|
Modernisation of China’s PLAAF
has to be viewed in context of PRC’s overall security environment,
National Defence Policy, its military strategy and then the need for
development of strong capabilities in air and space which would be
sub-sets in the overall development of Beijing’s comprehensive
national power. China’s latest white paper on defence released in
December 2006 and the earlier one issued in 2004 have laid down
benchmarks and timelines for development of military and economic
power in a coordinated fashion. The three step strategy outlined in
their defence policy is:-
|
(a)
|
Lay solid foundation by 2010.
|
|
(b)
|
Make major
progress by 2020
|
|
(c) |
Reach the
strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and
being capable of winning informationized wars by mid-21st
century. |
It has been emphasized in the White
Papers of 2004 and 2006 that PLA has to fight local wars under
conditions of informationization. This term has replaced the erstwhile
term of fighting ‘local wars under high tech conditions’, which had
been in force for over ten years. The new precept places great stress
on the importance of information warfare (IW) and information
technology (IT) based Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) albeit with
some distinctive Chinese characteristics.
Further, its overall policy of ‘active defence’ does not exclude an
offensive intent in order to retain military advantages of initiative
and surprise. While articulating PLA’s implementation of military
strategy of active defence, the White Paper says “The Air Force
aims at speeding up its transition from territorial air defence to
both offensive and defensive operations, and increasing its
capabilities in areas of air strike, air missile defence, early
warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projections.” Earlier in
2004 paper the overall stress was on information operations,
anti-missile weaponry and automated command and control systems.
Electronic Warfare (EW), reconnaissance and strategic mobility are
niche capabilities which are being improved upon. The overall aim is
to build an “Air Force which is appropriate in size, sound in
organizational structure and advanced in weaponry and equipment and
which possesses integrated and complete array of information support
and operational means”.
PLA has also come to the conclusion that its technology gap with the US
military and other modern militaries of the world needs to be plugged
with speed. China is laying increased emphasis on asymmetric,
non-linear and ‘leap- ahead’ technologies and wants to ‘build a strong
military by means of science and technology’. And it is in the field
of information warfare and technology intensive and power projection
arms like Air Force, Navy and Second Artillery Rocket Forces where it
is laying increased emphasis. It was for this reason that Chiefs of PLAAF and PLA Navy were included in CMC as members in 2004. General
Qiao Qingchen is the ninth commander of PLAAF since 1949. This indicates
that an air force chief remains at the top for more than five to seven
years which may have both beneficial and non-beneficial aspects in
running the PLA AF.
In January 2005, Political Commissar of PLAAF at Chengdu Military
Region, Lt. Gen. Liu Yazhou had stated that when a nation grows strong
enough, it practices hegemony. The sole purpose of power is to pursue
even greater power. Further, during the interview he opined, “It
was both our misfortune and fortune to historically co-exist with the
US military. We are unfortunate that the US is so powerful, and we are
fortunate because of the very same reason: because we have a potential
rival. Having rival means that we have an object of reference, and we
have an aim in our march forward, which in turn gives us momentum”.
He also stressed on the use of talented man power.
While considering modernization of PLAAF it is not only necessary to
reflect on the new aircrafts and weapon systems being inducted but
also on the leadership, doctrinal changes, organizational structures,
training and profile of the manpower.
It is believed that three changes in doctrinal guidance have occurred
since 1999 which have imparted impetus to the present reforms in PLAAF.
Firstly, PLAAF revised (in 1999) its “Campaign Gangyao” which provides
classified doctrinal basis and general guidance on how the PLAAF would
fight future campaigns. Secondly, in 2001 PLAAF revised its Training
Guidance Concepts. These consisted of 16-Characters Guidelines (of
four characters each) which translate into:-
|
(a) |
Fight the way
you train.
|
|
(b) |
All training
would be opposition force training.
|
|
(c) |
Discipline is
essential.
|
|
(d) |
And use science
and technology as the basis for all training. |
In 2002, PLAAF revised its Outline
for Military Training and Evaluation (Junshi Xunlian yu Kaohe Dagang)
or ‘dagang’ in short. This volume of classified documents, supported
by dozen of regulations, provides real details of how PLAAF trains.
One of the PLAAF’s methods for reducing high number of staff officers
in various HQ s was to downgrade the five air corps (kongjun jun) and
restructure six corps level bases (jidi) as command posts. PLAAF has
total of 12 CPs which includes two in each region with none in Jinan
MR. PLAAF has four subordinate branches (aviation, SAMs, AA Artillery,
and AB forces) and all have seen structural changes in the past
decade. Number of Air Divisions seems to have been reduced from a high
of 50 in 1980s to 30.
PLAAF: Equipment Profile and IW Capabilities
Some of the modernization trends in PLA Air Force are outlined below:-
|
(a)
|
PLAAF also
has intentions to upgrade its Su-27 fleet. Two Russian firms are
in the run for the contract for providing improved engines.
PLAAF had received its first and second batch of Su-27s in 1992
and 1996. It is likely to purchase 52 engines with 26 Su-27
being upgraded in first phase in 2007-2008 and 26 later in
second phase. Further, Russians expect that PLAAF would
eventually upgrade 273 fighter aircrafts with new engines and
these would be a mix of Su-27, Su-30 and J-11 with an overall
contract budget of US $ 2 billion.
|
|
(b) |
Comparison/cost-benefits analyses of J-10’s capabilities with
F-16’s performance may reveal that F-16’s costs could be very
exorbitant compared to the additional benefits gained. Some
reports indicate that J-10 can deliver 80 percent of F-16’s
performance/capabilities.
|
|
(c) |
Major deals
of aircrafts for strategic airlift, in-flight refueling and for
strategic bombers occurred after joint Sino-Russian military
exercise Peace Mission in August 2005 where these aircrafts took
part in the manoeuvres and their capabilities were showcased by
the Russians.
|
|
(d) |
Su-33 would
arm the three carrier battle groups that, according to Chinese
press reports are on track to be ready in a little more than a
decade. Should these fighters receive a maximum Russian upgrade,
then the PLA Navy could possess fighters that in important
respects would be superior the U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F, the dominant
U.S. Navy combat aircraft for the foreseeable future.
|
|
(e) |
LS-6
Thunderstone PGM (a 440 kg bomb) has been developed for
stand-off precision attack missions on ground targets by the
PLAAF. Final testing was completed in October 2005. It has a
glide range of 48 kms with launch altitude of 800 meters and 60
kms with a launch attitude of 11,000 meters. Another PGM
developed by Luoyang is LT-2 Thunder Power, a 500 kg Airborne
Laser Irradiation Pod, Day/Night Pod or a Ground Laser
Irradiation Device.
|
|
(f) |
Air Force is
developing capabilities in Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS), airborne early warning, and ECM aircrafts and UAVs.
Shaanxi Y-8 has been designed for special EW, ELINT and ECM
missions. This aircraft was first observed in operation in
summer of 2004 and it is believed that some of its equipment may
be from the US Navy’s EP-3 ELINT aircraft that made emergency
landing in Hainan in April 2001. Another version of Y-8 aircraft
is ‘Balance Beam’ airborne early warning aircraft that is meant
for tactical ISR, EW and ELINT missions.
|
|
(g) |
PLA has EW as
key element of its ‘Three Attacks and Three Defenses’ strategy
(attack stealthy aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters;
defend against precision strikes, electronic warfare, and enemy
reconnaissance) to meet requirements of ‘local war under high
tech conditions’ which has now progressed to ‘local war under
informationalised conditions’. Both military and civil sectors
are actively exploring IW concepts which could lead to
developing a corps of network warriors to defend China’s
telecommunication, command and information networks while
uncovering vulnerabilities of adversaries’ networks.
|
|
(h) |
PRC has
completed one million kilometeres of fiber optics line and
communication infrastructure called “Eight Horizontal Grids and
Eight Vertical Grids” supported by satellite, ground mobile
receiving stations and ground to air data links . With
technologies obtained from Western countries and by exploiting
its booming commercial information technology and tele-
communications sector it has improved the quality of its
military programmes. PLA has acquired and deployed a wide
variety of air, sea and land based intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to enhance its ability to
detect monitor and target military activities in Asia and West
Pacific Ocean. Some of the latest programmes include
electro-optics, synthetic aperture radar, over the horizon
radars, and surveillance systems that can detect stealthy
aircrafts |
Development of Air Infrastructure
in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
There are five airfields in Tibet and 15 around Tibet. New airfields
at Shiquanhe and Bayixincun are being construction. Gonga and Pangta
airfields are being upgraded to handle 1.1 million and 1.0 million
respectively i.e. 2.1 million transients per year. Ten new airports
are planned to be constructed in the next five years. Construction of
Nyingtri Airport (Linzhi) located in SE TAR, one of the key projects
enumerated in the tenth Five -Year Plan period (2001-2005), is in
progress. It will accelerate the growth of the economy and provide
boost to the tourist industry in Linzhi. Construction of an airfield
at Bayixincun, in Central TAR opposite Arunachal Pradesh has been
reported.
Establishment of TAR International Airlines is presently under
consideration in Tibet. TAR Airlines will replace the South-West China
Airlines, which presently operates all flights from TAR to Mainland
China and on the Lhasa-Kathmandu route. A domestic air service within
TAR is also planned and necessary infrastructure is being developed in
Lhasa. As per recent reports air traffic to TAR has been increasing by
20 percent annually due to greater number of tourists and businessmen
visiting the region. Such developments would progressively increase
the air induction capability into TAR. Boeing aircrafts have been
specially modified to meet the high altitude requirements. Plans to
open Delhi – Lhasa route is also under consideration.
Upgradation of airfields would increase induction and build up
capacity of PLA up to air Heads. With greater air to air refueling
capability, the radius of action as well as payload of all aircrafts
will increase. The capacity will further increase for air transported
operations after induction of 40 x IL-76 and upgradation of
airfields, which is in progress.
Combined with its expanding space power as demonstrated by China’s
anti-satellite test in January 2007 and laser-illumination of some of
the US satellites in 2006, PLA’s aerospace power capabilities are
gaining momentum of their own. While cross Straits balance has already
improved in favour of PRC and presents a challenge to Taiwan and its
allies, the air power balance across the Himalayas is fast eroding to
the detriment of India. Necessary steps need to be taken to keep a
favourable balance of aerospace power to maintain peace and
tranquility along Sino-Indian border because weakness may invite
aggression.
|
