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There is a great deal of concern about the exact attitude of Beijing
towards proliferation of weapons and their technology. Beijing on its
part has sought to address these concerns by increasing it
participation in international non proliferation regimes and issuing
export control regulations. Doubts have been expressed regarding
Chinese remonstrations over their ignorance about such proliferated
sales. PRC has been accused of being a passive assenter to such deals
while some believe PRC entities acted on their own in these matters.
In 1985 the Chinese and U.S. governments signed a Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement (NCA) that, when enacted, would allow American firms to
apply for licenses to sell nuclear reactors to China. The desire to
gain certification spurred Beijing to take several actions to
demonstrate a commitment to nonproliferation. Consequently, the
disclosure of sale of ring magnets to Pakistan compelled Beijing, in
May 1996, to publicly reiterate its NPT and IAEA commitment that
“China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities.” Early 1998 saw Clinton Administration certifying that
China had met the conditions for enacting the NCA. American companies
had begun thus to obtain licenses to supply nuclear reactors to China.
In 1992 China signed the NPT , which required that any Chinese
(peaceful) nuclear technology transfers and their recipient facilities
be placed under IAEA safeguards, but did not require that the states
importing the technology be under full-scope safeguards. On 10
September 1997, China implemented regulations on nuclear export
controls which permitted the nuclear exports to facilities under IAEA
safeguards. On 16 October 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee (on
nuclear trade). As far as MTCR is concerned, China agreed to its
Guidelines but not to the Annex that specified a common list of
controlled items. China has not joined the PSI. In January 2004, China
applied to join the 40 member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In the
opinion of many, China with its record of non compliance to non
proliferation on joining NSG would lend to compromise of the integrity
of an important nonproliferation regime.
China’s sale of unsafeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan could be used
in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. Impositions of sanctions were a
dilemma for the US due to consideration for American corporations
doing business in China. Later, the then US administration officials
stated that sanctions would be not placed on either China (or
Pakistan) as China had promised to provide assistance only to
safeguarded nuclear facilities. China is also said to have sold a
“special industrial furnace” and “high-tech diagnostic equipment” to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. High temperature
furnaces are said to be used to mold uranium or plutonium. The deal
was allegedly made by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation.
The same conglomerate was said to have sold the ring magnets too.
China is said to be the main hand in building a nuclear power plant in
Chasma and was also suspected of helping Pakistan to build an
unsafeguarded, plutonium-producing reactor at Khushab, in 1994.
Operational since 2001, the Chashma reactor has IAEA safeguards but
not full scope safeguards. China also signed a contract to build a
second nuclear power reactor (Chashma-2) in Pakistan on 5 May 2004.
This contract was signed right before a decision by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) on China’s membership.
On April 6, 1998, Pakistan first tested its nuclear-capable Ghauri
(Hatf-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is based on the
North Korean No Dong missile. China has assisted Pakistan with
development of the Shaheen-2 two-stage, solid-fuel MRBM. Despite the
PRC’s November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge, in early 2001,
PRC company reportedly delivered 12 shipments of missile components to
Pakistan’s Shaheen-1 SRBM and Shaheen-2 MRBM programmes.
There have been controversial PRC nuclear deals with Iran pointing to
an Iranian nuclear weapon programme. PRC technicians built
electromagnetic isotope separation system, for enriching uranium at
the Karaj nuclear research facility. Experts from China have worked at
a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium
enrichment) near Isfahan. Since 2000, Iran is said to be building a
secret uranium enrichment plant at Natanz with technology for gas
centrifuge enrichment from Pakistan (Khan Research Laboratories) – a
country that received nuclear cooperation from China. China has also
supplied Iran with 1.8 metric tons of natural uranium. There is also
an Iranian-PRC contract to extract uranium ore in Yazd.
China has delivered perhaps hundreds of missile guidance systems and
computerized machine tools to Iran sometime between mid-1994 and
mid-1995, as also sold land-, sea-, and air-launched antiship missiles
and patrol boats some of which are equipped with C-802 missiles. Iran
has test-fired PRC air-launched, anti-ship cruise missiles. They were
C-801 missiles fired from F-4 fighters. They allegedly helped Iran to
develop a new ground-launched anti-ship cruise missile with a range of
about 310 miles. There are also reports of three of the PRC entities
sanctioned in May being engaged in “conventional weapons-related
cooperation with Iran.
US in fact had briefed China on U.S. classified intelligence about
Iran’s development of the Shahab-3 missile that could deliver a
nuclear warhead. It is based on North Korean Nodong MRBM. On 22 July
1998, Iran first tested the mobile Shahab-3 missile. The U.S.
intelligence has been actively involved in monitoring transfers of
precursor chemicals and chemical-related equipment from China to
Iranian organisations affiliated with the military or the
Revolutionary Guards.
The idea of having the IAEA refer the case of Iran’s to the UNSC was
not acceptable to China. The latter has energy deals with Iran to fuel
continued rapid economic growth to contain social unrest. Some
progress in China’s cooperation on proliferation issue was observed
when on 4 February China was one of 27 countries that voted at the
IAEA to support a resolution to report Iran to the UNSC. One question
is whether any international sanctions on Iran would cover oil
exports.
Since 1998, there have been confirmations of PRC assistance to North
Korea’s missile programme. Pakistan reportedly shared with North Korea
nuclear expertise in exchange for North Korean nuclear know-how.
China’s nuclear technology has indeed indirectly contributed to North
Korea’s nuclear weapons programme through Pakistan, since China was
the “principal supplier” to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.
There are also questions about China’s knowledge about the
Pakistani-North Korean Trade. It must be noted that the PRC and DPRK
militaries had high-level contact just before both the missile tests
of August 1998 and July 2006. The PLA has denied information about and
leverage over those tests. As of now, China is the one country that US
could use to persuade North Korea to give up the bomb. How well China
wishes to fare and will fare is yet not clear. Pyongyang after all
relies heavily on economic support from China.
PRC technology transfers have grave implications for secondary, or
retransferred, proliferation, since North Korea reportedly has
supplied technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
Beginning in 2000, public reports appeared on PRC assistance to
Libya’s missile programme. Once Libya agreed to dismantle its nuclear
weapons programme, investigators found in the material turned over to
them, a Chinese nuclear warhead blueprint that was originally given to
Pakistan.
A Pentagon report in 2001 said that PRC firms may have also
contributed equipment and technology to Syria’s liquid fuel missile
programme.
The Policy
China needs to recognise nonproliferation for its own national
interests and develop stronger export controls. Their weapons
proliferation activities have continued and repeated assurances have
proved to be unreliable. It is doubtful if trade in sensitive nuclear
weapons and missile technology can continue without the knowledge of
the PRC government and/or its military. After all, state-owned and
defense-industrial enterprises are the “sequential proliferators.” It
is generally believed that the PRC entities “remain involved with
nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and Iran, while, “in some
cases,” the entities are involved without the PRC government’s
knowledge.
The 20003 White Paper on “China’s Nonproliferation Policy and
Measures” endorses multilateral nuclear transfer control regimes and
specifies the roles of various agencies involved in the process and
the criteria for granting approval for proposed transfers of nuclear
technology.
Perhaps China has not been forcefully pressed on weapons
nonproliferation as a priority issue as yet. In relation to the US and
their partial efforts at curbing such proliferation, China has tried
to link the proliferation issues with U.S. conventional arms sales to
Taiwan.
There have been debates about U.S. using satellite exports to gain
China’s cooperation in missile nonproliferation. President Clinton’s
National Security Council, had proposed something on these lines in
return for effective PRC missile export controls.
Some argue for a cooperative approach, rather than sanctions to handle
such proliferation. Sanctions could in fact stigmatise the country on
whom it has been applied. Shrewd diplomacy may deter proliferation but
then it depends on the country that is targeted. China is one country
that will have to be cornered to accept such pressures. Diplomacy
alone is not enough. Perhaps, as one author says, China would be more
cooperative if they drew up the rules. China sought to enjoy the
international respectability that came with committing to support
international nonproliferation guidelines. Ironically, it sought to
reap the under-the-counter political and economic benefits of
violating these guidelines. However, this cheating did more harm than
good to China’s opportunities for increased cooperation with the
United States and other countries that value nonproliferation. The
Chinese have made serious efforts to curtail nuclear proliferation
proscribed by widely-accepted international guidelines, and some
Chinese officials appear dedicated to supporting in deed the
nonproliferation principles. Chinese erratic ways with proliferation
may not help in their efforts towards economic modernization.
The level of dedication to proliferation again varies depending on
political and economic interests.
Dr Sudha Raman is a research Coordinator with the United Service
Institution of India-Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation
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