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US – Pak relations are based on the doctrine of necessity and short to
medium term congruence of strategic interest, particularly as these
relate to the US War on terrorism and rise of political Islam. This
contextual relevance is heightened by the developments in West Asia
and the need for the Americans to remain engaged in Afghanistan.
It is within above context Pakistan remains a key player for the US
engagement in Afghanistan, particularly in terms of logistics,
information and intelligence. In addition there is a growing belief
within the administration that it is a strategic imperative to wean
nuclear Pakistan away from the path of Islamic extremism toward
enlightened moderation. Failure to do so could result in Jihadi or
extremist fringe elements gaining an upper hand in Pakistan with all
the attendant consequences. Such a perspective is based on the
American belief that “Islamization is a force to reckon with in
Pakistan and the military is the ultimate institution able to prevent
the country from going down the path of a Taliban – style Islamic
revolution...
It is for this reason ever since 2002 election, US has done almost
everything possible to retain Musharraf in power behind the façade of
civilian rule. What is also noteworthy is that this perception has
been deliberately and carefully cultivated by the Pakistani regime
itself. Having rigged the elections in 2002 Pakistani spin doctors
gave a twist to these accusations by first acknowledging that Islamist
victory in NWFP and Baluchistan was partially engineered, and
subsequently came out with an explanation that final results surpassed
their imagination. Underlying theme being uncontrollable Islamic
forces could possibly get unleashed in the entire country if
international pressure went too far. The whole idea was to obtain
breathing space from the US pressure as also to fine tune domestic
agenda both aimed at strengthening the advantage to Musharraf.
Seen in the above context the 2007-2008 election are unlikely to be
any different. Despite the fact that political changes in the US as a
result of congressional elections have put Musharaff’ duplicity in
sharper focus, particularly with US Congress passing a legislation
that will seek certification from US President that Musharaff is
abiding by his commitments to counterterrorism as a pre requisite to
any US assistance or arms sales, as also the recent tough talking by
both the US Vice president and the Secretary of Defence, all available
indications nonetheless point toward the fact that US is unlikely to
do little more than call in question Musharaff behaviour more as a
performa exercise, in fact US is expected to countenance Musharaff’
perfidy in retaining both his Uniform and Presidency.
US remains caught up in a catch 22 situation. On the one hand
Pakistani support and base facilities together with CI operations in
FATA are critical to its war against Taliban and Al Qaida, on the
other it is under increasing pressure from NATO forces and allies to
call in question President Musharraf’s duplicity.
Criticality of War in Afghanistan
War in Afghanistan in some sense is becoming even more critical for
the Americans than in Iraq. This is based on the premise that defeat
in Afghanistan will unleash strong Islamist backlash, with untold
convulsions in Pakistan with every chance of Jihadi’s gaining an upper
hand. Such a scenario could result in Jihadi/fringe elements getting
control of nuclear weapons, a truly holocaust scenario that is even
acknowledged by both policy analysts and State Department officials in
the US.
In geopolitical terms this will mean abandoning South Asia and in fact
Central Asia as well given the fact that Americans at best only have a
toehold in Central Asian region. This would leave the vacant strategic
space for the Chinese to usurp in collaboration with Russia, making
Pakistan as the lynchpin of Chinese “greater neighbourhood strategy”
and the front line state now of the Chinese, added to above is the
question of Iranian nuclear ambitions. A defeat in Afghanistan will
not only leave the field open for the Iranians to follow their nuclear
ambitions, but provide greater salience to growing Shia – Sunni
divide. Seen in the context of developing scenario in West Asia,
adverse developments in Afghanistan have the makings of a first rate
scenario with the portents to push the entire region on to the verge
of awful instability.
Given the above somewhat exaggerated but eminently possible
perspective it is unlikely that the Americans will quit and run. This
means America will need to fine tune its policy on Pakistan. On one
hand it will need to prevent Musharaff from carrying out his perfidy
with Islamist elements beyond a point that could destablise him.
Second America will need to create additional leverages to force a
more restraining role on Pakistani ruling elite to prevent their self
centered policies from exacerbating socio economic divide and
distributive justice. Failing which Musharff’s attempts at weakening
the institutionalization of Islam in Pakistani state will fail,
providing a fillip to increased Islamisation of Pakistani society as a
sort of social crutch.
On the fillip side Pakistan’s ability to contain Taliban is
increasingly being questioned. U.S. and NATO force commanders have
openly castigated Musharraf for not containing Islamists and making
deals with Taliban as acts of political opportunism. In fact recent
reports reveal ISI having made deals with Mullah Dadullaha, a
prominent warlord of Helmand Province in SW Afghanistan, aimed at
providing muscle to the Taliban spring offensive. Despite
protestations to the contrary Pakistani establishment (Musharaff –
Military – ISI) has not given up on seeking strategic depth in
Afghanistan. Intent of these activities aimed at promoting Taliban is
to force NATO to sue for piece and broker power sharing deal with
Karzai, through pro Pakistan warlords. Treaty with North Waziristan is
also to be seen from the same perspective i.e. as a concession to
Taliban to support its wider strategic goals. It is in above backdrop
Army’s dual role in combating terrorism and supporting MMA is coming
into question, in a policy of running with the hares and hunting with
hounds.
ISI’s complicity in sheltering Taliban and supporting their activities
in Afghanistan needs to be viewed from the perspective of its
motivations based not only an Islamic fervour, but on longstanding
view that support to Taliban buys Pakistan influence and strategic
depth in Afghanistan. They see Western engagement as a ‘Transient
Phase’ and are keeping options open for Post Western withdrawal phase.
In addition there is cozy nexus between Intelligence Agencies and
religious parties. While religious parties provide ISI with recruits
and support Taliban, ISI rigs votes for these parties. Basic issue is
that given the close relationship between the religious parties, ISI
and the Taliban, Musharaff is unlikely to do or will be able to do
anything to break this nexus.
Implications of current trends on Future US-Pak Relations
As highlighted above US remains caught up in its own contradictions.
On the one hand Pak support in the prevailing scenario particularly
when it has burnt its bridges with Central Asia is critical, on the
other its leverages with Pakistan are increasingly reducing. As a
consequence, we will see repeat of 2002 in the 2007- 08 general
elections. President Musharraf will be duly elected as the President
of Pakistan without having to give up his uniform. Americans apart
from making perfunctory noises will endorse the arrangement.
On Taliban front, Musharraf is unlikely to give up its Islamist
constituency for its strategic and political relevance. However, he
will continue to make all kinds of pledges to root out Islamic
extremism, without getting his armed forces involved in any
substantial manner in bloody CI operations. Deployment of so called
80,000 troops on CI Operations by the Pakistani army is perhaps the
biggest scam. Pakistan is at best making half hearted attempts in
containing Islamist forces in the tribal belt of NWFP, for the reasons
already discussed. Secondly having been comprehensively defeated by
battle hardened tribal it has little stomach to get involved yet
again. The charade of undertaking large scale Counter Insurgency
operations and deals with Taliban is likely to be perpetuated, on the
basis of TINA (there is no alternative) factor.
As a result the localization of Taliban in certain pocket of NWFP and
hounding them in Baluchistan is part and parcel of Musharraf’s
‘Dealing with Islamist’ strategy. This will continue, with ISI being
the main player. Musharraf is also aware that US and NATO forces
ability to raise the ante in terms of Trans border operations is
extremely limited and if attempted beyond a degree could mean rupture
in relations which the Americans can ill afford. As a consequence
American/Western ability to restrain Musharraf will continue to remain
limited.
There is another factor, which restrains Americans hand. They appear
to have bought Musharraf line of ‘after me the deluge’ hook line and
sinker. In fact one of the scenarios that is reportedly ever so often
painted to the American diplomats and politicians is the possible loss
of control over nuclear weapons and their falling in jihadi hands.
This is one issue on which ‘Americans’ are extremely worried and
concerned. This in their view is the ultimate wild card.
US policy analysts also appear to be concerned about the fact that
post Musharraf Pak could once again lapse into instability with Army
yet again becoming the rallying point, bringing to naught the so
called experiment of enlightened moderation and guided democracy. They
appear to be distinctly uncomfortable with such a scenario on account
of growing unpopularity and diminishing leverages. This also needs to
be seen from the perspective of the American engagement in
Afghanistan, which is likely to extend well beyond the present decade.
Musharraf is cleverly leveraging American limitation to its advantage.
On one hand he cleverly drawing political support from Islamists, MQM
and MMA while marginalizing the mainstream political parties,
simultaneously it is using ISI to retain control over Islamists and
keep the religious leaders in check, in what can be called finally
balancing strategy.
On the other hand he is keeping the military happy through induction
of state of art weaponry from US and medium to high technology from
China. There as an apparent attempt to stop the decline in
conventional military balance with India. New package from US includes
36 F-16 and 60 upgrade kits for the existing F-16, Huey Cobra attack
helicopter will all weather flying capability, P-3C Orion, maritime
reconnaissance aircrafts, PGM’s and standoff attack weapons, improved
avionics for existing aircrafts etc. Above weapon procurement is part
of the US 5 billion dollar package, which Musharaff successfully
negotiated with Washington. What should be a matter of concern from
Indian perspective is that it is completely India centric acquisitions
with little relevance for war on terrorism.
In geo-strategic terms, US engagement of Pak needs to be seen as an
attempt to check unrestrained Chinese influence, ensure Islamist
forces are kept under surveillance and use presence in Balochistan to
maintain surveillance over Iran. Americans also appear to be realising
the importance of Gwadar, toward this contract for port operation to a
Singapore firm may not be a purely commercial deal but an attempt to
keep a check on developments in sensitive Makran coast.
Implications for India
India needs to disabuse itself from the fact that it has any leverage
in weaning Pakistan away from US-Indo-US strategic partnership
notwithstanding. If at all dehyphenation of Indo-Pak relations appear
to be on Pakistan’s terms. Consequently India cannot use US as an
leverage in Indo –Pak relations. If at all US will maintain an even
handed approach without jeopardizing its interests in Afghanistan.
Consequently little shift in US policy toward Pakistan is expected in
the short to even medium term.
A fundamental issue that comes to fore is will change in India’s
Afghan policy to a more proactive engagement including support to ISAF
operations induce a shift in US policy. Answer is most likely no as
the two are mutually excusive, with little correlation. Such a policy
could benefit bilateral Indo- US relations but not relations with
Pakistan.
In fact it is well neigh possible that Pakistan could leverage
American support to obtain a better deal on Kashmir or build US
pressure for early settlement. What is important from the Indian point
of view is the likelihood that both the major players in South Asia
i.e. US and China could tilt in Pakistan’s favour in resolution of
Indo- Pak standoff. There is need for critical analysis of emerging
dialectic of US-Pak relations and its impact Indian options while
evolving our negotiation strategy.
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