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While the recent visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki – moon to Sudan
brought some hope and cheer for the long suffering people of Darfur it
remains to be seen as to how much of the promises made by both, the
Sudanese govt and the UN are kept to keep their hopes alive. Reacting
to the appeals made by The UNSG, the Sudanese govt promised to do its
utmost to implement the Jan 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
and ensure provision of essential relief services by the aid agencies
in Darfur. The UN also pledged to deploy United Nations Assistance
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as quickly as possible to provide peace and
stability in Darfur and support CPA and better North –South relations.
The UN is currently implementing a three-phased approach to bolster
African Union Mission in Sudan AMIS) and deploy a robust peacekeeping
force in Darfur. The approach consists of measures to augment AMIS in
the form of a Light Support Package (LSP), a Heavy Support Package (HSP),
and culminates in the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Each
phase has required its own set of agreements and understandings among
the UN, the AU and the Government of Sudan. In order to reach these,
the UN has undertaken a complex round of negotiations, including on
the level and type of support, issues of command and control, and the
legal framework governing the effort. UNAMID represents a unique model
of partnership for peacekeeping between the UN and a regional
organization.
The Light Support Package (LSP) provides support to the management
capacity of AMIS and consists of 105 military staff officers, 34
police advisers, and 48 civilians, as well as material and equipment.
While the majority of the LSP had been deployed as of the end of Aug
2007, the dispatch of 36 armoured personnel carriers was still
pending. It is, however, envisioned that these vehicles will be
deployed to Darfur in tandem with an additional two battalions
provisionally scheduled to arrive towards the end of 2007.
The Heavy Support Package (HSP), to be deployed in the second half of
2007, is designed to support AMIS until the Hybrid operation deploys
and comprises 2,250 military, 721 police and 1,136 civilians at a cost
of US $287.9 million to be
Funded by the UN. Preference is to be accorded to African troops. If
no suitable African personnel are found, the UN will strive to find
capable personnel of countries acceptable to all the parties.
The Security Council had earlier approved the creation of a hybrid
United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force On 31 July 2007 to
quell the violence and instability plaguing the Darfur region of
Sudan, where hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and two
million others forced to flee their homes.
In what Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called a “historic and
unprecedented resolution,” Council members unanimously backed the
establishment of a force of nearly 20,000 military personnel and more
than 6,000 police officers.
The hybrid operation – to be known as UNAMID – has an initial mandate
of 12 months and will incorporate the existing AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS),
which has been deployed across Darfur since 2004. It will become the
largest peacekeeping force in the world.
By October 2007, UNAMID is scheduled to have its management, command
and control structures in place, and then by the end of the year it is
expected to be ready to take over operations from AMIS.
Since fighting erupted between rebel groups, Government forces and
allied Janjaweed militias in 2003, UN officials have repeatedly
described Darfur as the scene of one of the world’s worst humanitarian
crises. More than 200,000 people have been killed and the conflict has
spilled into neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).
UNAMID is tasked with acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to
support the “early and effective implementation” of last year’s Darfur
Peace Agreement between the Government and the rebels, and it is also
mandated to protect civilians, prevent armed attacks and ensure the
security of aid workers and its own personnel and facilities.
Command and control structures and backstopping for UNAMID will be
provided by the UN, and the operation will also have a single chain of
command.
While cooperation by govt of Sudan, availability of water,
infrastructure and other resources as well as funds will dictate if
the mission can be deployed within the stipulated timeframe, one
single most factor which stands out as a possible roadblock , unless
all the heads think alike, is the functioning of the proposed Hybrid
peacekeeping force.
Rodolphe Adada of the Republic of the Congo has been appointed Joint
AU-UN Special Representative (JSR) designate for Darfur to lead UNAMID.
He will report to both the UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission
Chairperson. The JSR is assisted by a jointly appointed Deputy Special
Representative designate, Henry Anyidoho of Ghana. Directives to the
JSR will be issued through the AU Peace and Security Commissioner and
the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The
day-to-day functioning of the force will be in accordance with the
concept of operations which has been jointly agreed upon by the AU and
the UN. That is, in accordance with agreements made in Addis Ababa and
Abuja in 2006, and as specified in the joint report on the Hybrid
operation from June 2007, the command and control structures for the
mission will be provided by the UN.
General Martin Luther Agwai of Nigeria has been appointed Force
Commander designate of UNAMID by the AU, in consultation with the UN,
and will report to the JSR. Prior to the deployment of UNAMID, General
Agwai will command the AMIS force. The same appointment procedure and
reporting lines will apply to the UNAMID Police Commissioner. The AU
and the UN strategic headquarters will ensure effective consultation
through a Joint Support Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) in Addis Ababa,
which will consist of a number of liaison officers and communications
equipment.
The AU experience in Ethiopia-Eritriea, Burundi, and in Sudan itself
has been of a mixed nature. While various regional organizations have
worked alongside the UN forces, either prior to or after the
deployments of a UNPK force in a mission area, with varying degree of
success, the current arrangement of proposed hybrid force is a unique
one. Even in a regular UN mandated mission the leadership has a great
difficulty keeping all its UN elements and agencies together to work
towards a common goal. Here, the SRSG and Force Commander will require
special skills to implement the planned command and control
arrangements and ensure everybody tows the designated line. It may
have been better to assign separate responsibilities to UN and AU
forces by augmenting the resources of AMIS. Soldiers wearing twin hats
of UN and AU will only add to the confusion and heartburns when it
comes to terms and conditions of the two and specially the financial
emoluments. Only time will tell if this new experiment by the UN
succeeds or the people of Darfur will have to wait even longer before
they can live in peace.
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