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One
of the most perplexing issues of Indian Foreign Policy is deciphering
the present character and future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations.
India needs to take a re-look at the strategic contours of the
bilateral relationship on the coming visit of Chinese President Hu
Jintao in November 2006, when he is expected to sign around 12
agreements with India. Despite the year 2006 being designated as the
‘Year of Friendship’, mutual suspicions persist. India’s goal of
emerging as a great power is crucially dependent on the grand strategy
of dealing with the rising China. India has taken some very pertinent
actions in fostering of the relationship. Like signing of the
declaration on India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity in May 2005 during the visit of Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao. Or mechanisms setup to deal with the vexatious border
problem. Most importantly the opening of the Nathu La Pass trade
exchanges. However, it should be added that even though these
developments represent a supposedly ‘high point’ in the bilateral
relationship, yet they have their limitations. The Strategic
Partnership is vacuous, as the Sino-Indian relations are far from a
normal friendly bilateral relationship to be fit to talk of a
strategic partnership.
The
Chinese foreign policy is too strategically savvy to forge a strategic
partnership with India. India and China compete for the great power
status especially in the region and the world as a whole. These two
Asian countries are talked of in the same breath as rising, yet their
geo-strategic position and status is far from comparable. Even a
cursory analysis of international politics discourse gives a far
higher status to China than to India. In a general overview of the
attributes of the power it unambiguously comes out that China is a
greater power than India. In the Joint Statement signed by Indian PM
Dr Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005, had
the statement which said ‘the Chinese side also reiterated that India
is an important developing country and is having an increasingly
important influence in the international arena.’ ‘An important
developing country’ is the maximum recognition, which China is willing
to give to India. While China is a permanent member of UN Security
Council, with veto powers, India is contesting for a Secretary
General’s position, which is generally held by small countries.
India’s candidature for the UN Secretary General position amply showed
not only ad-hocism pervading in the Indian Foreign Policy
establishment but absence of strategic thought in India. The Indian
support for Shashi Tharoor, despite his great personal achievements,
was more a support for a well-connected individual than attempts at
projection and pursuit of India’s national interests. The vote against
Shashi Tharoor, was by one of the most bandied ‘natural ally’ of India
viz., US. It showed Indian strategic establishment’s poor ability to
predict behaviour even of its closest friends. Similarly, ideas of
strategic partnership with China are far fetched from reality.
The
strategic partnership envisaged in the declaration is more rhetorical
than substantive. Sino-Indian relations have an inevitable rivalry
built into it. China’s foreign policy has wonderfully adapted to the
changing times, yet at its core it still has belief in the
supercilious Middle Kingdom complex. In its hierarchical conception of
international order, it sees itself as the core, deserving obeisance
from the neighbouring countries. India also has beliefs in its
destined role of regional power and global power. Thus the quiet
competition is bound to be there. Further the bilateral relations are
complicated by the close relationship between China and Pakistan.
China has played a major role in augmenting military capabilities of
Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capability in a large part
owes its development to Chinese clandestine help. This ‘all weather’
friendship will endure itself or rather get enhanced in the changing
dynamics of international politics. The intractable dispute of Kashmir
between India and Pakistan is unlikely to resolve itself amicably in
the medium term, hence the bilateral relations will continue in the
old trajectory. Thus, this trilateral relationship is forged in a zero
sum calculus. The China-Pakistan nexus will continue to be important
for the partners. The importance has been enhanced due to the Indo-US
Nuclear Deal, China is apprehensive of the strategic implications of
the deal. It sees the deal as an active enlistment of India for the
strategic encirclement of China. In China’s strategy of overcoming
this encirclement, Pakistan plays an important part. It was
recognition of this that China and Pakistan agreed on a Treaty of Good
Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation during Premier Wen Jiabao’s
visit. This is the first treaty between China and a South Asian
country.
Indian strategic establishment should realise that path to tackle
Islamabad goes through Beijing rather than Washington. Indian foreign
policy is still in denial, over this geographical fact. US policy for
the region has been a part of the larger global strategy, which Henry
Kissinger pointed out as of preventing dominance of the Asia by any
one regional power. Hence its engagement with Pakistan has waxed and
waned in accordance with its larger strategic goals and interests.
This instead of addressing insecurity of Pakistan vis-a-vis India
enhances it. Further this paroxysmal engagement results in more arms
flows as happened recently with $ 5 billion of arms aid to Pakistan by
US. This infusion of arms into the sub-continent has given rise to the
viewpoint in India that, it is losing its conventional advantage with
Pakistan. However, the attempt is not to overlook China’s support of
Pakistan. But the future lies in increasing economic stakes for
Pakistan, in this China could be the most important player. In fact,
China and Pakistan are deliberating over forming of a Free Trade Area
among them. China is involved into a massive building of
transportation infrastructure in Pakistan. A more ambitious project
than of Karakoram Highway built in the 1970s has started in 2001
focusing on constructing of Gwadar Port. In fact total financial
commitment of China to modernization of transportation in Pakistan has
been around $1.5 billion. Despite the hostile strategic implications
for India in the geo-political terms, the geo-economics could be in
India’s advantage.
The
idea is not to overlook the strategic implications of the Gwadar port
or the Chinese efforts for modernization of the transportation
infrastructure in its western periphery. As a matter of fact it must
be stated that deep harbour port at Gwadar will give China a staging
ground for power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean. This
port is a potent symbol of China’s attempt at having a permanent
presence in the Indian Ocean and throwing a string of pearls around
India. Or Chinese lines of transportation to Central, South-west and
South Asia will be the conveyors of influence in the strategic region.
It could be argued that the China is pursuing geo-strategy under the
guise of geo-economics. India’s strategy should be to engage China
both geo-strategically and geo-economically. India has predominant
security interest in the Indian Ocean Region and it could not be
allowed to deteriorate by the outside powers. The predominant aim in
pursuing bilateral relations should be that the Sino-Indian relations
should acquire a wider expanse, that is, geo-strategy should be
pursued through geo-economics. Sino-Indian trade has grown to the
amount of $ 18.7 billion, in the year 2005. According to the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in this
year 2006, it is expected to cross $ 20 billion. However, despite the
burgeoning trade with positive balance of trade for India, there are
apprehensions and restrictions in India on Chinese entry into many
areas of business. Indian strategy should be to desist from India
becoming to China what Pakistan or Bangladesh is to India in terms of
economic cooperation.
The
Sino-Indian economic cooperation is especially desirable for the
economic benefits its produces, but also increasing economic
cooperation might reduce the dissonance in the strategic field.
Further Chinese massive help to Pakistan in terms of development of
transport infrastructure and other economic cooperation will in a way
alter the strategic discourse in South Asia, which is inordinately
dominated by realist discourses of power and terrorism. It is in
India’s interest to engage outside powers especially on two issues of
economic cooperation and terrorism. India need not be sceptical about
the expansion of SAARC with China and Japan joining it, as it will
give thrust to economic cooperation in the region. Secondly,
international discourse has become intolerant of terrorism, and
outside engagement will put pressure on Pakistan to desist from
exporting terrorism.
The Pakistan strategic establishment which has courted outside
intervention in the region throughout its history is now on back foot.
It apprehends that outside engagement in the region is going in
India’s favour. The strategic advantage India is having should be
exploited to the full. It is of utmost advantage to India that the
discourse in the South Asian politics should move from realist power
politics to the wider and deeper economic engagement. India and China
have convergence on the economic engagement. Though ‘all-weather
friendship’ between Pakistan and China is a worry for the strategic
establishment in India, but a slight metamorphosis in the relationship
is taking place, which can be termed as ‘hollowing out’ of the
relationship. The most prominent example in favour of this argument
can be cited is that China refused to endorse Pakistani position on
the Kargil. Indian foreign policy should aim at engaging China
economically and without letting down guards over the Indian Ocean
region. A slight ‘strategic tension’ may be even in India’s interest
as it provides strategic leverage vis-a vis Indo-US relations, but it
would be imprudent to let the relationship be marred by mutual
suspicion on matters of history.
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