Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and the Armed Forces

Brigadier RR Bali

INTRODUCTION

Warfare is increasingly becoming a complex phenomenon. Militaries and political establishments, which can better manage the complexities of war, are more likely to be on the winning side. The changing face of the international order and the erosion of the concept of nation-states is also affecting directly the context in which wars will be fought and conflicts are likely to arise. The evolution of India as a nuclear power has brought to the fore the complex inter-linkages between nuclear and conventional deterrence and likelihood of war.

Nuclear weapons do not prevent LIC that may rage within a nation supported by external powers. It does not also prevent border conflicts that may threaten vital national interests, however defined by the protagonists themselves. Nuclear weapons do not help recapture of lost territory. The weapons do not necessarily compel a nation to behave in any particular manner even if threatened by their possible use. Witness for example the ineffectiveness of the attempted US intervention in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, or its inability to coerce Iran into releasing its staff held hostage in Teheran. Nuclear weapons do not, in any way, replace or reduce the requirement of conventional forces. It is this emerging reality that needs to be kept in mind.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the relevance of maintaining large standing armies after the overt nuclearisation of India and its potential adversaries.
 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Occurrence of war and conflict has been a universal phenomenon during the evolution of various civilisations and societies. Adopting the generation approach based on distinct milestones in the evolution of military technology, warfare has transited five generations and is now passing through the sixth one. Earlier generations of warfare evolved from infantry and cavalry forces fighting without firearms (first generation), then with firearms (second generation) and then to rifled arms and tube artillery (third generation). The fourth generation was introduced through auto weapons, tanks, aircraft, enhanced transport capability and signal equipment while nuclear weapons were depicted as having ushered in the fifth generation of warfare. The present sixth generation warfare is the knowledge based information warfare.

Post-World War II Trends in Warfare

A review of the global scene over the past five decades reveals that potential nuclear warfare has given way to restricted nuclear deterrence; total war has given way to limited war; and there has been a rise in irregular warfare or unconventional forms of warfare. There has been an increasing propensity on the part of nation-states to demonstrate their military power rather than actually use it. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased without actually resorting to war.

In the post 1945 period, there has been an absence of war of the scale and, intensity of World War II. There have been wars, which have been limited in nature. It also led to the belief that the era of large-scale conventional inter-state wars is over and thus inter-state wars are no longer viable instruments of policy as espoused by Clausewitz. After World War II, though the means of waging total war were available to the superpowers, such an event did not occur and is unlikely to do so. Whether it was the Korean War, Vietnam War, wars in the Middle East, Sino-Vietnam War of 1979, Gulf War of 1991, wars in the Indian sub-continent (including the 1999 Kargil conflict) and the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the concept of total war has given way to limited wars.

In the context of the Indian subcontinent, there has been no major war since 1971. One reason could be that it would be difficult to identify political objectives that would justify a total war; also it would be difficult to achieve a decisive military victory. Besides the prohibitive cost of a conventional war, it is the lack of any significant military edge in the conventional capabilities of both nations and, thus, the inability to achieve a clear and decisive military victory which has contributed to the absence of a large scale conventional war. In all the war scenarios which are painted during military exercises, the wars do not last more than two to three weeks followed by UN intervention and, thus, a ceasefire. The need to avoid a nuclear exchange is another factor which contributed to absence of war in the subcontinent.

Interlinkages : Nuclear, Conventional and Unconventional Wars

The overt nuclearisation of South Asia, and with China already being a nuclearised country, the future wars/conflicts in the subcontinent would be fought with the possibility of a nuclear exchange as the backdrop. It is being felt that nuclear weapons have contributed more to prevention of a major war rather than war fighting in South Asia. The Western media and Pakistan are propounding the theory of South Asia becoming a nuclear ‘flashpoint’ for their own political ends.

Nuclear weapons are not an extension of conventional warfighting weapons and mechanisms. They have a philosophy, an idiom and a life of their own. Nuclear weapons do deter nuclear weapons and they do affect the nature of conventional wars, albeit indirectly. The mere presence of nuclear weapons imposes caution on the adversary and has an impact on battlefield conduct. In order to avoid presenting of concentrated target, there is a greater stress on dispersion, which consequently requires an ability to concentrate quickly when required to do so for executing a conventional warfare mission. Therefore, this would translate into military structures and organisations with greater stress on mechanisation, mobility and improved means of command, control and communications.

The nuclear factor would also inhibit the attacker in planning for a deep objective in the adversary’s terrain lest the nuclear threshold is crossed resulting in a nuclear exchange, which should be avoided at all costs. However, if a conventional war does occur in the Indian subcontinent, it would have limited objectives and most likely would be of a very short duration. The operation in Kargil sector is perhaps a harbinger of the likely nature of war in the subcontinent.

As the presence of nuclear deterrence mitigates the possibility of occurrence of protracted conventional war, similarly, the presence of a credible conventional deterrence also prevents the adversary from resorting to war. The world over, the true objective of military strategies is increasingly veering towards war prevention, which sounds somewhat paradoxical. Since it was not possible for Pakistan to achieve success in a conventional war, it resorted to what is termed as low intensity conflicts (LIC). In 1987, when it had covertly become a nuclear power, it decided to launch a proxy war against India.

China’s military doctrine, on the other hand, has been more broad based and has undergone a transition from Mao’s ‘People’s War’ to ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’ and thereafter from ‘Limited, Local War’ to ‘Limited War Under High-Tech conditions’. The Chinese believe that a major war is unlikely to take place, and limited local wars are more likely.

Therefore, any future war in the subcontinent is likely to be a hybrid of the industrial age type of warfare and post-industrial age type of warfare, with emphasis on technologies and information warfare. It is less likely that a major conventional war will occur and very likely that limited local wars and conflicts will continue to occur. There are complex inter-linkages between nuclear deterrence, conventional form of warfare and unconventional forms of warfare. Thus, the Indian political and military establishment needs to be prepared for a wide bandwidth of war and conflicts ranging from highly intense, hi-tech, local or limited wars to low intensity conflicts and proxy war.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The security of a nation can be threatened in three ways; firstly a straightforward external threat from another nation or a group of nations, secondly, an internal threat which arises out of communal, caste, linguistic, ethnic and organised criminal elements, thirdly, a threat wherein both external and internal factors interact with each other. India faces all three categories of threats.

External Security Environment

International security environment will be characterised by a host of factors. Presently some of the most important ones are :-

Internal Security Environment

India, like other developing countries has to look deeper inside than outside to ensure her stability and progress. The key issues are: -
 

DOES THE THREAT OF CONVENTIONAL WAR
DIMINISH WITH NUCLEAR ACQUISITIONS
 

Nuclear Deterrence

India’s ‘minimum credible nuclear deterrence’ doctrine and ‘no first use’ policy are based on the concept of deterrence by denial, rather than deterrence by punishment. Should deterrence ever break down, India will have to pay an enormous price for a nuclear first strike by an adversary before launching massive punitive retaliation. Across the entire spectrum of conventional conflict, the first use of nuclear weapons by India does not make sound strategic sense.

China’s nuclear deterrence doctrine has been in synchrony with its conventional warfighting doctrine. It was initially based on self-defence during the era of ‘people’s war’. It gradually shifted to one of minimum nuclear deterrence during the 1960s and 1970s and now it appears to have stabilised at limited nuclear deterrence, which includes nuclear coercion. China’s limited deterrence may be defined as a concept of ‘having enough capabilities to deter conventional, theatre and strategic nuclear war, and control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war’. But the US ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ (NPR) report is triggering a new storm. The NPR’s ethos of strategy, encompassing speciality use of nukes and China’s ambitious modernisation point to a greater, not lesser role for nuclear weapons in the years ahead.

As Pakistan’s military rulers have so often emphasised, Pakistan’s rationale for its nuclear weapons is not only to deter the threat of India’s nuclear weapons but also to counter India’s conventional military superiority. Ever since the inception of its nuclear programme, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been in military custody and the country’s civilian rulers have had no control over them. It is, therefore, no surprise that Pakistan has adopted a first use nuclear doctrine. Its military and political leaders have repeatedly stated that Pakistan would resort to he early use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict to prevent its comprehensive military defeat at India’s hands and to ensure that its survival as a viable nation state is not threatened. India’s superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons.

The Validity of Deterrence

In conventional terms, the Indian military machine is clearly superior to that of Pakistan’s. But whether the superiority in force levels is good enough to score a decisive win over Pakistan remains a moot point. Though the total strength of the Indian Army is double that of the Pakistan Army, the crucial factor during conflict will be the order of battle and the execution of tasks entrusted to different formations. Experts are thinking, still reckoning as to when exactly Pakistan will reach for its nuclear option. Some feel that in case India makes a breakthrough and threatens strategic towns, Pakistan will resort to nuclear weapons, inviting retaliation in the process. Others argue that since Pakistan knows that nuclear weapons are crucial to its existence, it could resort to them early in battle in an attempt to turn the tide and also to invite outside intervention.

Military Implications of Deterrence

The military implications of our nuclear deterrence demand that the retaliatory nuclear forces must be able to carry out their primary task of engaging counter value targets in accordance with the nuclear doctrine of no first use. At the same time, the armed forces must adapt and train to operate in a conventional manner through a nuclear environment. This is like preparing for multiple disaster relief as in the case of Gujrat earthquake under warlike conditions. By training and preparing to operate under adverse nuclear conditions we will be able to demonstrate the credibility of our deterrence.

LINKAGE BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS

India – China

Though China’s conventional forces far outnumber those of India China’s problems in inducting, deploying and logistically sustaining large forces in Tibet, benefits India to enjoy a reasonable defensive capability at present and, therefore, does not need a first use nuclear strategy to deter a conventional Chinese offensive backed by nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles deployed in Tibet. However, India’s existing defensive capability is being quickly eroded as China is rapidly modernising its armed forces, raising rapid deployment divisions and improving the logistics infrastructure in Tibet: If India continues to neglect the upgradation of its conventional military capability and military modernisation by investing the grossly inadequate sum of less than 2.5 per cent of its GDP for defence, as it is doing at present, the nation may again have to suffer the ignominy of large-scale military reverses, should China choose to fight even a limited border war after completing its military modernisation.

India – Pakistan

In case exchanges with Pakistan escalate to a larger conventional conflict, as they well might, Pakistan may launch its ARN through the Shakargarh Bulge in the Sialkot sector and threaten to cut off Kashmir’s lifeline, the NH-1A between Pathankot and Jammu. If Pakistan achieved initial success, such an offensive would pose a grave danger to the security of J&K. Would the first use of nuclear weapons be a rational choice for India under such circumstances? Or would it perhaps be more prudent, to launch, one or more Indian Strike Corps counter offensives across the IB in Punjab, Rajastan and Gujarat, as General Harbaksh Singh did in 1965 with Lal Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister, to make the Pakistanis recoil from their offensive in the Jammu sector? Surely, the launching of sizeable counter offensives into Pakistan’s heartland would be a better way to relieve pressure on J&K.

Another option favoured is the ‘zero warning’ option in which Pakistan is given the credible capability of launching what may be termed as a ‘cold start’ conventional war due to the proximity of its cantonments to the IB, or by concentrating strike formations under the garb of exercises. While there may be some merit in the initial military viability of such an option, unless India strengthens its technological intelligence and human capabilities, what needs to be considered is the “day after” impact of India’s counter moves to checkmate such a Pakistani offensive. With the Indian Air Force in full flow within hours and the army formations closing in rapidly on the Pakistani units, while also simultaneously sealing the border behind them, the invaders would be hard pressed to ensure their own security and would eventually be destroyed. International opinion would also be firmly on India’s side. Any well prepared army or air force can achieve tactical surprise, as the Egyptians did during the Yom Kippur war against the Israelis in 1973. The acme of military skill lies in being able to sustain the offensive logistically beyond 48 hours and holding on to the initial gains in the face of the adversary’s reaction. It should be clear to perceptive observers that Pakistan has learnt the right lessons from its strategic blunder in Kargil during the summer months of 1999 and is unlikely to repeat such hara-kiri in a hurry.

Inherent in an Indian nuclear first strike option, as advocated by the opponents of no first use, is the Pakistani nuclear retaliation that would inevitably follow on Indian cities and military targets. Cities like Jodhpur, Bikaner, Ahmedabad, Jalandhar, Ludhiana and perhaps even New Delhi and Mumbai would be the likely targets of a retaliatory Pakistani nuclear strike. In all the above scenarios, given the limited gains that an Indian first strike may achieve and the real possibility of successful Pakistani nuclear retaliation, the answer to the first use of nuclear option by India is a resounding ‘No’. An Indian nuclear first strike would not be justified, as the costs of Pakistani retaliation would be prohibitive. Nor would it be operationally expedient. In none of the above scenarios India’s survival as a nation-state is likely to be seriously threatened.

The Undeniable Linkage

       “Nuclear Weapons are not for tactical use”
                                                 – George Fernandes

It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of ‘warfighting’. However, the close link between nuclear weapons and a nation’s conventional military capabilities is undeniable. If a nation’s conventional capability is extremely low vis-a-vis a nuclear armed adversary, it may be necessary for that nation to adopt an extreme ‘first use’ strategy to thwart a conventional military offensive that may threaten to undermine its territorial integrity and lead to its break up. This is the situation that Pakistan finds itself in at present. While India may have no intentions of launching a major conventional offensive into Pakistan, given India’s conventional superiority Pakistan has based its national security strategy on the first use of nuclear weapons to prevent its comprehensive military defeat like in 1971 and consequently, its disintegration as a nation.
 

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
ARE THERE TO STAY

Revised Strategy of War Fighting

Military strategy requires a country to structure its forces and develop concepts of operations to subserve two objectives, deterrence and warfighting. In the case of conventional forces, the same forces are used to perform both roles, while in the case of nuclear forces their role is essentially uni-dimensional and limited to deterrence. There is, of course, a great deal of literature on employing nuclear forces for war fighting, but given the inevitable escalation spiral, there is little chance of using nuclear weapons in a realistic war fighting scenario.

Conventional forces have great utility in a warfighting role, but their effectiveness in the deterrent role is severely limited. In the words of Bernard Brodie, ‘The very large number of wars that have occurred in modern times prove that the threat to use force, even when sometimes looked like superior force, has often failed to deter’. Both nuclear and conventional forces, thus, have complementary roles to play in a nation’s military strategy; with the former providing the bulk of deterrence and the latter virtually all of warfighting capability.

The Indian nuclear strategy is based on the belief that nuclear weapons cannot and should not be employed in combat. Their only task is to defend India against nuclear threats or coercion.

Affordability Factor

Mere possession of nuclear weapons is not enough. The nation should be able to project credible deterrence. India’s ‘Nuclear Doctrine’ is silent on many aspect of strategy, policies, targeting plans, command and control, which still needs to be worked out. We also lack a compatible C412 and multiple delivery systems. Moreover, can India afford to incur the massive expenditure required to build in nuclear deterrence of the type that western powers have. As a principle, our nation believes in conventional forms of warfare and in the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort, and that too when our adversary subjects us to a first (nuclear) strike. Such a policy of ‘no first use’ is not only logical but it is the most restrained one. However, in no way it permits us to prune down on the conventional forces, especially in the light of military capability of our adversaries on our northern and western fronts. The only way to dissuade them from thinking about a conventional war against us is by having a visible dissuasive capability, both nuclear as well as conventional. India’s nuclear threshold is comfortably high, leaving ample scope for conventional warfare, especially limited border wars of the kind the Kargil was. In that sense, the nuclear factor has had little impact on the military balance and stability in the region. India still plans to fight and win a long conventional war, with its nuclear capability acting as a deterrent only. It has been opined that even if Pakistan did use nuclear weapons first, India could still continue to fight and win the war without responding in kind. It would, therefore, be pertinent to note that India will have to ultimately maintain the conventional deterrence.

Can Conventional Deterrence be Wished Away

Undoubtedly, a review of the global happenings over the past few decades illustrate that the threat of a nuclear war has diminished the chances of an all out conventional war. But has this nuclear deterrence relegated the significance of the armed forces for a nation like India? The obvious answer is a definite ‘no’. Perhaps the consequent change is only in the form of warfare - the all out conventional war has given way to limited war. On the contrary, the nuclear world has further complicated the whole concept of warfare and has made it obligatory for nations to have strong armed forces to effectively combat these irregular warfare or unconventional forms of warfare. There has been an increasing tendency on the part of nation states to demonstrate their military power even if they will never be using it in actuality. These days, the use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously. This significance of the armed forces is true especially in the case of Indo-Pak and to some extent even in case of Sino-Indian relations. The Brass Tacks manoeuvre by India in 1987 and the subsequent Zarb-e-Momin by Pakistan are examples. Hence, the very risks of Indo-Pak conflict and the modernisation by China makes it imperative for us to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. Lessons drawn from wars of 1948, 62, 65, 71 and the recent Kargil conflict have never suggested any cuts in conventional forces.

It may be risky predicting that all out conventional wars are unlikely; not being prepared for these may be catastrophic.

Present Defensive Deployment

India shares long stretches of International Border with Pakistan, China and other smaller neighbours in Western, Northern and North-Eastern frontiers which need large size forces for protection specially during hostilities. With China and Pakistan we also share the LAC and the LoC which necessitates altogether different doctrines for defensive and aggressive punitive response.

The LoC Environment. Of necessity, we have to occupy the LoC all along the front, both to show the flag as also to ensure that the enemy does not make any ingress in areas not occupied by us. This assumes special significance in view of the ‘Porous’ nature of the border, since gains made by any one side are likely to be permanent. This calls for additional security measures on the LoC protection duties.

In order to maintain the sanctity of the LoC, it would be incumbent for the defences to be based on the line itself so as to defend it during war-time and prevent encroachments during peace time. This compels deployment of large number of troops in linear pattern. Numerical superiority over enemy is an important factor for aggressive punitive action against a well entrenched enemy. It was experienced during Kargil Operation that certain attacks which commenced with one rifle company could finally be completed with the induction of four to five infantry units.

Requirement of Force Level. Requirement of force level for aforesaid security and safety of the country both from external sources and internal disturbances can be discussed as under:-
 

Proxy War. The conventional army has contributed immensely in taming the menace of proxy war. For how long it will continue is anyone’s guess, ipso-facto the requirement of large size army.

Against Terrorism. History has shown that both US and Israel have silenced such states that fomented terror in a decisive manner based on strength of their overall, vastly superior and mammoth standing, army. India likewise will continue to have greater dependence on army to fight the menace.

The Verdict

India’s military strategy should encompass a strong and viable defensive posture of dissuasion and a potent and credible conventional counter offensive capability of deterrence. Conventional capability to detect in time, and degrade enemy penetration/intrusion, as also strong mobile reserves, to achieve total annihilation of enemy. Simultaneously, strong and credible offensive capability that can inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy at the place of own choosing is also critical. The mere threat of our offensive should deter the enemy from attempting any exploits. To back up this conventional deterrence, nuclear dissuasion in the form of strong counter nuclear offensive with the capability and will to achieve total extermination of the adversary is also essential. Such a military capability will in effect deter our adversary – Pakistan. For modern Indian Army, manoeuvre and seizure of initiative are important fundamentals and it is towards attainment of this capability vis-a-vis our adversary that will guarantee our national security. However, in no way it implies that our nuclear capability is a waste, in fact the nuclear capability is as important as the conventional one. One of the wisest decisions India took since independence, was to overtly go nuclear. This overdue decision has helped raise India’s international stature, and its security interests, and anchor its policy in pragmatism. Gone are the days when India reveled in moral posturing. However, before using nukes, we will first need state-of-the-art conventional weapons.

India’s ultimate aim should be to possess a lean, mean and technically oriented army with a lethal punch. We should always remember that our military strategy revolves around a posture of ‘dissuasive deterrence’ vis-a-vis Pakistan and ‘dissuasive deference’ towards China. Against Pakistan we cannot afford to make any cuts in the existing favourable force level and the pro-active military stance. This is essential for achieving the intended strong dissuasive deterrence capability against Pakistan. We can at no instance disregard Pakistan’s singular aim of wresting Kashmir from India. The main hidden ingredient of her military strategy, which we invariably fail to appreciate, is its intended last blow to India in the form of a conventional military strike when it perceives India to be politically weak and indecisive, and with the threat of nuclear conflagration in the background and/or opening of the second front with China with whom we are yet to start planning our forces. To effectively avert this catastrophe, it is imperative that we maintain highly capable conventional armed forces.
 

The pace and initiative in the development of conventional weapons has never slowed down. The constant upgradation in conventional war machinery has been the endeavour world over. The nuclear element has its own, important, place in international relations. A nation like India, aspiring to be a future ‘super power’ has to constantly increase its strategic space the world over, which demands a mix of deterrences, both nuclear and conventional forces. Our adversaries have to be kept guessing about our options. India needs to have a judicious mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence depending upon the target; but combating should be based on preponderance of conventional forces. Nuclear forces cannot replace conventional ones. An operation based on single or limited option suffers from assured failure. Nuclear deterrence is a must, but an all-out nuclear exchange is all but out (there has been no nuclear war in last 50 years). A strong, modern, capable, dynamic and highly versatile conventional force is the right option. To take advantage of changing global strategic framework, which is working to India’s advantage, we need to maintain large standing armies.