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Introduction
A great power is one which has both the potential as well as the
intention to change the international system. The 123 agreement shows
that India has both the potential as well as the intention to change
the existing world order to its advantage and is hence an important
milestone in India’s quest for great power status. This
cleverly-worded agreement will have far-reaching impacts on India’s
foreign policy, nuclear ambitions and strategic thinking. This paper
looks at the implications of the deal on India’s nuclear policy, its
relations with major powers, foreign policy decision making and
concludes with a look at the challenges ahead for India.
Nuclear Policy
India is already a de facto nuclear power. This deal puts India on the
path towards recognition as de jure nuclear power as it accords
legitimacy to India’s nuclear programme. India has its impeccable non
proliferation record to thank for this deal and must ensure that this
record remains unblemished.
The Indo-US nuclear deal reinforces India’s voluntary moratorium
imposed after the 1998 tests while leaving scope for it to conduct
more tests if the “security environment” changes (Article 14.2) . For
the moment, the focus of India’s nuclear policy should be on the NPT
which is due for renewal in 2010. India should now concentrate its
diplomatic efforts on being admitted as a member of the NPT as a state
with ‘advanced nuclear technology’.
US
The deal will obviously strengthen relations with the US making it a
truly strategic relationship. The most important impact of the deal
will be on our defence relations with the Americans. Building on the
June 28 2005 ‘New Framework Agreement for Indo-US Defence
Cooperation’, we could buy more American arms and also expand ‘two-way
defence trade’. The potential for Indian defence exports to the US
could be in the form of outsourcing and co-production. We could also
have joint research, development and production of new weapons systems
in collaboration with the US. The influence of the Indian American
community will also increase as a result of this deal as is evident
from President Bush specifically thanking them for their efforts in
pushing the deal through in his remarks after signing the deal.
Pakistan and South Asia
Pakistan has predictably opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal saying that
it is discriminatory and would create nuclear asymmetry between India
and Pakistan as it would help India to divert its domestic stock of
fuel for military purposes, while using the imported fuel for civilian
purposes under international safeguards. Pakistan is likely to pull
out all stops to enhance its nuclear weapons capability. India must
for prepared for this contingency. Recent reports have indicated that
Pakistan and China are planning a deal on the lines of the Indo-US
nuclear lines. Even if these reports are true, India need not be
unduly worried about this as China and Pakistan have had a long
history of nuclear cooperation. India’s hegemonic power in the South
Asian region has increased as a result of this deal. India’s
relationship with the US is likely to be seen as a threat by our
smaller neighbours. We need to correct these perceptions and give them
concessions to help them develop and become stable. Our dependence on
power from countries like Bhutan could decrease as a result of this
deal. This would reduce their existing bargaining power with India.
China
Reports in the Chinese media suggest that China sees the deal as
further proof of US hypocrisy in non-proliferation efforts and as an
effort to contain China. China will probably push for some sort of
criteria for India to get the approval of the NSG so that at some
later stage Pakistan can also get NSG approval for nuclear cooperation
with China. It may also decide to reinforce its nuclear arsenal,
potentially bringing about a regional arms race. The normalcy and
cordiality which has been a trademark of Sino-Indian relations in
recent years due to efforts from both the sides may come under a cloud
in the event of the agreement coming into effect ultimately. This
could affect Asian stability adversely. India must convince China that
the deal is only meant for our energy security and increase further
cooperation with China.
But the Chinese also see the deal as a commercial opportunity for them
as is borne out by the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jeichi’s recent
statement that China is ready to ‘cooperate with all countries for
peaceful use of nuclear energy’.
Russia and the West
Nuclear cooperation between India and Russia and the West will enter a
new phase after this deal. Russia and the West (UK, France and
Australia) will follow the US lead on the deal and support India at
the NSG. There could even be a tussle among the Western countries for
the Indian nuclear market. In this, Russia would obviously have an
upper hand since some of our reactors are Russian-made. Our relations
with Russia can expand not only in existing projects but also in
projects like cooperation in space. We need to strike a balance in our
relations with Russia even as our relations with the US develop.
Iran and West Asia
Iran as well as the rest of West Asia will see this deal as a further
sign of our growing closeness with the US. The US legislation is
likely to become a serious negative factor in India’s relations with
Iran for years to come. Iran has already criticised the deal. There
are several references to Iran in the Hyde Act. We must ensure that
our policy towards Iran is not dictated by the US. We need to remember
that Iran has vast amounts of gas and oil which can be used for
meeting our energy requirements. More importantly, India needs to
court Iran to counter the Pakistani-Saudi strategic nexus and their
mutual cosiness with Wahhabi Islamic zealots. India must explore the
‘peace pipeline’ with Iran as this would contribute to our energy
security.
As for the rest of West Asia, most of them are allies of the US. But
while the regimes are pro-America, there is virulent anti-Americanism
on the Arab streets. Hypothetically, India, like Israel, could be seen
as an ally of the US by the people on the streets. This could make
India a target of anti-American extremists.
Foreign Policy Decision making
Last, but not the least, the debate over the nuclear deal points to a
glaring lacuna in India’s Constitution. I allude to the lack of a
mechanism for ratification of important agreements in Parliament—a
practice followed by many countries. The Constitution needs to be
amended so that major treaties and agreements are subject to
parliamentary ratification because Members of Parliament represent the
will of the people. This would have a fallout on India’s foreign
policy decision-making processes.
Challenges Ahead
There are three more stages for India to go before the nuclear deal is
implemented; negotiations on IAEA safeguards, consideration by the NSG
and approval of the US Congress. India’s diplomatic efforts must now
be focused on these three hurdles.
With regard to the nuclear deal, India needs to have a three-track
approach. First, India should continue our efforts for nuclear
self-sufficiency so that in the future, India can produce all the
nuclear power it needs through its own resources and efforts.
Thorium-based reactors could be a good source of power in the future
as India has abundant thorium resources. Second, India should open its
doors to international nuclear trade so that it can buy our supplies
of power stations and related technologies till it reaches the target
of self-sufficiency. The 123 agreement is one of the first steps in
this attempt. Third, India has to be prepared for a situation where
the doors might again be closed to it before it becomes self-reliant.
India needs to develop a strategy based on these objectives.
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(1) For more details, see ‘U.S. and India Release Text of 123
Agreement’,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm.
(2) C Raja Mohan, ‘ India and US: new brothers in arms’, Indian
Express, June 29, 2005
(3) ibid
(4) D.S. Rajan, ‘Beijing Hardens Its Stand on the India-US Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/122/beijing-hardens-its-stand-on-the-india-us-civil-nuclear-cooperation-agreement.
(5) Sumit Ganguly, ‘On the Cusp’, Newsweek, August 16, 2007.
(6) B. Raman , ‘The American Hug and The Chinese Frown’,
http://www.c3sindia.org/us/113/the-american-hug-and-the-chinese-frown/
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