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Implications of the 123 Agreement on India’s Foreign Policy

 Ms Uma Purushothaman


Introduction

A great power is one which has both the potential as well as the intention to change the international system. The 123 agreement shows that India has both the potential as well as the intention to change the existing world order to its advantage and is hence an important milestone in India’s quest for great power status. This cleverly-worded agreement will have far-reaching impacts on India’s foreign policy, nuclear ambitions and strategic thinking. This paper looks at the implications of the deal on India’s nuclear policy, its relations with major powers, foreign policy decision making and concludes with a look at the challenges ahead for India.

Nuclear Policy

India is already a de facto nuclear power. This deal puts India on the path towards recognition as de jure nuclear power as it accords legitimacy to India’s nuclear programme. India has its impeccable non proliferation record to thank for this deal and must ensure that this record remains unblemished.

The Indo-US nuclear deal reinforces India’s voluntary moratorium imposed after the 1998 tests while leaving scope for it to conduct more tests if the “security environment” changes (Article 14.2) . For the moment, the focus of India’s nuclear policy should be on the NPT which is due for renewal in 2010. India should now concentrate its diplomatic efforts on being admitted as a member of the NPT as a state with ‘advanced nuclear technology’.

US

The deal will obviously strengthen relations with the US making it a truly strategic relationship. The most important impact of the deal will be on our defence relations with the Americans. Building on the June 28 2005 ‘New Framework Agreement for Indo-US Defence Cooperation’, we could buy more American arms and also expand ‘two-way defence trade’. The potential for Indian defence exports to the US could be in the form of outsourcing and co-production. We could also have joint research, development and production of new weapons systems in collaboration with the US. The influence of the Indian American community will also increase as a result of this deal as is evident from President Bush specifically thanking them for their efforts in pushing the deal through in his remarks after signing the deal.

Pakistan and South Asia

Pakistan has predictably opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal saying that it is discriminatory and would create nuclear asymmetry between India and Pakistan as it would help India to divert its domestic stock of fuel for military purposes, while using the imported fuel for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Pakistan is likely to pull out all stops to enhance its nuclear weapons capability. India must for prepared for this contingency. Recent reports have indicated that Pakistan and China are planning a deal on the lines of the Indo-US nuclear lines. Even if these reports are true, India need not be unduly worried about this as China and Pakistan have had a long history of nuclear cooperation. India’s hegemonic power in the South Asian region has increased as a result of this deal. India’s relationship with the US is likely to be seen as a threat by our smaller neighbours. We need to correct these perceptions and give them concessions to help them develop and become stable. Our dependence on power from countries like Bhutan could decrease as a result of this deal. This would reduce their existing bargaining power with India.

China

Reports in the Chinese media suggest that China sees the deal as further proof of US hypocrisy in non-proliferation efforts and as an effort to contain China. China will probably push for some sort of criteria for India to get the approval of the NSG so that at some later stage Pakistan can also get NSG approval for nuclear cooperation with China. It may also decide to reinforce its nuclear arsenal, potentially bringing about a regional arms race. The normalcy and cordiality which has been a trademark of Sino-Indian relations in recent years due to efforts from both the sides may come under a cloud in the event of the agreement coming into effect ultimately. This could affect Asian stability adversely. India must convince China that the deal is only meant for our energy security and increase further cooperation with China.

But the Chinese also see the deal as a commercial opportunity for them as is borne out by the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jeichi’s recent statement that China is ready to ‘cooperate with all countries for peaceful use of nuclear energy’.
 
Russia and the West

Nuclear cooperation between India and Russia and the West will enter a new phase after this deal. Russia and the West (UK, France and Australia) will follow the US lead on the deal and support India at the NSG. There could even be a tussle among the Western countries for the Indian nuclear market. In this, Russia would obviously have an upper hand since some of our reactors are Russian-made. Our relations with Russia can expand not only in existing projects but also in projects like cooperation in space. We need to strike a balance in our relations with Russia even as our relations with the US develop.

Iran and West Asia

Iran as well as the rest of West Asia will see this deal as a further sign of our growing closeness with the US. The US legislation is likely to become a serious negative factor in India’s relations with Iran for years to come. Iran has already criticised the deal. There are several references to Iran in the Hyde Act. We must ensure that our policy towards Iran is not dictated by the US. We need to remember that Iran has vast amounts of gas and oil which can be used for meeting our energy requirements. More importantly, India needs to court Iran to counter the Pakistani-Saudi strategic nexus and their mutual cosiness with Wahhabi Islamic zealots. India must explore the ‘peace pipeline’ with Iran as this would contribute to our energy security.

As for the rest of West Asia, most of them are allies of the US. But while the regimes are pro-America, there is virulent anti-Americanism on the Arab streets. Hypothetically, India, like Israel, could be seen as an ally of the US by the people on the streets. This could make India a target of anti-American extremists.

Foreign Policy Decision making

Last, but not the least, the debate over the nuclear deal points to a glaring lacuna in India’s Constitution. I allude to the lack of a mechanism for ratification of important agreements in Parliament—a practice followed by many countries. The Constitution needs to be amended so that major treaties and agreements are subject to parliamentary ratification because Members of Parliament represent the will of the people. This would have a fallout on India’s foreign policy decision-making processes.

Challenges Ahead

There are three more stages for India to go before the nuclear deal is implemented; negotiations on IAEA safeguards, consideration by the NSG and approval of the US Congress. India’s diplomatic efforts must now be focused on these three hurdles.

With regard to the nuclear deal, India needs to have a three-track approach. First, India should continue our efforts for nuclear self-sufficiency so that in the future, India can produce all the nuclear power it needs through its own resources and efforts. Thorium-based reactors could be a good source of power in the future as India has abundant thorium resources. Second, India should open its doors to international nuclear trade so that it can buy our supplies of power stations and related technologies till it reaches the target of self-sufficiency. The 123 agreement is one of the first steps in this attempt. Third, India has to be prepared for a situation where the doors might again be closed to it before it becomes self-reliant. India needs to develop a strategy based on these objectives.
 

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(1) For more details, see ‘U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement’, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm.

(2) C Raja Mohan, ‘ India and US: new brothers in arms’, Indian Express, June 29, 2005

(3) ibid

(4) D.S. Rajan, ‘Beijing Hardens Its Stand on the India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/122/beijing-hardens-its-stand-on-the-india-us-civil-nuclear-cooperation-agreement.

(5) Sumit Ganguly, ‘On the Cusp’, Newsweek, August 16, 2007.

(6) B. Raman , ‘The American Hug and The Chinese Frown’, http://www.c3sindia.org/us/113/the-american-hug-and-the-chinese-frown/
 

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