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The United States' has finally prevailed in Pervez Musharraf getting a
second term no matter the contentious circumstances. It is important
to highlight that US efforts are part of perceived cleverly crafted
end game to 'manage' Afghanistan that is fast spiralling out of its
control. The US is embarked on a course to orchestrate the
“re-coronation” of Musharraf in return for his support in brokering a
deal with the 'good' and 'moderate' Taliban. The groundwork for this
course of action, backed by Washington, was laid by the Pakistani
President during the 'peace jirga, or tribal council, in Kabul last
month.
First inkling of Washington’s thinking was provided by, deputy
secretary of state and former intelligence chief John Negroponte who
was careful in not dismissing the Karzai’s offer of talks with so
called moderate Taliban during his Kabul visit on Sep 11. He was also
careful not to refer to them as 'terrorists'. His comment was
“whatever happens, these talks by the Taliban should be handled in
such a way by the government of Afghanistan that it does not in any
way undermine or prejudice all the important political, social and
economic accomplishments that have occurred in this country,'
Negroponte declared at his press conference in Kabul following which
he visited Islamabad.
An analysis of recent statements by US and Pakistani officials, and
the overall ground situation in the turbulent region, shows that
Washington is indeed gearing up for the endgame in Afghanistan leading
to its withdrawal from the insurgency-ridden country.
'The US administration's aim is to try and bring about some modicum of
stability in Afghanistan via Musharraf and, more importantly, provide
beleaguered Washington an acceptable exit strategy as realization
dawns that it is engaged in an un-winnable conflict. As a consequence
US appears to be outsourcing Afghanistan to Pakistan in order to exit
from a turbulent tribal region that, historically, has defied any
solution imposed on it from the outside, in a win - win end game.
Senior American military planners grudgingly accept that six years of
sustained operations against the Taliban by the US military and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have failed in
containing its rise or dealing a significant body blow to Al Qaeda's
proliferating influence. There is growing frustration in Washington
and ISAF contributing nations that peace in Afghanistan remains
illusive.
Their collective operations are making little or no progress as both
forces are not only battle fatigued but collateral damage, despite the
recent change in tactics of using leas lethal munitions, is creating
more supporters for the Taliban than those being killed in fire fights
or aerial attacks. It is widely believed in military circles that five
Taliban are created for every innocent Afghan killed.
In addition, there are reports of Al Qaeda and Taliban consolidation
inside Pakistan after the Pakistani army's assault on armed jihadi’s
holed-up in Islamabad's Lal Masjid and the emergence alongside of
'neo-Taliban' elements supported by the country's military and the
Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). In fact according to
some observers there are signs of large number of Pakistani Army
cadres disillusioned with Mush raff pro – US policy are joining
Taliban and more importantly Al Qaeda. They are reportedly adopting
guerrilla tactics of legendry Vietnamese General Giap in a bid to make
Pakistani Army withdraw from Waziristan and FATA.
As a consequence Waziristan on the Afghan border and the adjoining
tribal area of Swat has become major launch pads for the Taliban and
the Al-Qaeda into Afghanistan. As per security sources the Al Qaeda
leadership or shura-which reportedly includes Osama bin Laden's
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri-is believed to have installed itself in the
predominantly Pashtun dominated Bannu region of Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province.
There are also reports of the Taliban leadership concentrated in areas
around Dera Ismail Khan, South-West of Islamabad to bolster their
cadre in Afghanistan's worst insurgency wracked southern provinces of
Helmand, Urzgan, Zabul and Kandahar with devastating effect.
To make maters worse there are growing, and often irreconcilable
differences amongst the coalition forces over tactics and overall
deployment against the Taliban as the number of fighting men remain
woefully inadequate and with little hope of reinforcements.
This, in turn, has triggered greater dependency on air power leading
to excessive collateral damage which has the negative effect of
alienating locals and drying up of badly needed 'actionable
intelligence'.
So dire is the situation that the new British administration bluntly
informed the US recently that in Afghanistan the coalition forces were
'winning local battles but losing the war'. Amongst the Afghan
government too, there prevailed a growing sense of despondency over
the coalition forces war fighting strategy.
It is against such a calamitous backdrop that Washington is gearing up
for the 'endgame' of politically engaging the Taliban, a strategy for
which it believes Gen Musharraf is indispensable.
Hence the slew of recent events in Pakistan - Nawaz Sharif's
unceremonious deportation, brokering of deal with Ms Benazir Bhutto
and the stratagem surrounding Musharraf's future intentions to give up
uniform on being re-elected as President and make his trusted
lieutenant as the COAS, as also the so called national reconciliation
ordinance, are but part of the larger façade of legitimising
Musharraf’s rule under orchestrated democracy. All these developments
appear to carry Washington's imprimatur. 'Washington's aim in Gen
Musharraf's continuation at the helm and installation of pliable Army
Chief are the vital adjunct to its future Afghan policy'.
This then begs the question as to why is Gen Musharraf remain crucial
to Washington's future Afghan strategy?
For this the answer lies in Gen Musharraf’s address to the
Washington-backed Kabul jirga's concluding session that resulted in
the establishment of a 50-member committee to kick-start the
intra-Afghan peace process. These include 'good' or 'moderate' Taliban
alongside associates from its Hizb-i-Islami ally headed by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the ISID's favoured Pashtun warlord. Mush raff openly
questioned painting all Pashtuns as Taliban or their supporters. He
said “there are large numbers of Pashtuns and among even the Taliban
cadres who are keen to enjoy the fruits of development and progress.
He highlighted the importance of inducing these cadres to national
mainstream through a process of intra Pashtun reconciliation”
Alongside, the US is attempting to broker deals with Tajik Northern
Alliance groups in a bid to push for Afghanistan's ethnic
reconciliation. An indication of this move was provided by former
Afghan president and erstwhile anti-Soviet Mujahideen leader
Burhanuddin Rabbani. At a seminar in Peshawar recently Rabbani
suggested that negotiations on Afghanistan's future should involve all
Afghan factions, including the Taliban and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami.
For Musharraf the positive spin off of fostering such a union will
help in politically consolidating his position domestically in the
upcoming national elections aided by the fundamentalist Mutahid
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) group of six parties by signaling to them that he
was not abandoning their jihadist cause. Politically this is important
to ensure overdependence on Ms Bhutto, who will no doubt try to assert
herself.
Though this stratagem might eventually result in an MMA split, it
would suit Musharraf as it would doubtlessly isolate the revitalised
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) or PML(N) headed by former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif following his bold, albeit futile return to
Pakistan last week.
But the fundamental question that follows is how much are these grand
plans of an 'intra-Afghan dialogue' worth. And does the US believe
that these can be finessed at a time when the situation in Pakistan
itself is fast spinning out of control?
The answer is that the domestic political crisis in Pakistan is still
unfolding.
The battle lines are being constantly re-drawn with Musharraf despite
winning the Presidential battle has come out weakened to a degree that
he will now have to rule by proxy. Mainstream political parties,
although a divided lot sense an opportunity of winning majority in
national elections through political consolidation which could push
the military on to the back foot and upset well laid plan of both
Musharraf and the Americans. Even if PPP was to win PML (Q) and PPP
would be at best strange bedfellows expected to quibble over spoils of
office.
But there are two more players in the complex and cynical equation to
muddy the waters. These are the religious parties and their
fundamentalist supporters including Pan Islamic forces that also
anticipate victory and remain wedded to spreading their jihadi message
of Islamic purity to the rest of the country.
Regionally too the return of the Taliban would engender great
trepidation. Iran, for instance, would be greatly agitated over the
Taliban's rehabilitation in whatever form or configuration as would
the Central Asian States backed by Russia and China. All remain
fearful of the Jehadis spectre spilling over into their territories.
In short, a dangerous and loaded end game with the propensity to
engulf the entire region appears to be unfolding with largely
undeterminable consequences. One thing however is clear a scenario of
relative instability is likely to prevail in Pakistan in the near
term. Paradoxically situation in Afghanistan will have a major impact
in determining which direction it might take.
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