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Sino-Indian Relations Puzzle: Fitting in
the Pareechu Lake Issue
Mr
Narendra Kumar Tripathi |
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A very interesting characteristic pervades much of the discussion on
Sino-Indian relations in India. It is of "unease", both who see China
as an adversary or as friend are equally afflicted. The advocates of
adversarial relationship discomfit over the inadequate recognition and
response to the ascent of China. While the friends disquietude is over
explaining away the real concrete evidences of China's belligerent
actions. One such issue was of the Pareechu lake controversy. In fact
most of the strategic analysts in India largely analyse the
Sino-Indian relations as being hostage to the boundary issue, which if
solved will push this relation on to a frictionless plane. Or the
clash is over status and prestige between a perennially emerging great
power and an already emerged great power. It is hardly recognised that
India and China do not only share boundaries or competing territorial
claims but also very large river watersheds. Which makes India
strategically vulnerable for the river water supply, as China is in
the control of upstream areas. Pareechu lake was formed of one such
river, Sutlej or Langchen Khabab in the year 2004.
The news of an artificial lake on the Chinese side of border
threatening lives and property in the areas of Himachal Pradesh
generated "unease" in the Indian establishment. The predominant thrust
was over explaining away the incident as naturally caused or at a very
generic level due to the environmental degradation plaguing the earth
in the form of global warming. Despite the Chinese insistence on its
ecological causes, there was pattern to the whole issue, which implied
otherwise. Predictably Indian side was found unaware of the formation
of such a big obstruction reported to be around eighty metre wide and
one hundred and fifty metre thick. India boasts of state of the art
satellite capability but which couldn't collate the occurrence.1
It was China only who informed India of the landslide but only after
one month of its occurrence. The Chinese response to the whole crisis
was very symptomatic of the Chinese strategic practice that is of
ambivalence. Despite Indian requests to allow the experts to examine
the topographical details of the lake formed and its cause, visa was
denied by China, generating unease among China watchers.
The strategic and otherwise implications of the whole issue are fairly
long term. At the very basic level it did threaten the loss of life
and property around 350 villages of which eight were evacuated.
However in a fairly long term perspective it was a test case for China
to test the reaction and vulnerability of Indian establishment to the
efficacy or threat of "environmental bomb". Indian reaction was
bumbling at one side and focused on prevention and mitigation of
disaster on the other. This is more insidious implication of the whole
Pareechu lake controversy since China is aware of the environmental
vulnerability of India. There are reports that China with the help
from International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu, is extensively mapping the Himalayan region. Raising the
spectre of China using Himalayan glaciers as a weapon, which is
dangerous for water flow will combine with the gravitational force to
acquire a particularly potent force2. The vulnerability is
also more since China faces severe water scarcity coupled with that
Tibetan Plateau can be its major source of water. Himalayas is a
source of some of the major rivers of India viz., Indus, Sutlej and
Brahmaputra (Tsangpo). It is also stressed by some analysts that in
the long term Pareechu lake can reduce the flow of Sutlej to India.
Further the formation of Pareechu has rendered unviable the Nathpa
Jhakri Project for the tremendous increase in silt inflows. The 1500
MW Nathpa Jhakri Power Project was commissioned in the year 2003. Due
to the siltation it has not been working to its full capacity or
closure of the turbines. As it happened in the year 2004 its
underground water turbines got stuck due to massive flow of silt. This
was really surprising as the Project was commissioned in the year 2003
only. Despite the various generic causes of the massive increase in
silt, one of the reasons put forward by the experts is that increase
in silt flows might have been due to the dumping of the road building
wastes in the river3. It is not improbable since it is well
known that China has embarked on road building spree in the Tibetan
region.
The circumstances surrounding the whole controversy to the Pareechu
lake issue points to the Chinese culpability. Nevertheless it is
certain that China has embarked on a massive construction drive in the
Tibetan region. India's recognition of Tibet as an integral part
of China will prove to be strategically myopic. China has
constructed a thousand kilometre long railway line between Golmuz and
Lhasa. According to analysts, there are various dimensions to it.
Firstly, China has sets it sight on the 2008 Beijing Olympics as part
of the exercise. China wants to develop the region for tourism.
Secondly, China wants to rapidly integrate Tibet in the rest of China
predominantly through demographic change .The earlier settled Han
Chinese were moving out of Tibet for they were finding its
climatic conditions hard. With building of metalled road networks and
rail lines, it is sought to make it easier for them to adjust. Hence
the reports that the explosions were the cause of debris build up
appear very plausible4.
Conclusion
The strategic implications for India are profound. The historically
nourished idea that the Himalayas was an impregnable fortress providing
security to India may increasingly come into question in the twenty
first century. This will destabilise one of the strongest strategic
coordinates of Indian strategic calculus. Commenting on Indian
nuclear explosions of 1998, Dr. Van Evera of MIT remarked thus, "truth
is, the Himalayas are between you two, and China's never coming over
the Himalayas". In fact Himalayas could become the Achilles heels of
Sino-Indian relations. India needs to watch out.
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Notes
| 1. |
National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA),
Hyderabad is the nodal agency collecting satellite imagery. The
issue triggered mutual blame game, where its director told a
news agency that it has given information rather satellite
imagery in the second fortnight of July much earlier than the
Chinese. Though they privately admit that analysis of each and
every image is not their job particularly images across borders. |
| 2. |
Avilash Roul points out that Himalayas are
prone to the glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) which can
affect India for its downstream topography. United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that there are 44 glacial
lakes in Nepal and Bhutan which can become GLOFs. See Avilash
Roul, "Environmental Threat beyond McMohan Line",
No.3,September12,2004,http://www.sspconline.org/prnt_article.asp?artid=art2. |
| 3. |
The normal permissible limit for the silt
flows is 5,000ppm (parts per million),in the aftermath of the
Pareechu lake floods in 2005 it shot up to 151,000 ppm and even
when the floods subsided it was around 20,000 to 30,000 ppm. In
a study of twenty five years between 1972 and 1996 it has been
seen that silt above the permissible level stays only for four
or five days .But in the last two years this has been happening
for around two months. See "A Dam Squib on Silt Route", Outlook,
10 October 2005. |
| 4. |
Tibetan Government -in-exile based in
Dharamshala made the same claims that extensive developmental
work in the region is the cause of the artificial lake .See
"Tibetans say dangerous lake result of China's developmental
work",August 15,2004, www.phayul.com. |
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