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Indian political elite is under going convulsions on the Indo-US
Nuclear Deal. The surprising, yet understandable, reactions to the
deal are as reflective of its strategic culture or lack of it. The
deal is one of the best diplomatic bargains attempted and secured.
Yet, bickering over the deal, opens India to the charge of it not
being able to take yes for an answer. It could be argued per se that
India being a flourishing democracy, debate is welcome. However, the
debate is vacuous, full of political posturing and devoid of strategic
understanding. Even the sham of democratic debate does not hold much
ground as public opinion is in support of the deal. The same people,
who are asserting on the need for the parliamentary approval of the
international treaties, will balk at the suggestion for referendum on
this particular treaty. At the ideational or normative level, it
cannot be contested the need for an independent foreign policy. Yet,
an appreciation of the strategic affairs will also convey the
desirability for allies, friends and coalitions. Its best remembered
that, however strong the rhetoric of India’s rise may be, it cannot do
away with friends and allies, rather, it desperately needs some. The
clamour or rhetoric for ‘strategic autonomy’ cannot be an excuse for
an isolationist foreign policy espousing about the desirability of the
world peace.
The opponents of the deal, who castigate India for becoming a military
ally of the US, ignore the intrusive Chinese presence in the
sub-continent. China has embarked on a ‘string of pearls’ strategy
around India’s neighbourhood. It needs no reiteration that China has
not only fathered the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but also gifted
advanced military technology to the country. Chinese have increased
their presence in the South Asian region, its grand strategy is in
making Asia a Sino-centric continent. The resultant of which will be
restricting India’s influence to its borders only. Even assuming
India’s unrestricted influence within its boundaries, will be of too
much to seek. As many part of its territory is under threat from
secessionist forces and competing claims, most prominently being
Kashmir and some parts of the Northeast Region. Coupled with this is
the increasing naxalite problem. Thus, on increasing influence of
China in South Asia, India will be at twin disadvantages. At the state
level, the countries will be either pro-China or anti-India, while at
the societal level they will be failing states, and in their failing
India will be the most vulnerable. The vulnerability could be of
cross-border Islamic radicalism (Pakistan, Bangladesh), terrorism
(Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar), illegal influx (Bangladesh),
naxalism (Nepal) and ethnic secessionist linkages (Sri Lanka).
Thus, the need for balancing China is not a luxury of choice but of
necessity. The only luxury, so to speak is to have a foresight, and
begun balancing, even before the ‘hard rise’ of China takes place with
initiatives like Quad. Or indulge in mindless bickering as we are
doing today, and scurry for a strategic partnership, when the chips
are really down. The Indo-Soviet Friendship of 1971 is a case in
point, despite India’s claim for two decades, the policy of
non-alignment, it had to enter into a Friendship Treaty with the USSR.
After, marching into Bay of Bengal the US Enterprise, India felt that
it had no option but to enter into a security relationship with the
Soviet Union. It would be naïve to think that the so-called ‘strategic
autonomy’ could be maintained, if the security situation in South Asia
worsens. Rather, it has increasingly worsened, we have been
overlooking, under the deceptive satisfaction of ‘India’s rise’. Here,
it is again pertinent to take a cue from the history, when India’s
global profile was severely diminished by the 1962 war. It would be
strategically naïve to assume that India can maintain and augment its
global profile only by economic progress, ignoring worsening strategic
situation in its vicinity.
The deal by its strategic implications, give India an opportunity to
shape the security situation in Asia, and emerge as a key player in
the in Asian geo-politics. This shaping can only be done through
formation of strategic alliances and counter-alliances. The alliances
need not have a permanent utility and clear cut formulations of the
objectives. In short, ambivalence in strategic affairs is desirable
rather than disadvantage. It is especially pertinent to note in the
case of nuclear deal, where fetish to put every point in detail and in
writing will kill the deal. Therefore, opposing the deal on the remote
possibility of testing of nuclear weapons is a mistaken one. It should
be clear that Americans will oppose any future testing of nuclear
weapons by India, with the deal and without the deal. Rather, with the
deal, their response might be more tempered. On the whole debate about
‘nuclear sovereignty’, it could be argued that we are once again
guilty of discussing the wrong agenda. Rather, the debate could have
been helpful, if it could have been more focussed on Hyde act’s Iran
injunctions, and gave Government of India strong reasons to desist
from bartering away Iran on nuclear deal. As in the extended
neighbourhood, Iran could be of great value for India, both
economically and strategically.
The most baffling feature in ‘dealing with the deal’ is that India is
in an unprecedented favourable strategic situation, where it can
augment its regional and global profile. Unfortunately, due to its
diffidence and lack of strategic culture it is not able to fully
exploit it. Its global engagement is still limited by the traditional
Indian practise of sitting at sidelines, and espousing rhetorical
moral homilies. However, with endeavours like Malabar 07, Indian
strategic practise is beginning to change for better.
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