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With new realities replacing old ones, the United States---the
reigning hegemon---faces myriad challenges. In its effort to maintain
supremacy in a world that is witnessing the rise of other major
powers, Washington is relentlessly following a policy of ‘engagement’.
The February 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review (which sets the defence
agenda of the US administration every four to five years), in keeping
with this US objective, very appropriately submits that, “building
partnership capacity invigorates US efforts and acknowledges that
future challenges can be met only through the integrated use of all of
the instruments of national power and through the relevant
contributions of their international partners”. With this serving as
the backdrop, the United States is attempting to carve out a strategic
partnership with India in order to remain engaged with the region as a
whole.
While the trajectory
of the Indo-US relations have been moving up since 2000 with the visit
of the then US president Bill Clinton, the terrorist strikes on 11
September 2001 necessitated the United States to push forward its
engagement efforts with India. Post- September 11 attacks, the US
realised Asia’s emergence as the fulcrum of global politics and the
crucial role that India could play as an important pole in the
continent’s strategic landscape. One of the first, and crucial step,
signaling the opening of a new chapter in Indo-US ties was the
Joint Declaration issued by the two countries during the eartwhile
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Washington D.C. in
early November 2001. The Declaration underlined the areas of future
cooperation envisaged by the two nations setting the future direction
of the relationship.
The next landmark cooperation was the Next Step in
Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004. Both the countries
through NSSP agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas:
civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high
technology trade. In addition, they also decided to expand their
dialogue on missile defence. Cooperation in these areas, it was
agreed, would deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between the
two nations, and increase stability in Asia and beyond.
A prognosis of the
cooperation in several areas between the US and New Delhi demonstrates
that no hard ground was broken as far as the relationship between the
two was concerned until 2005. It is the Joint Statement of July
18, 2005 that set the new course of Indo-US relations. Indeed, out of
this Joint Statement only flowed the civil nuclear cooperation
which represents the most decisive step on the part of the United
States in demonstrating its readiness to treat India
differently---from a nuclear pariah to a partner.
The US President’s
visit to India in March 2006 further reiterated his administration’s
support of India’s ascent to a great power status. The last few months
have witnessed incessant debates over the civil nuclear deal. While
the Bush administration did break the mold by finding a nuclear modus
vivendi with India, it also realized that it was a difficult task,
given that India was an ‘independent deomcracy’ that had no past
record of security or economic dependence on the United States. This
definitely made India a unique case to handle.
The Indo-US strategic
ties seem to have transformed over the years and the partnership is
sure to continue. The changed atmospherics have altered the equations
between the two estranged democracies of the Cold War so much so that
though the Pakistan factor continue to influence the relationship
somewhat, yet the renewed focus on Pakistan has done little to disturb
new trends in Indo-US engagement. Nor have domestic political changes
in India undermined it.
New Delhi’s relevance
to Washington has increased given the new geopolitical shifts that are
unfolding on the international landscape. The partnership has been
long overdue. However, it is intriguing when one attempts to decipher
the relationship as it has been shaping up post September 11, 2001.
From ‘estrangement’ to ‘partnership’, the association has had
interesting landmarks that have helped in consolidating the
relationship.
Given such a close
partnership, one is compelled to delve into the factors that have
contributed towards such a firm association. Simply put, it is
probably based on a foundation of shared democratic values and
institutions, a belief in the importance of market forces as the
engine of economic growth, and a convergence of national interests.
While neither side appears to be seeking a full-fledged alliance, both
Washington and New Delhi are keen to forge strategic ties for reasons
listed below:
1.
India is perhaps the only thriving democracy in a volatile South Asia.
Its democratic credentials accord it a political stability which makes
it a more reliable country in the region.
2.
India’s strategic location—in the centre of Asia, astride the
frequently traveled Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) linking the
Middle East and East Asia, makes India particularly attractive to the
US military.
3.
US-India partnership would thus help secure sea-lanes—Both Washington
and New Delhi share a particular interest in ensuring free navigation
through the Indian Ocean. The massive naval expansion, the upgrading
of the Andamans base, the growing ties with Japan, Vietnam, and
Singapore, the large-scale exercises with the US Navy – are all
supposedly for the protection of commercial shipping.
4.
India as a counterbalance to China—Reports suggest that the US wants a
“friend in 2020 that will be capable of assisting the US military to
deal with a Chinese threat.” Ashley Tellis corroborates this further
in his Policy Brief #38 titled South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy
on the Subcontinent where he categorically states that “India
represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a partner and
not a formal ally” and will ‘hedge’ against growing Chinese
capabilities, through a mix of domestic exertions and external
balancing. According to the QDR 2006 China “has the greatest potential
to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive
military technologies that could overtime offset traditional US
military advantages absent US counter strategies”.
5.
India future economic powerhouse---The BRICS Report points out to
India’s rising economic fortunes and global ambitions that makes it a
‘potential world power.’
6.
India’s expanding knowledge-based industries offers a greater
incentive for the United States to engage India.
Unlike his predecessors, President George W. Bush has demonstrated a
strong desire to transform relations with India, guided by his
administration’s understanding of the geopolitical challenges likely
to confront the United States in the twenty-first century.
Given India’s significance in the current international system, the
two countries have, in the last six years attempted to strengthen the
partnership by taking the relationship to a new level. The US
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice had stated that “as
the nations of Asia continue their dramatic rise in a rapidly changing
region, a thriving, democratic India will be a pillar of Asia's
progress, shaping its development for decades. This is a future that
America wants to share with India, and there is not a moment to
lose”.
The Indo-US relations have indeed come a
long way since President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000. The
close partnership that is evolving between the two countries reflect
an agenda that has come to encompass shared global interests and
concerns ranging from Iran and China to nuclear cooperation and
nanotechnology. The transformation in Indo-US relations would probably
help change the global balance of power with India being an important
element in the global matrix.
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