing has reinforced rather
than appeased separatist sentiments in the region.
Nationalism and Minority Policy in China
Beijing's policy towards its minorities draws from its understanding
of nationalism, nationality and nation. Before exploring the
construction of national identity in China, it may be instructive to
comprehend what nationalism means. Nationalism may be understood as a
distinctive and unique identity conferred upon those who may be
variously regarded as nation, populace or race1. The
sociologist John Hutchinson identifies two kinds of nationalism;
Political and Cultural2. Frank Dikötter adds racial
nationalism as another form of nationalism.3 Political
nationalism concerns itself with the individual rights of equal
citizens. It is based on a cosmopolitan and rationalist conception of
the nation wherein individuals are united by common laws. Cultural
nationalists, on the other hand, consider the nation as an organic
being with a unique individuality and not merely a rational political
unit. Instead of consent and laws, it is the culture and history that
binds individuals to the nation. Racial nationalists also view the
nation as a unique entity with a distinctive history and culture. But
they carry this forward and portray the nation 'above all as a
pseudo-biological entity united by ties of blood.'4 For
racial nationalists, cultural features derive from an imagined
biological specificity. Individuals are thus ascribed membership to
the community first on the basis congenital endowment, and only
secondly on the basis of cultural features. These three forms of
nationalism may be overlapping or alternating. In the case of China,
it is cultural and racial nationalisms that have pre-dominated.
The Chinese state conceptualizes itself as a civilizational state
whereby all those people who live within its sphere of influence are
regarded as Chinese.5 Nationality is thus defined as a
group of people living in a common area, speaking the same language,
and having a 'sense of group identity in economic and social
organization and behavior.'6 By viewing nationality as a
distinct ethnic group, which is historically part of the Chinese
state, the term minority became associated with people and did not
entail a distinct political character.7 Thus, inherent in
the Chinese understanding of a civilizational state was the notion
that
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all the nationalities can be accommodated
without raising the question of self-determination. This
explains why the Uyghurs are considered as part of Chinese
civilization and are therefore, integral to the Chinese
nationhood.8 |
The national minority policy of China is rooted
within this understanding of nation and nationalism. The primary
objective of this policy is to hold the borderland territories, which
have been formally annexed, as an integral part of the Chinese state.
All policy initiatives in the borderlands are aimed towards this
objective.9 Essentially, three aspects form the crux of
Chinese national minority policy. These include the ethnic
classification project, limited autonomy and repressive policies.10
The ethnic classification project of the Chinese state was crucial in
determining its policy towards minorities. Benedict Anderson describes
the nation-state as an 'imagined community' and argues that in many
instances this 'imagining' was done through three institutions; the
map, the museum and the census.11 All these offer
possibilities of establishing order in an otherwise diverse populace.
By placing each individual in a certain category, everything from
language to people to religion became countables. After 1949, in
China, the Communists identified 56 distinct 'peoples'. However, the
notion of one china or Chinese was retained. Chiang Kai-Shek, who
assumed leadership of the Guomindang after Dr. Sun Yat-sen's death in
1925, held the view that although centuries of isolation had resulted
in differences in language and culture, the minorities in the
borderlands were still part of the Chinese race.12 Thus,
since the establishment of the PRC, the question of ethnic identity
has been complicated by the rigorous, modernist ethnic classification
project of the communist regime. As ethnic identities became
state-sanctioned, the fixed categories that became the ethnic markers
posited the majority against the minorities to an extent that the
majority identity was constructed at the expense of the minority
identity.13 The politics of identity is also simultaneously
a politics of othering. The state identified with the majority
Han community as against the other minority communities; making
Chinese and Han synonymous of each other. National identity has
therefore been constructed with indigenous meanings that are specific
to the Han community. This ethnic difference, which is a result of
inequitable state policies, is today pivotal to the conflict between
the state and its minorities in general, and the Uyghurs in
particular. A constructivist approach is needed to comprehend the
identity politics, which lies at the root of the conflict.
Identity issues, however, are interwoven with structural issues.
Limited autonomy and repressive state policies have further
complicated the problem. The areas dominated by the minority
communities have been accorded limited autonomy by the Chinese
constitution. In fact, the constitution of 1954 made the right to
secession illegal. Binh Phan gives a detailed account of how the
constitution has been used to institutionalise discrimination by
including provisions for limited regional autonomy.14 Since
ethnicity was a construction of the states claims to universality and
everybody within the territory was Chinese, autonomy had cultural
rather than politico-legal connotations.
Along with limited autonomy, repressive policies have also become part
of official policy. Unfortunately, attempts at curbing growing demands
for self-determination have backfired and the Uyghur movement has been
further cemented through its encounters with the state. The
establishment of Bingtuan-a quasi-military institution to maintain
state control in the region and curb ethnic unrest; and encouraging
massive Han immigration in Xinjiang, which has caused drastic
demographic changes within the region are some of the state policies
that have caused discontentment amongst the Uyghurs. Attempts at
repression have been further strengthened post 9/11 as China joined
the American-led war on terror. Since then, Chinese authorities have
actively worked to justify their crackdown in Xinjiang under the
rubric of 'counter-terrorism'. 'Terrorists' have replaced
'separatists' in official parlance and criminal law has been made more
explicit despite official claims that no incident of explosion or
assassination has taken place in the region in the last couple of
years.
Thus, notions of nationalism have impacted upon the national minority
policy of the Chinese state. This policy has been formulated with the
understanding that no piece of territory can be separated from the
Chinese mainland and no region can constitute an independent unit.
Ethnic classification and assimilative tendencies form the crux of the
national minority policy. The next section carries forward this
argument to establish that while this notion of 'one China' forms the
subtext, the resource potential and strategic location of Xinjiang
have emerged as crucial determinants that guide Chinese policies in
the region. In other words, economic and strategic objectives of the
state in the region have reinforced its notions of nationalism. The
two have converged together to form the basis of Chinese policy in
Xinjiang.
Significance of Xinjiang
Owen Lattimore described Xinjiang as the geographical "pivot of Asia"
and asserted that it was significant in determining the geopolitics of
the region. Its strategic position, at the crossroads of five distinct
regions-Russia, Central Asia, the subcontinent, Tibet and China-makes
Xinjiang both a 'back door' to China and 'China's corridor' to Central
Asia. It occupies 1/6th of China's landmass, contains some of the
world's largest oil deposits and houses China's nuclear test site- Lop
Nor. All this has made it imperative for China to tighten its hold
over the region and curb any separatist tendencies.
The Xinjiang region of China is critical for the country's security.
China's policies within the region are determined by the larger
understanding of its security environment. Beijing is aware that the
current threat environment is characterized by a low probability of
war breaking out among major powers. But there is a significant danger
of local conflicts, arising from ethnic and territorial disputes,
escalating. There is growing perception of threat emanating from the
possibility of nearly 10 million Muslims in Xinjiang aligning with the
pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic movement in the Central Asian region. This not
only has the potential to bolster the separatist thrust in the region,
but also the potential to destabilize the region.15
Besides, the Chinese leadership fears a ripple effect in Tibet and
Taiwan if it accedes to the demands of the Uyghurs. To promote and
protect Xinjiang as an integral part of China is therefore essential
for the Chinese leadership.
In addition to this, Xinjiang is being increasingly looked upon as the
new energy production base of China. The importance of the region is
two fold. It is not only a resource rich region itself, but is also a
key supply artillery that facilitates transport of oil and gas from
the northwest and from the adjacent central Asian nations to the
eastern and central parts of China. Xinjiang is expected to supply
over one fifth of China's total oil by 2010, including an import of 10
million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan. Since the silk route passes
through the region, it gives China the opportunity to build an energy
supply line along this route, which consists of nations rich in oil
and gas resources.16 In addition to being the supply
artillery, the region is itself rich in resources. It accounts for 40%
of the country's wool and is a rich source of gold and copper.
Significantly, it sits on 30 per cent of the nation's total oil
reserves and 34 per cent of its natural gas resources. Last year,
Xinjiang produced 22.28 million tons of crude oil, which is expected
to grow to an estimated 50 million tons annually, replacing
Heilongjiang Province in the northeast as the top oil producer in the
country.17 In fact, since 1993 crude oil production in the
region has increased at an annual average rate of more than 1 million
tons, ranking first in the country.18 The potential for
energy sources in the region has made integration of Xinjiang
paramount for China.
Concluding Remarks
From the analysis of the various aspects of Chinese policy in Xinjiang
we can conclude that there are a number of complex and interrelated
issues that need to be assessed in order to understand the policy
dynamics in Xinjiang. Identity and structural issues are interwoven in
a complex web that forms the roots of conflict in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. In order to grasp the rationale behind Chinese
policies in the region, it is critical to examine the interplay
between the two.
The concept of nationalism, to which Chinese state subscribes, has
inevitably resulted in a politicization of ethnic identity, which
forms the central part of conflict between the state and the Uyghurs.
The state has come to constitute a universal rationality for
organization and conflict prevention; and nationalism has been
understood as the 'political principle, which holds that the political
and national unit should be congruent.'19 This process has
unfortunately led to the creation of exclusionist identities. The
paper attempted to examine the complexities of this phenomenon to
comprehend the causes and mechanisms of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.
While polarization between ethnic groups and nationalism are vital to
conflict dynamics, they contribute only partially towards formulation
of Beijing's policies in Xinjiang. The strategic and economic
significance of the area is pivotal in Chinese thinking. With the
country depending on imports to meet 45% of its oil supply needs, it
has become vital to tap the resource potential of Xinjiang. Twenty
years ago China was amongst the largest oil exporters of East Asia.
Today it is the world's second-largest importer. In 2004, China alone
accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand.20
China's growing appetite for energy has made the integration of
Xinjiang a crucial policy goal of the Chinese leadership.
The Uyghurs thus face a double assault. There is a cultural threat as
the state, in its drive for national integration, asserts its right to
represent and define 'people' through the creation of a universal,
all-inclusive 'Chinese' identity. There is also a tangible economic
threat as the state siphons off the regions resources without any
accompanying socio-economic development. Repressive measures and
assimilative tendencies have not succeeded in integrating the Uyghurs.
In fact the Uyghur identity has become more pronounced in its
encounters with the Chinese state. Beijing needs to acknowledge that
any struggle, which fails to address the concerns of the people it
affects, cannot achieve the goals it has set to undertake. China's
policies towards the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region must be
formulated within this understanding.
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Notes
| 1. |
See, Frank Dikötter, "Culture, 'Race' and
Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century
China", International Affairs, 49:2, Winter 1996, pp. 590-605. |
| 2. |
John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural
Nationalism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp. 12-13. |
| 3. |
Dikötter, International Affairs. |
| 4. |
Ibid. |
| 5. |
Abanti Bhattacharya, "Conceptualising Uyghur
Separatism in Chinese Nationalism", http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa_jul03/sa_jul03bha02.html |
| 6. |
"Minorities: Demographic Overview", http://countrystudies.us/china/36.htm |
| 7. |
See Thomas Heberer, China and its National
Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1989. |
| 8. |
Bhattacharya, Conceptualising Uyghur
Separatism in Chinese Nationalism. |
| 9. |
Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem
Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944-1949, New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990, p. 11. |
| 10. |
Bhattacharya, Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese
Nationalism. |
| 11. |
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.
London/New York: Verso, 1991. |
| 12. |
Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem
Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944-1949. |
| 13. |
Dru C. Gladney, "Representation and National Identification",
http://cio.ceu.hu/courses/cio/modules/Module07Gladney/Gladney_01.html |
| 14. |
See, Binh G. Phan, "How Autonomous is the
National Autonomous Areas of the PRC?: An Analysis of Documents
and Cases", Issues and Studies, July 1996, pp. 83-108. Also see,
David W.S Wong, "Ethnic Integration and Spatial Segregation of
the Chinese Population", Asian Ethnicity, 1:1, 2000, pp. 53-72. |
| 15. |
Gaye Christoflersen, "Xinjiang and the Great
Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese
Regional Planning", The China Quarterly, 133, March 1993, pp.
130-151. |
| 16. |
Xinhua News Agency, "Oil, Gas Supply Line
Built Along Silk Road", 17 September 2005, http://qqq.china.org.cn/english/BAT/142534.htm. |
| 17. |
Ibid. |
| 18. |
"Xinjiang plans to be China's top oil
producer",
http://www.xioge.com/documents/Introduction.doc |
| 19. |
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell,
1983. |
| 20. |
David Zweig and Bi Fianhai, "China's Global
Hunt for Energy", Foreign Affairs, 84:5, September-October 2005,
p. 25. |
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